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Attack Tree Analysis for serilog/serilog-sinks-console

Objective: Exfiltrate sensitive data, disrupt application availability, or manipulate application behavior via serilog-sinks-console

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Exfiltrate sensitive data, disrupt application availability, or manipulate application behavior via serilog-sinks-console ├── 1. Exfiltrate Sensitive Data [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1.1. Misconfigured Output Template [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.1.1. Accidental Inclusion of Sensitive Properties [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.2. Console Output Interception [HIGH RISK] │ │ └── 1.2.1.1. Shared Server Environment [CRITICAL] │ └── 1.3 Environment Variable Exposure [HIGH RISK] │ └── 1.3.1 Sensitive data logged via environment variables [CRITICAL] └── 2. Disrupt Application Availability └── 2.1. Denial of Service (DoS) via Excessive Logging └── 2.1.1. Uncontrolled Log Volume [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exfiltrate Sensitive Data [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: This is the most critical threat category, focusing on unauthorized access to sensitive information logged to the console.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Misconfigured Output Template [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: The outputTemplate in Serilog configuration controls the format of log messages. If misconfigured, it can expose sensitive data.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Accidental Inclusion of Sensitive Properties [CRITICAL]

  • Description: Developers might inadvertently include sensitive properties (e.g., passwords, API keys, PII) in the outputTemplate, either directly or by logging entire objects that contain sensitive data. * Action: Review and restrict properties included in the output template. Use structured logging and avoid logging raw objects directly. Use Serilog's destructuring operators (@, $) appropriately. * Likelihood: Medium (Common mistake) * Impact: High to Very High (Depends on the data) * Effort: Very Low (Just needs to read the logs) * Skill Level: Very Low (No special skills needed) * Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires log review, might be missed)

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Console Output Interception [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: If an attacker can gain access to the console output, they can potentially see all logged information.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.1. Shared Server Environment [CRITICAL]

  • Description: In a shared server environment (e.g., a shared hosting provider, a multi-user system), other users or processes might have access to the console output of the application. * Action: Avoid using the console sink in shared server environments where other users/processes might have access to the console output. Use a more secure sink (e.g., file, database) with appropriate access controls. * Likelihood: Medium (If using a shared environment) * Impact: High to Very High (Full access to logged data) * Effort: Low (If already has access to the shared environment) * Skill Level: Low (Basic system access) * Detection Difficulty: Medium to High (Depends on monitoring)

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Environment Variable Exposure [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Sensitive data stored in environment variables can be inadvertently logged.

Attack Tree Path: 1.3.1 Sensitive data logged via environment variables [CRITICAL]

  • Description: Developers might log entire environment variables, or parts of them, which can contain secrets like API keys, database credentials, or other sensitive configuration data. * Action: Avoid logging entire environment variables. If necessary, sanitize or redact sensitive information before logging. * Likelihood: Medium (Common mistake) * Impact: High to Very High (Depends on the data in environment variables) * Effort: Very Low (Just needs to read the logs) * Skill Level: Very Low (No special skills needed) * Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires log review, might be missed)

Attack Tree Path: 2. Disrupt Application Availability

  • Overall Description: This category focuses on attacks that aim to make the application unavailable or unresponsive.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1. Denial of Service (DoS) via Excessive Logging

  • Description: Excessive logging can consume system resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O), leading to performance degradation or application crashes.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Uncontrolled Log Volume [CRITICAL]

  • Description: If logging levels are not properly configured (e.g., using Debug or Verbose in production), or if the application generates an excessive number of log messages, it can overwhelm the system. * Action: Implement logging level controls (e.g., MinimumLevel in Serilog). Use appropriate logging levels (e.g., Information, Warning, Error) and avoid excessive logging at lower levels (e.g., Debug, Verbose) in production environments. Consider using sampling or rate limiting if necessary. * Likelihood: Medium (If logging is not properly configured) * Impact: Medium (Performance degradation, potential unavailability) * Effort: Very Low (Just needs to trigger excessive logging) * Skill Level: Very Low (No special skills needed) * Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium (Performance monitoring should detect)