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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for mxgmn/wavefunctioncollapse

Attack Surface: Maliciously Crafted Input Images (Image Format Vulnerabilities)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities within image loading libraries when wavefunctioncollapse processes input images for tile sets or constraints. This is directly triggered by providing malicious image files to the library.
    • Wavefunctioncollapse Contribution: wavefunctioncollapse's core functionality relies on processing image inputs. It directly uses image loading libraries, inheriting their potential vulnerabilities.
    • Example: Providing a PNG image crafted to trigger a buffer overflow in the image loading library used by wavefunctioncollapse. Upon loading, this could lead to arbitrary code execution within the application using wavefunctioncollapse.
    • Impact:
      • Code Execution: Allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code on the system running wavefunctioncollapse.
      • Denial of Service (DoS): Crashing the application or system due to memory corruption or other image processing errors.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Input Validation: Validate image file formats and consider sanitizing or re-encoding images before use with wavefunctioncollapse.
      • Dependency Updates: Keep image processing libraries and wavefunctioncollapse dependencies updated to patch known vulnerabilities.
      • Sandboxing: Isolate wavefunctioncollapse processing within a sandboxed environment to limit the impact of successful exploits.

Attack Surface: Maliciously Crafted XML Tile Descriptions (XXE Injection)

  • Description: If wavefunctioncollapse or the application using it parses XML for tile definitions or rules, it can be vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) injection. This is a direct risk if XML parsing is part of the application's or library's input processing.
    • Wavefunctioncollapse Contribution: While not inherent to all WFC implementations, if the specific application or a variant of wavefunctioncollapse uses XML for configuration or input, it introduces this attack surface.
    • Example: Providing an XML file to wavefunctioncollapse (or the application using it) that contains an external entity definition pointing to a local file (e.g., /etc/passwd). If XXE is possible, the XML parser will attempt to resolve this entity, potentially exposing the file's contents.
    • Impact:
      • Local File Disclosure: Exposing sensitive files from the server or system.
      • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): Enabling attacks to internal or external systems via the server.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Disable External Entity Processing: Configure the XML parser used to completely disable external entity resolution.
      • Input Schema Validation: Validate XML input against a strict schema to prevent unexpected or malicious XML structures.

Attack Surface: XML Bomb (Billion Laughs Attack)

  • Description: Providing deeply nested or recursive XML structures as input to wavefunctioncollapse (or the application) that lead to exponential expansion during parsing, causing severe resource exhaustion and Denial of Service.
    • Wavefunctioncollapse Contribution: If XML is used for input configuration, even without XXE, the library or application becomes vulnerable to XML bomb attacks if the XML parser is not properly configured to prevent excessive expansion.
    • Example: Providing an XML file with nested entity definitions that expand exponentially. Parsing this XML by wavefunctioncollapse or the application will consume excessive resources, potentially crashing the application.
    • Impact:
      • Denial of Service (DoS): Rendering the application unresponsive or crashing it due to resource exhaustion.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • XML Parser Limits: Configure the XML parser to enforce strict limits on entity expansion depth and size.
      • Input Size Limits: Limit the size of XML input files to prevent excessively large payloads.
      • Resource Limits: Implement general resource limits (CPU, memory, time) to mitigate DoS attacks.