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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for mahapps/mahapps.metro

Attack Surface: Malicious XAML Injection

Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in XAML parsing to inject malicious XAML code, potentially leading to code execution or denial of service.

How mahapps.metro contributes: If an application dynamically loads XAML containing mahapps.metro components from untrusted sources, the library's custom controls and resource dictionaries become part of the vulnerable XAML parsing process. Attackers can craft malicious XAML leveraging mahapps.metro elements to trigger vulnerabilities during parsing.

Example: An application allows loading custom UI snippets (XAML) that can include mahapps.metro controls. A malicious user provides a crafted XAML snippet with a MetroWindow definition that includes a property trigger executing arbitrary code when the window is rendered.

Impact: Remote Code Execution, Denial of Service, Information Disclosure.

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Eliminate Dynamic XAML Loading from Untrusted Sources: Avoid loading XAML from external or user-controlled sources.
  • Strict XAML Sanitization and Validation: If dynamic loading is unavoidable, implement robust input validation and sanitization of XAML content before parsing, specifically disallowing or carefully controlling usage of mahapps.metro specific elements and properties.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Run the application with the minimum necessary permissions to limit the impact of potential code execution.

Attack Surface: Resource Dictionary Manipulation

Description: Modifying or replacing Resource Dictionaries used by mahapps.metro to inject malicious styles or resources, potentially leading to code execution, UI redress attacks, or denial of service.

How mahapps.metro contributes: mahapps.metro's theming and styling are heavily reliant on Resource Dictionaries. If an attacker can manipulate these dictionaries (e.g., through configuration files, compromised resources, or insecure settings), they can inject malicious styles or resources that are processed by the application's UI engine when mahapps.metro styles are applied.

Example: An application stores theme settings, including paths to mahapps.metro resource dictionaries, in a configuration file. An attacker modifies this file to point to a malicious resource dictionary. When the application loads and applies the theme, the malicious dictionary is loaded, potentially containing styles that trigger code execution through resource setters or event handlers.

Impact: Remote Code Execution, UI Redress Attacks (spoofing, phishing), Denial of Service.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Secure Configuration Management: Protect configuration files and settings related to mahapps.metro themes and styles. Use secure storage mechanisms and access controls to prevent unauthorized modification.
  • Resource Integrity Checks: Implement mechanisms to verify the integrity and authenticity of Resource Dictionaries loaded by the application, ensuring they haven't been tampered with. Use digital signatures or checksums.
  • Restrict Resource Dictionary Sources: Load Resource Dictionaries only from trusted and controlled locations within the application's deployment. Avoid loading from user-provided paths or external URLs.

Attack Surface: Input Validation Issues in Custom Controls

Description: Vulnerabilities arising from improper handling and validation of user input within mahapps.metro's custom controls, potentially leading to unexpected behavior, crashes, or in more severe cases, memory corruption or code execution.

How mahapps.metro contributes: mahapps.metro provides a rich set of custom controls (like Flyout, MetroWindow with custom behaviors, etc.) that might handle user input or process data. If these controls are not implemented with robust input validation and error handling, they can become attack vectors. While less likely in managed code to lead to direct memory corruption, vulnerabilities can still cause crashes or unexpected states that could be further exploited.

Example: A custom setting dialog implemented using mahapps.metro controls includes a text input field for a file path. If this input field within the mahapps.metro control lacks proper validation and allows excessively long paths or special characters, it could lead to a buffer overflow or path traversal vulnerability when the application attempts to process this path.

Impact: Denial of Service (crashes, unexpected behavior), potential for memory corruption (less likely in managed code, but possible in underlying native components or through interop), potential for further exploitation depending on the vulnerability.

Risk Severity: High

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Thorough Input Validation in Custom Controls: Implement robust input validation for all user inputs processed by mahapps.metro custom controls. Validate data type, format, length, range, and sanitize special characters as appropriate.
  • Secure Coding Practices for Control Logic: Follow secure coding guidelines when developing and using mahapps.metro controls, paying close attention to input handling, error handling, and state management within the control's code.
  • Code Reviews and Security Testing of UI Components: Conduct focused code reviews and security testing specifically on the UI components that utilize mahapps.metro controls, paying attention to input handling and data processing within these components.