Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
135 lines (112 loc) · 14.4 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

135 lines (112 loc) · 14.4 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for microsoft/garnet

Objective: Compromise Application via Garnet Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Garnet Exploitation [CRITICAL] ├───(OR)─ Exploit Network Communication Vulnerabilities [HR] │ └─── Decrypt/Analyze Intercepted Traffic (if encryption is weak or broken) [HR] │ └─── Weak TLS/SSL Configuration [CRITICAL] │ └─── Modify/Inject Malicious Data into Communication Stream [HR] │ └─── Data Injection to Cache (Cache Poisoning via Network) [CRITICAL] │ └─── Lack of Request Signing/Timestamping in Garnet Protocol [HR] ├───(OR)─ Exploit Data Handling Vulnerabilities within Garnet [HR] │ ├───(AND)─ Cache Poisoning (Data Level) [HR] │ │ ├─── Inject Malicious Data into Cache [HR] │ │ │ └─── Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Data Validation/Sanitization during Cache Insertion [CRITICAL] │ │ └─── Application Retrieves and Processes Malicious Cached Data [HR] │ │ └─── Application Vulnerable to Data Injection/Deserialization Attacks based on Cached Data [CRITICAL] │ └───(AND)─ Data Leakage from Cache │ │ └─── Unauthorized Access to Cached Data │ │ └─── Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Garnet's Authentication/Authorization Mechanisms [CRITICAL] ├───(OR)─ Exploit Garnet Software Vulnerabilities [HR] │ ├───(AND)─ Code Execution Vulnerabilities [HR] │ │ ├─── Deserialization Vulnerabilities (if Garnet uses deserialization) [CRITICAL] │ │ └─── Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Garnet's Dependencies [HR] │ │ └─── Outdated or Vulnerable Libraries used by Garnet [CRITICAL] ├───(OR)─ Exploit Management Interface Vulnerabilities (if exposed) [HR] │ ├───(AND)─ Authentication Bypass [HR] │ │ ├─── Default Credentials [CRITICAL] │ │ └─── Weak Password Policy [HR] │ ├───(AND)─ Authorization Bypass [HR] │ ├───(AND)─ Vulnerabilities in Management API [HR] │ │ ├─── Injection Vulnerabilities (Command Injection, SQL Injection, etc.) [CRITICAL] │ │ ├─── Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (if web-based interface) [HR] │ │ ├─── Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (if web-based interface) [HR] │ │ └─── API Abuse/Rate Limiting Issues [HR]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Network Communication Vulnerabilities [HR]

  • Decrypt/Analyze Intercepted Traffic (if encryption is weak or broken) [HR]

    • Weak TLS/SSL Configuration [CRITICAL]:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker performs a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack. If TLS/SSL is misconfigured (e.g., using weak cipher suites, outdated protocols, no certificate validation), the attacker can decrypt the communication between the application and Garnet.
      • Exploitation: Tools like Wireshark, SSLstrip, or custom scripts can be used to intercept and decrypt traffic. Vulnerability scanners can identify weak TLS/SSL configurations.
      • Impact: Full exposure of data exchanged between the application and Garnet, including potentially sensitive cached data, authentication tokens, or application logic.

  • Modify/Inject Malicious Data into Communication Stream [HR]

    • Data Injection to Cache (Cache Poisoning via Network) [CRITICAL]:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker performs a MitM attack and manipulates network packets exchanged between the application and Garnet. If the Garnet protocol lacks sufficient integrity checks or authentication, the attacker can inject malicious data into the cache.
      • Exploitation: Requires protocol analysis to understand the data format and injection points. Tools like Scapy can be used to craft and inject malicious packets.
      • Impact: Cache poisoning, where the application retrieves and processes attacker-controlled data from the cache, leading to potential application compromise (e.g., data injection, code execution if the application is vulnerable to processing malicious cached data).

  • Lack of Request Signing/Timestamping in Garnet Protocol [HR]

    • Attack Vector: Attacker passively captures valid requests sent from the application to Garnet. If the protocol doesn't use request signing or timestamps to prevent replay attacks, the attacker can replay these captured requests.
    • Exploitation: Network sniffing tools (e.g., tcpdump, Wireshark) to capture requests. Replay tools or scripts to resend the captured requests.
    • Impact: Replay attacks can bypass authentication or authorization checks, manipulate data in the cache, or cause unintended actions within the application if it relies on cached data manipulated by replayed requests.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Data Handling Vulnerabilities within Garnet [HR]

  • Cache Poisoning (Data Level) [HR]

    • Inject Malicious Data into Cache [HR]

      • Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Data Validation/Sanitization during Cache Insertion [CRITICAL]:
        • Attack Vector: Attacker attempts to insert malicious data into the cache through the application's normal cache insertion mechanisms. If Garnet or the application lacks proper input validation and sanitization before caching data, malicious data can be stored.
        • Exploitation: Requires understanding how the application inserts data into the cache. Crafting malicious data payloads that bypass validation checks. Common vulnerabilities include insufficient input length limits, lack of encoding for special characters, or missing checks for malicious content.
        • Impact: Cache poisoning, leading to the application retrieving and processing malicious data.

    • Application Retrieves and Processes Malicious Cached Data [HR]

      • Application Vulnerable to Data Injection/Deserialization Attacks based on Cached Data [CRITICAL]:
        • Attack Vector: The application retrieves data from the cache (potentially poisoned as described above) and processes it without proper output encoding or deserialization safeguards. If the application is vulnerable to data injection (e.g., SQL injection, command injection) or deserialization vulnerabilities when handling cached data, the attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities.
        • Exploitation: Depends on the specific application vulnerability. Common examples include:
          • SQL Injection: If cached data is used in SQL queries without proper parameterization.
          • Command Injection: If cached data is used to construct system commands without proper sanitization.
          • Deserialization Vulnerabilities: If cached data is deserialized without proper validation, and the deserialization process is vulnerable (e.g., insecure deserialization in Java, Python pickle vulnerabilities).
        • Impact: Application compromise, potentially leading to code execution on the application server, data breach, or denial of service.

  • Data Leakage from Cache

    • Unauthorized Access to Cached Data
      • Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Garnet's Authentication/Authorization Mechanisms [CRITICAL]:
        • Attack Vector: Attacker attempts to bypass Garnet's internal authentication and authorization mechanisms to gain unauthorized access to cached data. This could involve exploiting vulnerabilities in Garnet's user management, role-based access control, or authentication protocols.
        • Exploitation: Requires in-depth knowledge of Garnet's security implementation and potentially vulnerability research to find bypasses.
        • Impact: Unauthorized access to potentially sensitive cached data, leading to information disclosure.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Garnet Software Vulnerabilities [HR]

  • Code Execution Vulnerabilities [HR]

    • Deserialization Vulnerabilities (if Garnet uses deserialization) [CRITICAL]:

      • Attack Vector: If Garnet uses deserialization for internal data handling or communication, and this deserialization process is vulnerable (e.g., insecure deserialization), an attacker can provide malicious serialized data to Garnet.
      • Exploitation: Requires identifying deserialization points in Garnet and crafting malicious serialized payloads. Tools and techniques for exploiting deserialization vulnerabilities are well-documented for various programming languages.
      • Impact: Code execution on the Garnet server, potentially leading to full server compromise and control over the cache and potentially impacting applications relying on it.

    • Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Garnet's Dependencies [HR]

      • Outdated or Vulnerable Libraries used by Garnet [CRITICAL]:
        • Attack Vector: Garnet, like most software, relies on third-party libraries. If these libraries have known vulnerabilities and Garnet uses outdated versions, attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities.
        • Exploitation: Identifying Garnet's dependencies and checking for known vulnerabilities using vulnerability scanners (e.g., OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk). Exploiting known vulnerabilities often involves using publicly available exploits or adapting existing ones.
        • Impact: Impact depends on the specific vulnerability in the dependency. It can range from information disclosure to code execution on the Garnet server, potentially leading to full server compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Management Interface Vulnerabilities (if exposed) [HR]

  • Authentication Bypass [HR]

    • Default Credentials [CRITICAL]:

      • Attack Vector: If Garnet's management interface (web UI, API, CLI) is exposed and uses default credentials (username/password), attackers can easily gain access.
      • Exploitation: Simply attempting to log in with well-known default credentials for Garnet or common management interfaces.
      • Impact: Full access to the management interface, allowing attackers to configure Garnet, inject data, disrupt service, or potentially gain further access to the underlying system.

    • Weak Password Policy [HR]:

      • Attack Vector: If the management interface has a weak password policy (e.g., short passwords, no complexity requirements, no account lockout), attackers can use brute-force or dictionary attacks to guess valid credentials.
      • Exploitation: Using password cracking tools like Hydra, Medusa, or custom scripts to attempt various password combinations.
      • Impact: Gain access to the management interface, similar to default credentials, leading to potential configuration changes, data manipulation, or service disruption.

  • Authorization Bypass [HR]

    • Attack Vector: Once authenticated to the management interface (even with limited privileges), attackers may attempt to bypass authorization checks to access functions or data they are not supposed to. This could involve exploiting flaws in the access control logic.
    • Exploitation: Requires analyzing the management interface's functionality and access control mechanisms. Techniques include manipulating API requests, exploiting parameter tampering, or finding logic flaws in the authorization checks.
    • Impact: Gain access to privileged management functions, potentially leading to full administrative control over Garnet.

  • Vulnerabilities in Management API [HR]

    • Injection Vulnerabilities (Command Injection, SQL Injection, etc.) [CRITICAL]:

      • Attack Vector: If the management API is vulnerable to injection flaws (e.g., if it processes user-supplied input without proper sanitization when constructing commands or database queries), attackers can inject malicious code.
      • Exploitation: Requires identifying API endpoints that process user input and crafting injection payloads specific to the vulnerability type (e.g., SQL injection payloads, command injection payloads).
      • Impact: Code execution on the Garnet server, data breach, or denial of service, depending on the type of injection vulnerability and the API functionality.

    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (if web-based interface) [HR]:

      • Attack Vector: If the management interface is web-based and vulnerable to XSS, attackers can inject malicious JavaScript code into web pages served by the interface.
      • Exploitation: Requires finding input fields or parameters in the web interface that are not properly sanitized and inject JavaScript payloads.
      • Impact: Management interface compromise, session hijacking of administrators, potential for further attacks against administrators' browsers and systems.

    • Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (if web-based interface) [HR]:

      • Attack Vector: If the web-based management interface lacks CSRF protection, attackers can trick authenticated administrators into performing unintended actions by crafting malicious web pages or links.
      • Exploitation: Requires understanding the API requests made by the management interface and crafting malicious HTML or JavaScript to trigger these requests when an authenticated administrator visits a malicious page.
      • Impact: Unauthorized actions on the management interface performed by administrators without their knowledge, potentially leading to configuration changes, data manipulation, or service disruption.

    • API Abuse/Rate Limiting Issues [HR]:

      • Attack Vector: If the management API lacks proper rate limiting or abuse prevention mechanisms, attackers can send excessive requests to the API, potentially causing denial of service or resource exhaustion of the management interface.
      • Exploitation: Using API testing tools or scripts to send a large number of requests to the management API.
      • Impact: Denial of service of the management interface, making it unavailable for legitimate administrators.