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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for nuke-build/nuke

Mitigation Strategy: Dependency Vulnerability Management for Nuke and its Plugins

  • Mitigation Strategy: Regularly audit and update Nuke and its plugins.
    • Description:
      1. Establish a schedule: Define a recurring schedule (e.g., monthly, quarterly) to review and update Nuke and its plugins.
      2. Monitor for updates: Subscribe to Nuke's release notes, community forums, and security mailing lists to stay informed about new versions and security advisories. Check plugin repositories for updates as well.
      3. Test updates in a staging environment: Before applying updates to the production build environment, test them thoroughly in a staging or development environment to ensure compatibility and avoid build breakages.
      4. Apply updates promptly: Once updates are tested and validated, apply them to the production build environment in a timely manner.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Vulnerable Dependencies (High Severity): Exploiting known vulnerabilities in outdated Nuke versions or plugins can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE), data breaches, or Denial of Service (DoS).
    • Impact: High reduction in risk for vulnerable dependencies. Regularly updating significantly reduces the window of opportunity for attackers to exploit known vulnerabilities.
    • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. We have a process to update Nuke version annually, but plugin updates are less frequent and ad-hoc. Implemented in our DevOps procedures documentation.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to establish a more frequent schedule for plugin updates and integrate automated notifications for new Nuke and plugin releases.

Mitigation Strategy: Utilize dependency scanning tools (for Nuke dependencies)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Utilize dependency scanning tools (for Nuke dependencies).
    • Description:
      1. Choose a suitable tool: Select a dependency scanning tool that supports .NET and Nuke's dependency management (e.g., OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk, WhiteSource).
      2. Integrate into CI/CD pipeline: Integrate the chosen tool into your CI/CD pipeline as a build step within your Nuke build process. Configure it to scan your build.nuke project and report vulnerabilities in Nuke's dependencies and plugins.
      3. Configure vulnerability thresholds: Set thresholds for vulnerability severity (e.g., only fail builds on high and critical vulnerabilities).
      4. Establish remediation process: Define a process for reviewing and addressing reported vulnerabilities. This includes updating dependencies, applying patches, or finding alternative solutions within the Nuke build context.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Vulnerable Dependencies (High Severity): Proactively identifies known vulnerabilities in Nuke and its dependencies before they are exploited.
    • Impact: High reduction in risk for vulnerable dependencies. Automated scanning provides continuous monitoring and early detection of vulnerabilities within the Nuke build environment.
    • Currently Implemented: Not implemented. We are currently relying on manual reviews and infrequent updates.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to select and integrate a dependency scanning tool into our GitLab CI pipeline and establish a clear vulnerability remediation workflow specifically for Nuke dependencies.

Mitigation Strategy: Pin Nuke and plugin versions

  • Mitigation Strategy: Pin Nuke and plugin versions.
    • Description:
      1. Identify current versions: Determine the current versions of Nuke and all plugins used in your project.
      2. Specify exact versions: In your global.json (for .NET SDK version) and potentially within your build.nuke script or a dedicated configuration file for plugins, specify the exact versions of Nuke and plugins instead of using version ranges or wildcards.
      3. Document pinned versions: Clearly document the pinned versions and the rationale behind them within the Nuke build documentation.
      4. Update versions deliberately: When updates are necessary (after testing and validation), explicitly update the pinned versions in your configuration files within the Nuke build project.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Unexpected Dependency Updates (Medium Severity): Prevents unintended updates of Nuke or plugins that could introduce vulnerabilities, break build compatibility, or cause unexpected behavior in the build process.
      • Build Reproducibility Issues (Low Severity): Ensures consistent builds across different environments and over time by using the same Nuke and plugin versions.
    • Impact: Medium reduction in risk for unexpected updates and improved build stability specifically related to Nuke and its plugins. Pinned versions provide predictability and control over Nuke dependencies.
    • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. We pin the .NET SDK version in global.json, but Nuke and plugin versions are not explicitly pinned in a dedicated configuration.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to implement version pinning for Nuke and all plugins, potentially using a dedicated configuration file within the build.nuke project.

Mitigation Strategy: Apply secure coding practices to your build.nuke scripts

  • Mitigation Strategy: Apply secure coding practices to your build.nuke scripts.
    • Description:
      1. Input validation: Validate all external inputs to your build.nuke scripts (e.g., parameters, environment variables) to prevent injection attacks within the build process.
      2. Output encoding: Encode outputs properly to prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities if build logs or reports generated by Nuke are displayed in web interfaces.
      3. Error handling: Implement robust error handling in build.nuke to prevent sensitive information from being exposed in error messages or build logs generated by Nuke.
      4. Principle of least privilege: Ensure build.nuke scripts only have the necessary permissions to perform their tasks within the build environment. Avoid running build scripts with overly permissive accounts.
      5. Code clarity and maintainability: Write clean, well-documented, and modular build.nuke scripts to facilitate easier review and reduce the likelihood of introducing errors in the build logic.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Injection Attacks (Medium to High Severity): Improper input validation in build.nuke can lead to command injection or other injection vulnerabilities if build scripts execute external commands based on user input.
      • Information Disclosure (Low to Medium Severity): Poor error handling or logging practices in build.nuke can unintentionally expose sensitive information through Nuke's output.
    • Impact: Medium reduction in risk for injection attacks and information disclosure originating from build.nuke scripts. Secure coding practices minimize vulnerabilities introduced through build script logic.
    • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Developers are generally aware of secure coding practices, but specific guidelines for build.nuke scripts are not formally documented or enforced.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to create and document secure coding guidelines specifically for build.nuke scripts and incorporate them into developer training, focusing on Nuke-specific aspects.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement thorough code review for build.nuke scripts

  • Mitigation Strategy: Implement thorough code review for build.nuke scripts.
    • Description:
      1. Mandatory code reviews: Make code reviews mandatory for all changes to build.nuke scripts before they are merged into the main branch.
      2. Security-focused reviewers: Ensure that at least one reviewer in each code review has security awareness and can identify potential security vulnerabilities in build.nuke scripts.
      3. Review checklist: Develop a code review checklist that includes security considerations specific to build.nuke scripts (e.g., secrets management within Nuke, input validation in Nuke scripts, external script execution from Nuke).
      4. Automated code analysis: Consider using static code analysis tools to automatically identify potential security issues in build.nuke scripts before code review.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Logic Flaws and Unintended Actions (Medium Severity): Code reviews can catch logic errors or unintended actions in build.nuke scripts that could lead to security misconfigurations or vulnerabilities within the build process.
      • Accidental Introduction of Vulnerabilities (Low to Medium Severity): Reviews help prevent developers from unintentionally introducing vulnerabilities through coding mistakes or oversight in build.nuke scripts.
    • Impact: Medium reduction in risk for logic flaws and accidental vulnerabilities in build.nuke scripts. Code reviews provide a crucial second pair of eyes to identify potential security issues in build logic.
    • Currently Implemented: Implemented. All code changes, including build.nuke scripts, undergo mandatory code reviews using GitLab Merge Requests.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to enhance code reviews with a security-focused checklist specific to build.nuke scripts and potentially integrate static code analysis tools for .nuke scripts.

Mitigation Strategy: Minimize external script execution within build.nuke

  • Mitigation Strategy: Minimize external script execution within build.nuke.
    • Description:
      1. Prefer Nuke tasks and plugins: Utilize Nuke's built-in tasks and plugins whenever possible instead of relying on external scripts called from build.nuke.
      2. Vet external scripts: If external scripts are necessary to be executed from build.nuke, carefully vet their source, purpose, and integrity. Only use scripts from trusted sources.
      3. Control script execution path: Explicitly specify the full path to external scripts executed by build.nuke to prevent path traversal vulnerabilities or execution of malicious scripts from unexpected locations.
      4. Restrict script permissions: Run external scripts executed by build.nuke with the minimum necessary permissions.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Malicious Script Injection (High Severity): Executing untrusted or compromised external scripts from build.nuke can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) and full system compromise of the build agent.
      • Supply Chain Attacks (Medium Severity): Compromised external scripts executed by build.nuke can introduce vulnerabilities or backdoors into the build process and ultimately into the application.
    • Impact: High reduction in risk for malicious script injection and supply chain attacks originating from external scripts executed by Nuke. Minimizing external script execution reduces the attack surface and reliance on external components within Nuke builds.
    • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. We generally prefer Nuke tasks, but some build steps still rely on custom shell scripts executed from build.nuke.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to review and minimize the use of external scripts in build.nuke, replacing them with Nuke tasks or plugins where feasible. For remaining external scripts executed by Nuke, implement stricter vetting and control measures.

Mitigation Strategy: Input validation and sanitization in build.nuke scripts

  • Mitigation Strategy: Input validation and sanitization in build.nuke scripts.
    • Description:
      1. Identify input sources: Identify all sources of external input to your build.nuke scripts (e.g., command-line parameters, environment variables, files accessed by Nuke scripts).
      2. Define validation rules: Define clear validation rules for each input, specifying allowed characters, formats, lengths, and ranges within the context of build.nuke script usage.
      3. Implement validation logic: Implement validation logic in your build.nuke scripts to check inputs against the defined rules. Reject invalid inputs and provide informative error messages from Nuke.
      4. Sanitize inputs: Sanitize inputs within build.nuke to remove or escape potentially harmful characters or sequences before using them in commands or operations within the build process.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Injection Attacks (Medium to High Severity): Prevents command injection, path traversal, and other injection vulnerabilities by validating and sanitizing user-controlled inputs processed by build.nuke scripts.
      • Unexpected Build Behavior (Low to Medium Severity): Input validation helps prevent unexpected build failures or incorrect behavior caused by malformed or invalid inputs to build.nuke scripts.
    • Impact: Medium to High reduction in risk for injection attacks and improved build stability within Nuke builds. Input validation is a fundamental security practice for preventing various types of attacks in the context of Nuke scripts.
    • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic input validation is performed in some areas of build.nuke, but it is not consistently applied across all input sources in build.nuke scripts.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to systematically review build.nuke scripts, identify all input sources, and implement comprehensive input validation and sanitization for each input within the Nuke build process.

Mitigation Strategy: Avoid hardcoding secrets in build.nuke scripts or configuration files

  • Mitigation Strategy: Avoid hardcoding secrets in build.nuke scripts or configuration files.
    • Description:
      1. Identify hardcoded secrets: Review your build.nuke scripts and configuration files to identify any hardcoded secrets (e.g., API keys, passwords, connection strings) within the Nuke project.
      2. Remove hardcoded secrets: Delete all hardcoded secrets from your build.nuke scripts and configuration files.
      3. Educate developers: Train developers on the risks of hardcoding secrets in Nuke build scripts and best practices for secure secrets management within Nuke builds.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Credential Exposure (High Severity): Hardcoded secrets in build.nuke can be easily discovered by attackers if build scripts or repositories are compromised, leading to unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.
      • Accidental Secret Leakage (Medium Severity): Secrets hardcoded in build.nuke can be unintentionally leaked through version control history, build logs, or error messages generated by Nuke.
    • Impact: High reduction in risk for credential exposure and accidental leakage from build.nuke scripts. Eliminating hardcoded secrets is a critical step in securing sensitive information within Nuke builds.
    • Currently Implemented: Implemented. We have policies against hardcoding secrets in build.nuke and use environment variables or secret management tools.
    • Missing Implementation: Continuous monitoring and automated checks to prevent accidental introduction of hardcoded secrets in future changes to build.nuke scripts.

Mitigation Strategy: Utilize secure secret management solutions (integrated with Nuke)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Utilize secure secret management solutions (integrated with Nuke).
    • Description:
      1. Choose a solution: Select a suitable secret management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, Azure Key Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) based on your infrastructure and requirements for use with Nuke.
      2. Integrate with Nuke: Integrate the chosen secret management solution with your Nuke build process. This typically involves using SDKs or APIs provided by the secret management tool to retrieve secrets during Nuke builds.
      3. Store secrets securely: Store all sensitive information (API keys, passwords, certificates) in the chosen secret management solution instead of in build.nuke configuration files or environment variables directly accessed by Nuke.
      4. Implement access control: Configure access control policies in the secret management solution to restrict access to secrets to only authorized Nuke build processes and personnel.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Credential Exposure (High Severity): Centralized secret management for Nuke builds reduces the risk of secrets being exposed in multiple locations and provides better control over access within the build process.
      • Secret Sprawl (Medium Severity): Prevents secret sprawl within Nuke builds by providing a single, secure location for managing all secrets used in the build process.
      • Auditing and Rotation (Medium Severity): Secret management solutions often provide auditing capabilities and features for automated secret rotation, improving security posture of secrets used by Nuke.
    • Impact: High reduction in risk for credential exposure and improved secret management practices within Nuke builds. Centralized secret management provides a more secure and manageable way to handle sensitive information used by Nuke.
    • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. We use Azure Key Vault for some secrets used in Nuke builds, but not all secrets are managed through it consistently across all projects.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to expand the use of Azure Key Vault to manage all secrets used in Nuke builds across all projects and enforce its usage consistently within Nuke build configurations.

Mitigation Strategy: Leverage environment variables for sensitive configuration (in Nuke builds)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Leverage environment variables for sensitive configuration (in Nuke builds).
    • Description:
      1. Identify sensitive configuration: Determine which configuration values used in Nuke builds are sensitive (e.g., API endpoints, database connection strings without passwords).
      2. Use environment variables: Configure your build.nuke scripts to read these sensitive configuration values from environment variables instead of hardcoding them or storing them in configuration files within the Nuke project.
      3. Securely manage environment variables: Ensure that environment variables are set securely in the build environment used by Nuke and are not exposed in Nuke build logs unnecessarily. Use secure methods for setting environment variables in your CI/CD system for Nuke builds.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Accidental Secret Leakage (Medium Severity): Using environment variables for Nuke configuration is generally more secure than hardcoding secrets in files, but still requires careful management to prevent leakage from Nuke build outputs.
      • Configuration Management (Low Severity): Environment variables provide a flexible way to manage configuration for Nuke builds across different environments without modifying build.nuke code.
    • Impact: Medium reduction in risk for accidental leakage compared to hardcoding within Nuke builds. Environment variables offer a better, but not perfect, way to manage sensitive configuration for Nuke.
    • Currently Implemented: Implemented. We use environment variables extensively for configuration in our Nuke build pipelines.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to ensure that environment variables containing sensitive information used by Nuke are not inadvertently logged or exposed in Nuke build outputs and that their management within the CI/CD system is secure for Nuke builds.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement least privilege access for secrets (used by Nuke)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Implement least privilege access for secrets (used by Nuke).
    • Description:
      1. Identify required access: Determine which Nuke build processes and users require access to specific secrets.
      2. Grant minimal permissions: Configure access control policies in your secret management solution (or environment variable management system) to grant only the minimum necessary permissions to access secrets used by Nuke.
      3. Regularly review access: Periodically review and audit access control policies to ensure that they are still appropriate and that no unnecessary access is granted to secrets used by Nuke.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Unauthorized Access to Secrets (Medium Severity): Least privilege access limits the potential impact of a compromised build agent or user account running Nuke by restricting access to secrets used by Nuke.
      • Lateral Movement (Low to Medium Severity): Reduces the risk of attackers using compromised build systems running Nuke to gain access to other sensitive systems by limiting the secrets they can access through Nuke.
    • Impact: Medium reduction in risk for unauthorized access and lateral movement related to secrets used by Nuke. Least privilege is a fundamental security principle that minimizes the impact of security breaches within the Nuke build context.
    • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. We have some access control in place for Azure Key Vault, but it is not consistently applied and regularly reviewed across all projects using Nuke.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to implement and enforce least privilege access for all secrets used by Nuke across all projects, including regular reviews of access control policies for secrets used in Nuke builds.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement artifact signing (within Nuke build process)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Implement artifact signing (within Nuke build process).
    • Description:
      1. Generate signing key: Generate a strong cryptographic key pair for signing build artifacts produced by Nuke. Securely store the private key and make the public key available for verification.
      2. Integrate signing into build process: Integrate artifact signing into your Nuke build process. Use tools or libraries within build.nuke to digitally sign build artifacts (e.g., binaries, container images) after they are built by Nuke.
      3. Publish signature: Publish the digital signature alongside the build artifact in a secure and accessible location, making it available for verification of artifacts built by Nuke.
      4. Verification process: Implement a verification process in your deployment pipeline or distribution process to verify the digital signature of build artifacts produced by Nuke before deployment or use.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Artifact Tampering (High Severity): Digital signatures ensure the integrity and authenticity of build artifacts produced by Nuke, preventing attackers from tampering with them after they are built.
      • Supply Chain Attacks (Medium Severity): Signing helps mitigate supply chain attacks by verifying that artifacts produced by Nuke originate from a trusted source and have not been modified in transit.
    • Impact: High reduction in risk for artifact tampering and improved supply chain security for artifacts built by Nuke. Digital signatures provide strong assurance of artifact integrity and authenticity for Nuke outputs.
    • Currently Implemented: Not implemented. We are not currently signing our build artifacts produced by Nuke.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to implement artifact signing for our build artifacts produced by Nuke, including setting up key management, integrating signing into the Nuke build process, and implementing verification in deployment pipelines for Nuke artifacts.

Mitigation Strategy: Utilize checksums and hash verification (within Nuke build process)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Utilize checksums and hash verification (within Nuke build process).
    • Description:
      1. Generate checksums/hashes: Integrate checksum or cryptographic hash generation into your Nuke build process. Generate checksums/hashes for build artifacts after they are built by Nuke.
      2. Store checksums/hashes securely: Store the generated checksums/hashes securely alongside the build artifacts or in a separate secure location, making them available for verification of Nuke artifacts.
      3. Verification process: Implement a verification process in your deployment pipeline or distribution process to verify the checksums/hashes of build artifacts produced by Nuke before deployment or use. Compare the calculated checksum/hash with the stored value.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Artifact Tampering (Medium Severity): Checksums and hashes can detect accidental or intentional modifications to build artifacts produced by Nuke after they are built.
      • Data Corruption (Low Severity): Helps detect data corruption during storage or transfer of build artifacts produced by Nuke.
    • Impact: Medium reduction in risk for artifact tampering and improved data integrity for artifacts built by Nuke. Checksums and hashes provide a simpler form of integrity verification compared to digital signatures for Nuke outputs.
    • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. We generate checksums for some artifacts produced by Nuke, but not consistently for all and verification is not fully automated in deployment pipelines.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to consistently generate checksums/hashes for all build artifacts produced by Nuke and fully automate checksum verification in our deployment pipelines for Nuke artifacts.

Mitigation Strategy: Principle of least privilege for build agents (running Nuke)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Principle of least privilege for build agents (running Nuke).
    • Description:
      1. Identify required permissions: Determine the minimum permissions required for build agents to perform Nuke build tasks (e.g., access to source code repositories, artifact repositories, deployment environments).
      2. Configure build agent accounts: Configure the operating system accounts used by build agents running Nuke with only the necessary permissions. Avoid using overly permissive accounts like administrator or root for Nuke build agents.
      3. Restrict network access: Limit network access for build agents running Nuke to only the necessary resources. Use firewalls or network segmentation to restrict outbound and inbound connections for Nuke build agents.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Lateral Movement (Medium Severity): Least privilege limits the potential damage if a build agent running Nuke is compromised. Attackers will have limited permissions to access other systems or data from the compromised Nuke build agent.
      • Privilege Escalation (Low Severity): Reduces the risk of attackers escalating privileges on a compromised build agent running Nuke if the initial account has limited permissions.
    • Impact: Medium reduction in risk for lateral movement and privilege escalation related to build agents running Nuke. Least privilege is a fundamental security principle that minimizes the impact of security breaches in the Nuke build environment.
    • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Build agents are configured with dedicated service accounts, but permissions might not be strictly minimized in all cases for agents running Nuke.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to conduct a thorough review of build agent permissions and implement stricter least privilege policies, ensuring that agents running Nuke only have the minimum necessary access.

Mitigation Strategy: Isolate build environments (for Nuke)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Isolate build environments (for Nuke).
    • Description:
      1. Containerization/Virtualization: Use containerization (e.g., Docker) or virtualization (e.g., VMs) to isolate build environments where Nuke is executed. Run each Nuke build process in a separate, isolated container or VM.
      2. Network isolation: Isolate build agent networks running Nuke from production networks and other sensitive environments.
      3. Ephemeral build environments: Consider using ephemeral build environments for Nuke builds that are created and destroyed for each build, reducing the persistence of potential compromises in the Nuke build environment.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Lateral Movement (Medium Severity): Isolation limits the impact of a compromised Nuke build environment by preventing attackers from easily moving to other systems or environments from the compromised Nuke build environment.
      • Build Environment Contamination (Low Severity): Isolation prevents Nuke build processes from interfering with each other and reduces the risk of build environment contamination within Nuke builds.
    • Impact: Medium reduction in risk for lateral movement and improved build environment security for Nuke builds. Isolation provides a strong security boundary between Nuke build processes and other environments.
    • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. We use containers for some Nuke build processes, but not consistently for all. Network isolation is partially in place for Nuke build agents.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to expand the use of containerization or virtualization to isolate all Nuke build environments and implement stricter network isolation for build agent networks running Nuke. Explore the feasibility of using ephemeral build environments for Nuke builds.

Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize build logs (generated by Nuke)

  • Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize build logs (generated by Nuke).
    • Description:
      1. Identify sensitive information: Identify types of sensitive information that should not be included in build logs generated by Nuke (e.g., secrets, API keys, passwords, internal paths, personally identifiable information).
      2. Implement sanitization mechanisms: Implement mechanisms to automatically sanitize build logs generated by Nuke before they are stored or shared. This can involve using regular expressions or dedicated sanitization tools to remove or mask sensitive information in Nuke logs.
      3. Review sanitized logs: Periodically review sanitized build logs from Nuke to ensure that sanitization mechanisms are effective and that no sensitive information is still being exposed in Nuke logs.
    • List of Threats Mitigated:
      • Information Disclosure (Medium Severity): Sanitization prevents sensitive information from being exposed in build logs generated by Nuke, reducing the risk of accidental or intentional leakage from Nuke build outputs.
      • Credential Exposure (Medium Severity): Prevents secrets from being logged in Nuke build logs, mitigating the risk of credential exposure through Nuke build logs.
    • Impact: Medium reduction in risk for information disclosure and credential exposure from Nuke build logs. Sanitization is crucial for protecting sensitive information in build logs generated by Nuke.
    • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. We have some basic log sanitization in place for Nuke logs, but it is not comprehensive and might not cover all types of sensitive information in Nuke build outputs.
    • Missing Implementation: Need to implement comprehensive build log sanitization for logs generated by Nuke, including identifying all types of sensitive information and implementing robust sanitization mechanisms for Nuke logs. Regularly review and improve sanitization rules for Nuke build logs.