Attack Surface: Information Disclosure via Console Output
Description: Unauthorized access to sensitive data logged to the console.
Serilog-sinks-console Contribution: This sink directly writes log events to the standard output (console), making the data potentially accessible to anyone who can view the console. This is the core functionality of the sink and the primary source of risk.
Example: An application logs a user's session token to the console. An attacker with access to the server's console (e.g., through a compromised account or a misconfigured container) can see the token and use it to impersonate the user.
Impact: Loss of confidentiality, potential for account takeover, data breaches, regulatory violations (e.g., GDPR, CCPA).
Risk Severity: Critical (if sensitive data is logged) or High (if potentially sensitive data is logged).
Mitigation Strategies:
* Avoid Logging Sensitive Data: The most effective mitigation. Do not log PII, authentication tokens, API keys, or other confidential information to the console.
* Data Redaction/Masking: If sensitive data must be logged for debugging, redact or mask it before logging. For example, log only the first and last few characters of a token.
* Structured Logging: Use Serilog's structured logging features (message templates and properties) to control which data is logged. Avoid logging entire objects that might contain sensitive fields.
* Restrict Console Access: Implement strict access controls on the server and container environment to limit who can view the console output. Use the principle of least privilege.
* Secure Container Logging: If using containers, ensure that access to container logs (e.g., docker logs, kubectl logs) is properly secured and restricted to authorized users.
* Log Rotation and Deletion: If console output is redirected to a file, implement log rotation and deletion policies to limit the amount of historical data available.
* Use a Different Sink: For sensitive logs, consider using a more secure sink, such as a dedicated log aggregation service with robust access controls and encryption.
Attack Surface: CI/CD Pipeline Log Exposure
Description: Sensitive information logged to the console during CI/CD pipeline execution is exposed due to insufficient access controls on pipeline logs.
Serilog-sinks-console Contribution: If the application uses serilog-sinks-console during CI/CD builds or deployments, any sensitive data logged will be captured in the pipeline logs. The sink's direct output to the console is the mechanism of exposure.
Example: A CI/CD pipeline runs unit tests that log database connection strings (a bad practice) to the console. Anyone with access to the pipeline logs can view these connection strings.
Impact: Exposure of sensitive configuration data, potential for unauthorized access to development or production systems.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies: * Restrict Access to Pipeline Logs: Implement strict access controls on CI/CD pipeline logs, limiting access to authorized personnel only. * Avoid Logging Sensitive Data in Pipelines: Do not log any sensitive information (passwords, API keys, connection strings, etc.) during CI/CD pipeline execution. * Use Secrets Management: Use a secrets management tool (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault) to securely store and inject sensitive data into the pipeline environment, rather than hardcoding it or logging it. * Review Pipeline Configuration: Regularly review and audit CI/CD pipeline configurations to ensure that sensitive data is not being logged or exposed. * Use a Dedicated CI/CD Logging Sink: Consider using a separate Serilog sink specifically for CI/CD pipelines, configured to avoid logging sensitive information.