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Attack Tree Analysis for serilog/serilog-sinks-console

Objective: To compromise application that use given project by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the project itself, specifically to exfiltrate sensitive information or disrupt application operations by leveraging vulnerabilities related to console logging.

Attack Tree Visualization

High-Risk Attack Paths and Critical Nodes:

└───[AND] Exploit Serilog Console Sink Weaknesses └───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1. Information Disclosure via Console Logs [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.1. Sensitive Data Logged [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.1.1. Application Logs Sensitive Data Unintentionally [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.1.1.1. Developer Error in Logging Configuration/Code [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └───[CRITICAL NODE - Developer Error leading to Sensitive Data Logging] [L: Medium, I: Major, E: Very Low, S: Low, DD: Medium] ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.2. Unauthorized Access to Console Output [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.2.1. Direct Console Access [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.2.1.1. Physical Access to Server/Container [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └───[CRITICAL NODE - Physical Access to Logs] [L: Low, I: Critical, E: Low, S: Low, DD: Very Easy (if no physical security)] │ │ ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.2.1.2. Access to Container Logs (e.g., Docker logs) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └───[CRITICAL NODE - Unsecured Container Logs] [L: Medium, I: Major, E: Low, S: Low, DD: Medium (depending on logging infrastructure)] │ │ ├───[AND] [HIGH-RISK PATH] 1.2.1.3. Access to System Logs (if console output redirected) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ │ └───[CRITICAL NODE - Unsecured System Logs with Console Output] [L: Medium, I: Major, E: Low, S: Low, DD: Medium (depending on system logging configuration)]

Attack Tree Path: Path 1: Information Disclosure via Sensitive Data Logging (Unintentional Developer Error)

  • Critical Node: Developer Error leading to Sensitive Data Logging
    • Attack Vector 1: Accidental Inclusion in Log Statements:
      • Developers might inadvertently include sensitive variables or object properties in log messages using string interpolation or concatenation without realizing the data's sensitivity in a production context.
      • Example: _logger.LogInformation("User details: {UserDetails}", user); where user object contains password or PII.
    • Attack Vector 2: Logging Exception Details:
      • When exceptions occur, developers might log the entire exception object, which can contain sensitive information like database connection strings, internal file paths, or user input that triggered the error.
      • Example: _logger.LogError(ex, "Error processing request"); where ex contains sensitive data in its properties or stack trace.
    • Attack Vector 3: Overly Verbose Logging Levels in Production:
      • Leaving logging level at Debug or Verbose in production environments can lead to excessive logging of detailed application flow, including sensitive data that would normally be filtered out at higher logging levels like Information or Warning.
    • Attack Vector 4: Configuration Errors:
      • Incorrectly configured Serilog settings or sinks might unintentionally route logs containing sensitive data to the console in production, even if the intention was to log only non-sensitive information to the console during development.

Attack Tree Path: Path 2: Information Disclosure via Unauthorized Direct Console Access

  • Critical Node: Physical Access to Logs

    • Attack Vector 1: Server Room Breach:
      • An attacker gains physical access to the server room or data center where the application server is located. They can then directly access the server console output displayed on a monitor, or access the server itself to view console logs.
    • Attack Vector 2: Container Host Access:
      • In containerized environments, if an attacker gains physical access to the container host machine, they can access the console output of running containers, including the application's console logs.
    • Attack Vector 3: Insider Threat:
      • A malicious insider with physical access to the server or container host can intentionally access console output to steal sensitive information logged by the application.

  • Critical Node: Unsecured Container Logs

    • Attack Vector 1: Docker Logs Access without Authorization:
      • If container logs (e.g., Docker logs) are not properly secured, an attacker who gains access to the container environment (even without root on the host) might be able to view container logs using commands like docker logs <container_id>, potentially revealing console output.
    • Attack Vector 2: Exposed Container Logging API:
      • Some container orchestration platforms or management tools might expose APIs to access container logs. If these APIs are not properly authenticated or authorized, an attacker could exploit them to retrieve console logs remotely.
    • Attack Vector 3: Shared Container Environment Vulnerabilities:
      • In shared container environments (e.g., misconfigured Kubernetes namespaces), an attacker might be able to gain access to logs of containers belonging to other applications, including the target application's console logs.

  • Critical Node: Unsecured System Logs with Console Output

    • Attack Vector 1: System Log File Access without Authorization:
      • If the application's console output is redirected to system logs (e.g., using systemd journal, syslog, or file redirection), and these system log files are not properly secured with appropriate file permissions, an attacker who gains access to the server operating system can read these log files and access the console output.
    • Attack Vector 2: Remote System Log Access Exploitation:
      • If system logs are accessible remotely (e.g., via a centralized logging system or exposed network service), and these remote access mechanisms are not properly secured (e.g., weak authentication, lack of authorization), an attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to retrieve system logs containing console output remotely.
    • Attack Vector 3: Log Aggregation System Vulnerabilities:
      • If system logs are aggregated into a centralized logging system, vulnerabilities in the logging system itself or its access controls could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to the aggregated logs, including the application's console output.