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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for lucasg/dependencies

Attack Surface: 1. Dependency-Based Code Injection (Supply Chain Attack)

  • Description: Malicious code is injected into the application through a compromised or malicious dependency (either direct or transitive). This is the most direct and severe threat related to dependency management.
    • How Dependencies Contribute: The library's primary function is to manage dependencies, making it the direct pathway for this type of attack. The attack surface increases with the number and complexity of dependencies.
    • Example: An attacker compromises a widely-used utility library that is a transitive dependency of dependencies. The attacker injects code that steals environment variables containing API keys.
    • Impact: Complete application compromise, data exfiltration, remote code execution (RCE), system takeover, potential for lateral movement within the network.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Mandatory: Use a Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tool to identify all dependencies (including transitive ones) and their known vulnerabilities. This should be integrated into the CI/CD pipeline.
        • Mandatory: Regularly update dependencies to the latest patched versions. Prioritize security updates immediately.
        • Implement code signing and verification to ensure only trusted code executes. This helps prevent the execution of tampered-with dependencies.
        • Use a reputable package repository (e.g., the official Go module proxy) and always verify checksums (Go modules do this automatically, but ensure it's enabled).
        • Generate and maintain a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to track all dependencies and their origins.
        • Strongly Consider: Dependency pinning (with careful evaluation of the trade-offs between security and maintainability). Pinning can prevent unexpected updates to vulnerable versions, but it also requires more manual maintenance.
        • Employ least privilege principles: the application should only have the necessary permissions to perform its functions. This limits the damage an attacker can do if they gain control.
        • Implement runtime application self-protection (RASP) capabilities if feasible.
      • Users:
        • If deploying a pre-built binary, verify its integrity (e.g., using checksums provided by the developers). Do not trust binaries from untrusted sources.
        • Monitor for security advisories related to the application and its dependencies. Subscribe to relevant security mailing lists.
        • Deploy the application in a sandboxed or isolated environment (e.g., a container with limited privileges).

Attack Surface: 2. Dependency Confusion/Substitution

  • Description: An attacker publishes a malicious package with the same name as a private or internal dependency, tricking the build system into using the malicious version instead of the legitimate internal one.
    • How Dependencies Contribute: The library's dependency resolution process is directly involved. If the build system is misconfigured, it might prioritize public repositories over private ones.
    • Example: Your organization uses a private Go module named internal-auth. An attacker publishes a malicious package with the same name on the public Go module proxy. Your build system, due to misconfiguration, downloads and uses the malicious package.
    • Impact: Application compromise, data exfiltration, RCE, potential for full system control.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Mandatory: Configure the build system (e.g., Go modules) to explicitly prioritize your private repository. This is the primary defense.
        • Use explicit versioning for all dependencies, including private ones. This helps prevent accidental upgrades to malicious versions.
        • Strongly Consider: Using a private package repository that supports scoped packages (e.g., @myorg/internal-auth). Scoping makes it much harder for attackers to successfully perform a dependency confusion attack.
        • Regularly audit build configurations and dependency management practices to ensure they are secure and follow best practices.
      • Users: (Limited direct control, relies heavily on developer practices)
        • Ensure the application is built and distributed by a trusted source. Avoid downloading binaries from unofficial sources.

Attack Surface: 3. Vulnerabilities in Transitive Dependencies (Known and Unknown)

  • Description: Exploitable vulnerabilities (both known and unknown/0-day) exist in the libraries that github.com/lucasg/dependencies uses transitively. This is a broad category encompassing a wide range of potential vulnerabilities.
    • How Dependencies Contribute: The library inherently introduces a potentially large number of transitive dependencies. Each transitive dependency is a potential attack vector.
    • Example: A transitive dependency used for parsing YAML files has a known vulnerability that allows for remote code execution when processing a maliciously crafted YAML input.
    • Impact: Varies widely depending on the specific vulnerability, ranging from denial-of-service (DoS) to RCE, data breaches, and complete system compromise.
    • Risk Severity: High (can be Critical depending on the specific vulnerability and its exploitability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developers:
        • Mandatory: Use an SCA tool to continuously monitor for known vulnerabilities in all dependencies (including transitive ones). This should be integrated into the CI/CD pipeline and trigger alerts for high/critical vulnerabilities.
        • Mandatory: Regularly update dependencies to their latest patched versions. Establish a process for rapid updates in response to newly discovered vulnerabilities.
        • Use tools like go mod graph and go mod why to understand the dependency tree and identify potentially problematic dependencies (e.g., those with a history of vulnerabilities).
        • Consider using a minimal base image for containerized deployments to reduce the overall attack surface.
        • If possible, evaluate and potentially replace transitive dependencies that have a poor security track record.
      • Users:
        • Monitor for security advisories related to the application and its dependencies.
        • Apply updates promptly, especially security patches.