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Attack Tree Analysis for microsoft/garnet

Objective: * Primary Goal: Exfiltrate Sensitive Data Cached by Garnet.

  • Secondary Goal: Cause Denial of Service (DoS) Specific to Garnet-Cached Data.
  • Tertiary Goal: Manipulate Cached Data (Data Poisoning). (Note: While data poisoning is high impact, the identified high-risk paths primarily focus on exfiltration and DoS).

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                     |  Attacker's Goals (Prioritized)                 |
                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                     | 1. Exfiltrate Sensitive Data Cached by Garnet   |
                                     | 2. Cause Denial of Service (DoS)                |
                                     | 3. Manipulate Cached Data (Data Poisoning)      |
                                     +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                      |
         +------------------------------+------------------------------+
         |                              |
         V                              V
+---------------------+      +---------------------+
|  Exfiltrate Data   |      |   DoS via Garnet    |
+---------------------+      +---------------------+
         |                              |
  +------+                      +------+------+
  |             |              |             |
  V             V              V             V
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
|  Exploit| |  Network| |Resource | |  Config |
| Garnet  | | Sniffing| |Exhaustion| | Flaws   |
|  API/   | | (MITM)  | | [HIGH RISK]| |{CRITICAL}|
|Protocol | |[HIGH RISK]|         | |         |
+---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
    |           |           |           |
    |           |           |           |
+---+---+ +-----+---+ +-----+---+ +-----+---+
|Exploit| |Intercept| |  Send  | |Use Def.|
|Known  | |Traffic  | |Massive | |Creds/  |
|Vulns  | |to Garnet| |Requests| |Ports   |
|(CVEs) | |{CRITICAL}| |[HIGH RISK]| |[HIGH RISK]|
|[HIGH  | |         | |        | |        |
| RISK] | |         | |        | |        |
+-------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+
    |           |           |
    |           |           |
+---+---+ +-----+---+ +-----+---+
|  Find | |  Use  | |  Abuse |
|Unpatch| |  Man- | |  Lack  |
|ed     | | in-the| |  of    |
|Server | | Middle| |  Rate  |
|[HIGH  | | Attack| |  Limiting|
| RISK] | |[HIGH  | |[HIGH RISK]|
|       | | RISK] | |         |
+-------+ +---------+ +---------+

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Garnet API/Protocol -> Known Vulnerabilities (CVEs) [HIGH RISK] -> Find Unpatched Server [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker searches for Garnet instances that haven't been patched against known vulnerabilities (CVEs). They then use publicly available exploits or develop their own based on the CVE information to gain unauthorized access to the cached data.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on patching frequency and vulnerability disclosure rate)
    • Impact: High to Very High (Direct data exfiltration)
    • Effort: Low to Medium (Exploits may be publicly available)
    • Skill Level: Intermediate (Script kiddie to someone who can understand and modify exploits)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (If using known exploits, IDS/IPS might detect. Otherwise, depends on logging and anomaly detection.)

Attack Tree Path: Network Sniffing (MITM) [HIGH RISK] -> Intercept Traffic to Garnet {CRITICAL} -> Use Man-in-the-Middle Attack [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker positions themselves on the network path between the application and the Garnet server. If the communication is not properly secured (e.g., weak or no TLS), they can passively intercept the data being exchanged. Alternatively, they use active techniques like ARP spoofing or DNS poisoning to redirect traffic through their controlled system.
    • Likelihood (No/Weak TLS): Low (If TLS is properly configured; High if not)
    • Likelihood (MITM Attack): Low to Medium (Depends on network security controls)
    • Impact: High (Direct access to data in transit; potential for modification)
    • Effort (No/Weak TLS): Low (Passive sniffing is easy if no encryption)
    • Effort (MITM Attack): Medium (Requires bypassing network security measures)
    • Skill Level (No/Weak TLS): Novice (Basic network sniffing tools)
    • Skill Level (MITM Attack): Intermediate (Understanding of ARP spoofing, DNS poisoning, etc.)
    • Detection Difficulty (No/Weak TLS): Hard (Passive sniffing is difficult to detect without specific network monitoring)
    • Detection Difficulty (MITM Attack): Medium (Network intrusion detection systems might detect ARP spoofing or unusual DNS activity)

Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK] -> Send Massive Requests [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker floods the Garnet server with a large number of requests, overwhelming its capacity to handle legitimate traffic. This prevents the application from accessing cached data, leading to a denial of service.
    • Likelihood: Medium to High (Relatively easy to execute)
    • Impact: Medium to High (Disrupts access to cached data, impacting application performance)
    • Effort: Low (Simple scripts or tools can generate high request volumes)
    • Skill Level: Novice (Basic scripting or use of DoS tools)
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium (High traffic volume is usually easily detectable; distinguishing malicious from legitimate traffic might be harder)

Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion [HIGH RISK] -> Abuse Lack of Rate Limiting [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: If Garnet or, more importantly, the application using Garnet, does not implement rate limiting, an attacker can easily send a large number of requests, exhausting resources and causing a denial of service.
    • Likelihood: High (If rate limiting is not implemented)
    • Impact: Medium to High (Disrupts access to cached data)
    • Effort: Low (Simple scripts or tools)
    • Skill Level: Novice
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (High traffic volume is easily detectable)

Attack Tree Path: Configuration Flaws {CRITICAL} -> Use Default Credentials/Ports [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The attacker exploits a Garnet deployment that uses default credentials or is running on well-known ports without proper authentication. This allows them to directly access and potentially disrupt the Garnet service.
    • Likelihood: Low (If security best practices are followed; High if not)
    • Impact: High (Allows easy access to Garnet, potentially for DoS or data manipulation)
    • Effort: Very Low (Trivial to exploit)
    • Skill Level: Novice (Basic knowledge of default settings)
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Easy (Default settings are easily identifiable)