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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for jbogard/mediatr

Mitigation Strategy: Input Validation and Sanitization (Per Request Type)

  • Description:

    1. Identify all Request Objects: List all classes implementing IRequest or IRequest<TResponse> (your commands and queries within MediatR).
    2. Define Validation Rules: For each MediatR request object, create a corresponding validator (e.g., using FluentValidation). Within the validator:
      • Define rules for every property.
      • Use appropriate validation rules (e.g., NotEmpty(), MaximumLength(), GreaterThan(), EmailAddress(), regex).
      • Consider custom validation for complex business rules.
    3. Register Validators: Register all validators with your dependency injection container.
    4. Implement Validation Behavior: Use a MediatR pipeline behavior (e.g., a custom ValidationBehavior<TRequest, TResponse>) to automatically apply validation to all MediatR requests. This behavior should:
      • Retrieve validators for the current request type.
      • Execute the validators.
      • If validation fails, throw a ValidationException (or custom type) before the MediatR handler executes.
    5. Sanitization (If Necessary): If sanitization is required, do it before validation, using a trusted library. Prioritize validation.
    6. Test Thoroughly: Write unit tests for each validator.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Malicious Input: Attackers send crafted MediatR requests with invalid data to exploit handler vulnerabilities (e.g., SQL injection, buffer overflows, XSS). Severity: High
    • Data Corruption: Invalid data can corrupt data stores. Severity: Medium
    • Unexpected Behavior: Handlers behave unpredictably with unexpected input. Severity: Medium
    • Denial of Service (DoS): Large/complex input could overwhelm the system via MediatR. Severity: High

  • Impact:

    • Malicious Input: Reduces exploitation risk by rejecting invalid MediatR requests before handler execution.
    • Data Corruption: Prevents invalid data persistence.
    • Unexpected Behavior: Ensures MediatR handlers receive only valid input.
    • Denial of Service (DoS): Mitigates some DoS attacks by limiting input size/complexity within the MediatR pipeline.

  • Currently Implemented: [Placeholder: e.g., "Implemented for CreateProductCommand and UpdateProductCommand using FluentValidation and a custom MediatR ValidationBehavior."]

  • Missing Implementation: [Placeholder: e.g., "Missing for DeleteProductCommand, GetAllProductsQuery, and all other MediatR request types. Need validators and registration."]

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Pipeline Behaviors (MediatR-Specific)

  • Description:

    1. Review Existing Behaviors: Examine all custom MediatR pipeline behaviors.
    2. Minimize Behavior Logic: Keep MediatR behaviors simple and focused. Avoid complex logic or state.
    3. Secure Behavior Order: Ensure MediatR behaviors for security checks (validation, authorization) are registered early in the MediatR pipeline.
    4. Avoid Sensitive Data in Context: Do not store sensitive data in the MediatR pipeline context.
    5. Thorough Testing: Write comprehensive unit/integration tests for all custom MediatR behaviors, focusing on security.
    6. Prefer Built-in Behaviors: Use well-tested, built-in MediatR behaviors (or from trusted libraries) instead of custom ones when possible.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Security Bypass: Malicious/poorly designed MediatR behaviors could bypass security checks in handlers or other behaviors. Severity: High
    • Code Injection: Attackers might inject malicious code into the MediatR pipeline via custom behaviors. Severity: High
    • Data Tampering: MediatR Behaviors could modify request/response data. Severity: High
    • Denial of Service (DoS): Inefficient MediatR behaviors could cause performance issues or DoS. Severity: Medium

  • Impact:

    • Security Bypass: Ensures security checks are consistently applied within the MediatR pipeline.
    • Code Injection: Reduces code injection risk by limiting the attack surface within MediatR.
    • Data Tampering: Protects MediatR request/response data integrity.
    • Denial of Service (DoS): Improves performance/resilience via efficient MediatR behaviors.

  • Currently Implemented: [Placeholder: e.g., "Only a custom MediatR ValidationBehavior is implemented. It's reviewed and tested."]

  • Missing Implementation: [Placeholder: e.g., "Review the need for other custom MediatR behaviors. New behaviors require audit and testing."]

Mitigation Strategy: Avoid Command/Query Object Overloading (MediatR Context)

  • Description:

    1. One Command/Query Per Operation: Create a separate MediatR command/query object for each operation.
    2. Clear Naming: Use descriptive names for MediatR command/query objects (e.g., CreateUserCommand, GetUserByIdQuery).
    3. Specific Validation: Implement validation specifically for each MediatR command/query object.
    4. Avoid Shared Properties (When Unrelated): If operations share properties but have different validation/authorization, create separate MediatR objects.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Logic Errors: Reduces risk of using the wrong MediatR object or applying incorrect validation/authorization. Severity: Medium
    • Security Bypass: Prevents exploiting overloaded MediatR objects to bypass checks. Severity: Medium

  • Impact:

    • Logic Errors: Improves code clarity/maintainability, reducing errors.
    • Security Bypass: Makes it harder to exploit ambiguities in MediatR object usage.

  • Currently Implemented: [Placeholder: e.g., "Most operations have dedicated MediatR objects, but some older code might reuse objects."]

  • Missing Implementation: [Placeholder: e.g., "Review all MediatR command/query objects and refactor any overloaded ones."]