threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for lucasg/dependencies

Threat: Dependency Confusion/Substitution

• Threat: Dependency Confusion/Substitution

  • Description: An attacker publishes a malicious package with the same name as a private or internal dependency to a public repository. lucasg/dependencies, if misconfigured or due to a vulnerability in its resolution logic that affects how it chooses between sources, might prioritize the malicious public package. The malicious package executes arbitrary code upon installation or import.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise. Attacker gains remote code execution (RCE) with the application's privileges. Data exfiltration, system manipulation, and lateral movement are possible.
  • Affected Component: Dependency resolution logic within lucasg/dependencies specifically related to source prioritization and conflict resolution. User configuration of lucasg/dependencies regarding trusted sources.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (of lucasg/dependencies): Implement robust dependency resolution that strictly prioritizes trusted sources (private repositories) and verifies package integrity (hashes, signatures). Provide clear warnings and prevent resolution from untrusted sources if a trusted source is configured.
    • User: Configure lucasg/dependencies to exclusively use trusted, private repositories for internal dependencies. Never rely on public repositories for private dependencies. Pin dependencies to specific, verified versions and hashes. Regularly audit dependency sources.

Threat: Compromised Upstream Dependency

• Threat: Compromised Upstream Dependency

  • Description: A legitimate dependency that lucasg/dependencies manages is itself compromised (e.g., maintainer account hacked, vulnerability introduced). lucasg/dependencies downloads and installs the compromised version. The compromised dependency contains malicious code.
  • Impact: RCE, data breach, system compromise. The impact depends on the compromised dependency's role and the nature of the malicious code.
  • Affected Component: Any dependency managed by lucasg/dependencies. lucasg/dependencies acts as the conduit for the compromised code.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (of lucasg/dependencies): Implement robust integrity checks (hashes, signatures) for all downloaded dependencies. Provide mechanisms for users to pin dependencies to specific, known-good versions and enforce those pins.
    • User: Pin dependencies to specific, verified versions and hashes. Regularly update dependencies (after careful review and testing). Monitor security advisories for the dependencies you use. Use software composition analysis (SCA) tools.

Threat: Tampering with Cached Dependencies (if lucasg/dependencies doesn't re-verify)

• Threat: Tampering with Cached Dependencies (if lucasg/dependencies doesn't re-verify)

  • Description: An attacker gains access to the system where lucasg/dependencies caches downloaded dependencies. The attacker modifies the cached files, injecting malicious code. lucasg/dependencies, if it does not re-verify integrity on each load, subsequently loads the tampered dependency.
  • Impact: RCE, system compromise. The attacker's code runs with the application's privileges.
  • Affected Component: The dependency caching mechanism within lucasg/dependencies, specifically its handling of cached dependency integrity.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (of lucasg/dependencies): Mandatory re-verification of the integrity of cached dependencies (using hashes) every time they are loaded. Store cached dependencies securely (read-only for most users).
    • User: Ensure proper file system permissions. Regularly audit the cache. Consider a read-only file system for the cache.

Threat: Weak or Missing Dependency Signature Verification

• Threat: Weak or Missing Dependency Signature Verification

  • Description: lucasg/dependencies either does not verify digital signatures of downloaded dependencies, or uses a weak mechanism. An attacker can provide a malicious package that appears legitimate (e.g., a compromised or typosquatted package).
  • Impact: RCE, system compromise, as the attacker can execute arbitrary code via a malicious dependency.
  • Affected Component: The dependency download and verification process within lucasg/dependencies, specifically the signature verification logic.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer (of lucasg/dependencies): Implement mandatory strong signature verification (e.g., GPG, trusted key server) for all downloaded dependencies. Reject dependencies without valid signatures.
    • User: Ensure signature verification is enabled and configured correctly. Use only trusted key servers. Regularly update trusted keys.