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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for microsoft/garnet

Threat: Unauthorized Data Access via Unauthenticated Client

  • Description: An attacker connects to the Garnet server without providing valid authentication credentials. If Garnet is not configured to require authentication (or if authentication is misconfigured), the attacker can directly access and potentially modify data stored within Garnet.
    • Impact: Confidentiality and integrity breach. The attacker can read and potentially modify any data stored in Garnet, leading to data theft, corruption, or further attacks.
    • Garnet Component Affected: Authentication module (if present), access control logic (within RespServer and RStore). This is a direct vulnerability in how Garnet handles client connections and authorization.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if authentication is not enabled or bypassed)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Mandatory Authentication: Configure Garnet to require authentication for all client connections. Use strong authentication mechanisms, such as TLS client certificates (mTLS) or strong, properly managed passwords/tokens. Ensure the authentication mechanism is correctly implemented and cannot be bypassed.
      • Access Control Lists (ACLs): If Garnet supports ACLs, use them to restrict access to specific keys or namespaces based on client identity, even after authentication. This provides defense-in-depth.

Threat: Denial of Service via Connection Exhaustion

  • Description: An attacker opens a large number of connections to the Garnet server without sending valid requests or closing them. This exhausts the server's resources (file descriptors, memory, threads) allocated for handling connections, preventing legitimate clients from connecting and using Garnet.
    • Impact: Availability disruption. The Garnet server becomes unresponsive, and any application relying on it is unable to function, leading to service outage.
    • Garnet Component Affected: Network listener (TcpListener or equivalent), connection management logic. This is a direct vulnerability in how Garnet handles incoming connections.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Connection Limits: Configure Garnet (if possible) to limit the maximum number of concurrent connections from a single IP address or globally. This is a crucial defense.
      • Timeouts: Implement short timeouts for idle connections within Garnet's configuration to prevent attackers from holding connections open indefinitely.
      • Resource Monitoring: Monitor server resource usage (connections, memory, CPU) and alert on unusual spikes that could indicate an attack.

Threat: Denial of Service via Request Flooding

  • Description: An attacker sends a large volume of legitimate (or seemingly legitimate) requests to the Garnet server at a rate that exceeds its processing capacity. This overwhelms the server's internal queues and processing threads, causing it to become slow or unresponsive.
    • Impact: Availability disruption. The Garnet server becomes slow or unresponsive, impacting application performance and potentially causing a complete service outage.
    • Garnet Component Affected: Command processing logic (e.g., RespServer, RStore), potentially all modules depending on the nature of the requests and Garnet's internal architecture. This is a direct vulnerability in how Garnet handles request processing.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Rate Limiting (Garnet-Level): If Garnet provides built-in rate limiting capabilities, configure them to limit the number of requests per client or per IP address within a given time window. This is the most direct mitigation.
      • Request Prioritization (If Supported): If Garnet supports request prioritization, configure it to prioritize certain types of requests or requests from specific clients to ensure critical operations are not affected.
      • Resource Monitoring: Monitor server resource usage and alert on unusual spikes, indicating a potential flood attack.

Threat: Privilege Escalation via Garnet Vulnerability

  • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in Garnet's code (e.g., a buffer overflow, a command injection vulnerability, a logic flaw in a specific command handler, or an issue in the persistence layer) to gain elevated privileges on the Garnet server or the host system. This requires a flaw within Garnet's codebase.
    • Impact: System compromise. The attacker gains control of the Garnet server and potentially the entire host system, allowing them to execute arbitrary code, steal data, or launch further attacks. This is the most severe outcome.
    • Garnet Component Affected: Potentially any module, depending on the specific vulnerability. Vulnerabilities in core components like RespServer, RStore, the network layer, or the persistence mechanism are particularly high-risk.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Run as Non-Root: Run the Garnet server process as a non-root user with the least necessary privileges. This limits the damage if a privilege escalation vulnerability is exploited.
      • Regular Updates: Keep Garnet updated to the latest version to patch any known security vulnerabilities. Actively monitor security advisories and release notes for Garnet.
      • Input Validation (Garnet-Level): Garnet itself must rigorously validate all input received from clients, even if authentication is enabled. This is a fundamental security principle to prevent injection attacks. This validation should occur at the lowest possible level within Garnet's code.
      • Containerization: Run Garnet within a container (e.g., Docker) to isolate it from the host system and limit the impact of a potential compromise. Configure the container with minimal privileges.
      • Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing of the Garnet deployment, specifically looking for vulnerabilities in Garnet itself.