Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
51 lines (44 loc) · 5.22 KB

attack-surface.md

File metadata and controls

51 lines (44 loc) · 5.22 KB

Attack Surface Analysis for monogame/monogame

Attack Surface: Malicious Content Files

  • Description: Attackers craft specially designed asset files (images, audio, models, shaders) to exploit vulnerabilities in MonoGame's content processing pipeline.
  • How MonoGame Contributes: MonoGame's ContentManager and its underlying platform-specific implementations handle the loading and processing of various asset formats. Vulnerabilities in these handlers are the primary concern. This is directly within MonoGame's code.
  • Example: A crafted DDS image file with invalid dimensions or compression flags triggers a buffer overflow in MonoGame's texture loading code, leading to arbitrary code execution.
  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution, denial of service, information disclosure.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer:
      • Fuzz Testing: Extensively fuzz test all content loading pathways with a variety of malformed inputs. This is the most crucial mitigation.
      • Input Validation: Implement strict validation of all content file headers and metadata before processing the content. Reject files that don't conform to expected specifications.
      • Sandboxing: If possible, load and process content in a sandboxed environment to limit the impact of any exploits.
      • External Libraries: For complex formats (e.g., compressed textures, 3D models), consider using well-vetted, external libraries instead of relying solely on MonoGame's built-in handlers.
      • Memory Safety: Use memory-safe techniques when interacting with unmanaged resources within the content pipeline.
      • Regular Updates: Keep MonoGame and its dependencies updated to the latest versions to benefit from security patches.
    • User:
      • Trusted Sources: Only load content from trusted sources. Avoid downloading game assets from unofficial websites or untrusted users.

Attack Surface: Malicious Shaders (If User-Provided)

  • Description: Attackers provide malicious shader code (HLSL, GLSL) that exploits vulnerabilities in the shader compiler, graphics driver, or GPU. This is only high risk if the application allows user-provided shaders.
  • How MonoGame Contributes: MonoGame compiles and executes shaders on the GPU. While the vulnerability might reside in the driver, MonoGame provides the pathway for the malicious shader to be loaded and executed. This is a direct interaction.
  • Example: A shader designed to cause a GPU hang, trigger a driver crash, or perform unauthorized computations.
  • Impact: Denial of service, system instability, potentially arbitrary code execution (depending on the driver vulnerability).
  • Risk Severity: High (if user-provided shaders are allowed)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer:
      • Shader Validation: If user-provided shaders are allowed, implement strict validation and sanitization. Limit shader complexity and capabilities. Consider using a shader validator or a sandboxed compilation environment.
      • No User Shaders (Ideal): The best mitigation is to not allow users to provide their own shaders. Only use pre-compiled, vetted shaders from the developer.
    • User:
      • Trusted Sources: Only use games/mods from trusted sources.

Attack Surface: Vulnerable Native Dependencies (P/Invoke) - Directly Used by MonoGame

  • Description: Exploits targeting vulnerabilities in native libraries that MonoGame itself interacts with via P/Invoke. This is distinct from vulnerabilities in libraries used by the game, but not by MonoGame directly.
  • How MonoGame Contributes: MonoGame uses P/Invoke to call native functions for platform-specific functionality (audio, input, graphics). This directly exposes the application to vulnerabilities in those native libraries used by MonoGame.
  • Example: A vulnerability in a native audio library that MonoGame itself depends on (e.g., OpenAL, if used internally by MonoGame) is exploited through a specially crafted sound file loaded by MonoGame.
  • Impact: Varies depending on the vulnerability; could range from denial of service to arbitrary code execution.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developer:
      • Dependency Auditing: Carefully review all P/Invoke calls within MonoGame's source code and the native libraries they interact with.
      • Minimize P/Invoke: Reduce the use of P/Invoke within MonoGame where possible (contributing back to the MonoGame project).
      • Memory Safety: Use memory-safe wrappers around native calls within MonoGame.
      • Regular Updates: Keep all native dependencies of MonoGame (SDL2, OpenAL, etc.) up-to-date. Monitor security advisories.
      • Sandboxing: If possible isolate native library interactions within a sandboxed process.
    • User:
      • System Updates: Keep the operating system and its components up-to-date.