Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
43 lines (36 loc) · 4.45 KB

File metadata and controls

43 lines (36 loc) · 4.45 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for jstedfast/mailkit

  • Description: A Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacker intercepts the connection and prevents the upgrade to a secure TLS connection after the STARTTLS command (SMTP, IMAP, or POP3). Communication proceeds in plaintext.
  • MailKit Contribution: MailKit provides the STARTTLS functionality and TLS/SSL support. The vulnerability arises from the application's failure to enforce TLS and properly validate certificates using MailKit's provided mechanisms. This is a direct interaction with MailKit's connection handling.
  • Example: An application uses client.Connect("imap.example.com", 143, SecureSocketOptions.StartTls); but doesn't check client.IsSecure after connection or handle exceptions during the TLS handshake.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of email credentials and content.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce TLS: Always require TLS. Use SecureSocketOptions.SslOnConnect if possible. If using SecureSocketOptions.StartTls or SecureSocketOptions.StartTlsWhenAvailable, verify that client.IsSecure is true after connecting.
    • Certificate Validation: Rigorously validate the server's certificate using MailKit's event handlers (e.g., SmtpClient.ServerCertificateValidationCallback, ImapClient.ServerCertificateValidationCallback). Check hostname, validity, trusted root CA, and revocation status (client.CheckCertificateRevocation = true;).
    • Error Handling: Handle SslHandshakeException and other connection exceptions. Never proceed with an unencrypted connection.
    • Protocol Selection: Use client.SslProtocols to specify only strong TLS versions (e.g., Tls12 | Tls13).
  • Description: An attacker sends an email with a deliberately complex or malformed MIME structure to consume excessive resources (CPU, memory), causing a Denial of Service.
  • MailKit Contribution: This attack directly targets MailKit's MIME parsing engine. The vulnerability lies in how MailKit handles (or fails to handle) these malicious structures.
  • Example: An email with thousands of deeply nested MIME parts is sent. MailKit's parser consumes excessive memory and CPU while processing it.
  • Impact: Application unavailability.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Resource Limits: Configure MailKit's ParserOptions to set limits:
      • ParserOptions.MaxMimeDepth: Limit the nesting depth of MIME parts.
      • ParserOptions.MaxHeaders: Limit the number of headers.
      • Consider using a custom MimeParser with even stricter limits if needed.
    • Regular Updates: Keep MailKit updated to benefit from performance improvements and any fixes related to MIME parsing.
    • Timeout Mechanisms: Implement timeouts for MailKit's parsing operations (e.g., using CancellationToken with client.Inbox.FetchAsync()).
    • Monitoring: Monitor MailKit's resource usage during parsing.
  • Description: An attacker sends a specially crafted MIME structure to exploit a vulnerability in MailKit's MIME parser, achieving Remote Code Execution. This is theoretical but represents the highest impact.
  • MailKit Contribution: The vulnerability would reside directly within MailKit's MIME parsing code.
  • Example: A hypothetical vulnerability exists in MailKit's handling of a specific, malformed Content-Type header. An attacker exploits this to inject code.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regular Updates: Absolutely essential. Keep MailKit updated to the latest version to receive security patches. This is the primary defense.
    • Fuzz Testing: Consider fuzz testing MailKit's MimeParser with a variety of malformed MIME inputs to proactively identify potential vulnerabilities. This is a more advanced mitigation.
    • Security Audits: If the application is highly sensitive, consider a professional security audit that specifically examines MailKit's integration and usage.