attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for serilog/serilog-sinks-console

Attack Surface: Information Disclosure via Sensitive Data in Console Logs

• Description: Exposure of confidential information (passwords, API keys, PII, internal paths, etc.) within log messages written to the console.
• Serilog.Sinks.Console Contribution: Serilog.Sinks.Console directly outputs log messages to the console, making any sensitive data included in those messages immediately visible to anyone with console access. This direct output is the core mechanism by which the sink contributes to this attack surface.
• Example: An application logs database connection strings, including usernames and passwords, at Information level, and this logging is directed to the console in a production environment accessible to multiple developers or potentially exposed through container logs.
• Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive credentials, data breaches, potential compromise of systems and user accounts.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Avoid logging sensitive data: Absolutely refrain from logging sensitive information to the console, especially in production. Redact, mask, or use placeholders for sensitive data before logging.
  • Implement robust filtering: Utilize Serilog's filtering capabilities to strictly prevent specific properties, fields, or messages containing sensitive patterns from being logged to the console sink.
  • Secure console access: Restrict access to console output to the absolute minimum necessary personnel. Implement strong access controls for systems where console output is visible (e.g., container orchestration platforms, servers).
  • Adopt structured logging and exclusion: Leverage structured logging to separate data from messages. Configure Serilog to explicitly exclude sensitive properties from being outputted to the console sink, even if they are part of the log event.

Attack Surface: Information Disclosure via Verbose Logging Exposing Critical Internal Details in Production

• Description: Excessive logging at debug or verbose levels in production environments reveals critical internal application details, logic, and potential vulnerabilities through console output, significantly aiding attackers. This goes beyond general verbosity and focuses on exposure of critical internal workings.
• Serilog.Sinks.Console Contribution: Serilog.Sinks.Console faithfully outputs all log messages it is configured to receive, including highly detailed debug information if set to verbose levels. This direct and unfiltered output to the console is the direct contribution of the sink to this attack surface.
• Example: A production application, configured to log at Debug level to the console, exposes detailed internal component interactions, sensitive algorithm logic, or specific vulnerability details in log messages visible in production container logs or monitoring systems.
• Impact: Significant information leakage that provides attackers with deep insights into application architecture, critical algorithms, and potential vulnerabilities, enabling highly targeted and effective attacks.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Enforce strict log level control: Mandate and rigorously enforce higher log levels (e.g., Warning, Error, Fatal) for Serilog.Sinks.Console in production environments. Debug and Verbose levels should be strictly limited to non-production environments.
  • Environment-based configuration management: Implement robust environment-specific configuration to guarantee different and appropriate log levels are automatically applied for development, staging, and production environments, preventing accidental verbose logging in production.
  • Regular security audits of logging configurations: Conduct periodic security audits specifically focused on reviewing Serilog configurations, especially the log levels and sinks used in production, to ensure they adhere to security best practices and minimize information exposure via console logging.
  • Principle of least information logging: Adopt a principle of logging only the absolutely necessary information, even at lower log levels. Avoid logging excessive technical details or internal state information that could be exploited if exposed.