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attack-tree.md

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Attack Tree Analysis for nuke-build/nuke

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code on Build Server/Developer Machine via NUKE

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code on Build Server/Developer Machine via NUKE
├── 1. Compromise NUKE Build Definition (Build.cs or similar) [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.1.  Direct Modification of Build Definition File
│   │   ├── 1.1.1.  Compromise Source Code Repository (e.g., Git) [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   ├── 1.1.1.1.  Weak Repository Credentials/Access Controls [HIGH RISK]
│   │   │   └── 1.1.1.2.  Compromised Developer Account (Phishing, Credential Stuffing) [HIGH RISK]
│   ├── 1.2.  Indirect Modification via Dependencies
│   │   ├── 1.2.1.  Compromise a NUKE Global Tool
│   │   │   ├── 1.2.1.1.  Supply Chain Attack on NuGet Package for the Tool [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.2.2.  Compromise a NuGet Package Used by the Build Definition [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   ├── 1.2.2.1.  Supply Chain Attack on the NuGet Package [HIGH RISK]
│   │   │   └── 1.2.2.2.  Typosquatting [HIGH RISK]
├── 2.  Exploit NUKE's Parameter Injection Mechanism
│   ├── 2.1.  Manipulate Environment Variables
│   │   ├── 2.1.1.  Compromise CI/CD System (e.g., Jenkins, Azure DevOps, GitHub Actions) [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   ├── 2.1.1.1.  Weak CI/CD System Credentials/Access Controls [HIGH RISK]
│   │   │   └── 2.1.1.3.  Compromised CI/CD Administrator Account [HIGH RISK]
│   ├── 2.2.  Manipulate Command-Line Arguments (if exposed/unvalidated)
│   │   ├── 2.2.1.  Social Engineering (trick developer into running malicious command) [HIGH RISK]
│   └── 2.3.  Manipulate Configuration Files (e.g., `nuke.config`, `.nuke`)
│       └── 2.3.2.  Social Engineering (trick developer into using malicious configuration) [HIGH RISK]
├── 3.  Compromise CI/CD Pipeline Configuration (if using external tools) [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 3.1.  Modify Pipeline Definition
│   │   ├── 3.1.1.  Weak Pipeline Credentials/Access Controls [HIGH RISK]
│   │   └── 3.1.2.  Compromised CI/CD Administrator Account [HIGH RISK]
├── 4.  Compromise Developer Machine [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 4.1.  Phishing/Social Engineering [HIGH RISK]
│   └── 4.2.  Malware Infection [HIGH RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise NUKE Build Definition [CRITICAL]

  • This is the core of the attack, directly modifying the build logic.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Compromise Source Code Repository [CRITICAL]

  • Gaining control of the repository allows complete control over the build definition.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1. Weak Repository Credentials/Access Controls [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Attacker gains access to the repository using weak, default, or easily guessable credentials, or through brute-force/credential stuffing attacks. Lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA) significantly increases the risk.
  • Mitigation: Strong, unique passwords; mandatory MFA; regular password audits; principle of least privilege.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.2. Compromised Developer Account (Phishing, Credential Stuffing) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Attacker obtains a developer's credentials through phishing emails, social engineering, or by using credentials stolen from other breaches (credential stuffing).
  • Mitigation: Security awareness training (phishing, social engineering); MFA; password managers; monitoring for suspicious login activity.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Indirect Modification via Dependencies

  • Altering the build definition through its dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.1. Supply Chain Attack on NuGet Package for the Tool [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Attacker compromises a NuGet package used by a NUKE global tool. When the tool is updated, the malicious package is pulled in, executing arbitrary code.
  • Mitigation: Careful vetting of global tools; dependency vulnerability scanning; pinning tool versions; using private feeds for internal tools.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2. Compromise a NuGet Package Used by the Build Definition [CRITICAL]

  • Directly compromising a package used in the build.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2.1. Supply Chain Attack on the NuGet Package [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Similar to 1.2.1.1, but targeting a package directly used in Build.cs or related files.
  • Mitigation: Dependency vulnerability scanning; pinning dependency versions; using private feeds; careful vetting of all dependencies; code reviews focusing on dependency changes.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2.2. Typosquatting [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Attacker publishes a malicious package with a name very similar to a legitimate package, hoping developers will accidentally install the wrong one.
  • Mitigation: Careful review of package names before installation; using tools that warn about similar package names; dependency analysis.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit NUKE's Parameter Injection Mechanism

  • Manipulating inputs to the build process to inject malicious code.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Compromise CI/CD System [CRITICAL]

  • Gaining control of the CI/CD system allows modification of environment variables and other build parameters.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.1. Weak CI/CD System Credentials/Access Controls [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Similar to 1.1.1.1, but targeting the CI/CD system.
  • Mitigation: Strong, unique passwords; mandatory MFA; regular password audits; principle of least privilege.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.3. Compromised CI/CD Administrator Account [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Similar to 1.1.1.2, but targeting a CI/CD administrator account.
  • Mitigation: Security awareness training; MFA; password managers; monitoring for suspicious login activity; strict access controls for administrator accounts.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1. Social Engineering (trick developer into running malicious command) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Attacker deceives a developer into executing a command that injects malicious code or modifies build parameters.
  • Mitigation: Security awareness training; clear guidelines on running commands; code reviews.

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.2. Social Engineering (trick developer into using malicious configuration) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Attacker convinces a developer to use a malicious nuke.config or .nuke file.
  • Mitigation: Security awareness training; clear guidelines on configuration files; code reviews.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Compromise CI/CD Pipeline Configuration [CRITICAL]

  • Directly modifying the CI/CD pipeline to inject malicious commands.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1. Weak Pipeline Credentials/Access Controls [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Similar to 1.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.1, but targeting the pipeline configuration itself.
  • Mitigation: Strong, unique passwords; mandatory MFA; regular password audits; principle of least privilege.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.2. Compromised CI/CD Administrator Account [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Similar to 1.1.1.2 and 2.1.1.3, but targeting an account with pipeline modification privileges.
  • Mitigation: Security awareness training; MFA; password managers; monitoring for suspicious login activity; strict access controls.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Compromise Developer Machine [CRITICAL]

  • Gaining full control of a developer's machine allows for a wide range of attacks.

Attack Tree Path: 4.1. Phishing/Social Engineering [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Tricking the developer into installing malware, revealing credentials, or taking other actions that compromise their machine.
  • Mitigation: Security awareness training; email filtering; endpoint protection.

Attack Tree Path: 4.2. Malware Infection [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Developer's machine is infected with malware through drive-by downloads, malicious email attachments, or other means.
  • Mitigation: Endpoint protection (EDR); regular software updates; web filtering; security awareness training.