Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
37 lines (30 loc) · 4.77 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

37 lines (30 loc) · 4.77 KB

Threat Model Analysis for spectreconsole/spectre.console

Threat: Threat 1: Denial of Service via Table Overflow

  • Description: An attacker provides an extremely large number of rows or columns, or excessively long cell content, when the application uses Table to display data. The attacker might achieve this by manipulating user input that directly or indirectly controls the table's dimensions or content. Spectre.Console attempts to render the entire table, consuming excessive CPU and memory, leading to application unresponsiveness.
    • Impact: The application becomes unavailable to legitimate users. The system hosting the application may also become unstable if resources are exhausted.
    • Spectre.Console Component Affected: Table class and its related methods (e.g., AddColumn, AddRow, AddRows).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Input Validation (Row/Column Count): Impose strict limits on the maximum number of rows and columns allowed in a table. Reject input that exceeds these limits.
      • Input Validation (Cell Content Length): Limit the maximum length of text allowed within individual table cells. Truncate or reject excessively long input.
      • Pagination/Lazy Loading: Instead of rendering the entire table at once, implement pagination or lazy loading. Only render a subset of the data visible to the user at any given time. This is a significant architectural change but provides the best protection.
      • Resource Monitoring & Timeouts: Monitor CPU/memory usage during table rendering. Implement a timeout; if rendering exceeds a threshold, terminate the operation and display an error.

Threat: Threat 2: Denial of Service via Tree Manipulation

  • Description: Similar to the table overflow, an attacker provides input that results in an extremely large or deeply nested Tree. This could involve a large number of nodes or excessive depth. Rendering the tree consumes excessive resources.
    • Impact: Application becomes unresponsive or crashes due to resource exhaustion.
    • Spectre.Console Component Affected: Tree class and its methods for adding nodes (e.g., AddNode).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Node Count Limit: Restrict the maximum number of nodes allowed in a tree.
      • Tree Depth Limit: Limit the maximum depth (levels of nesting) of the tree.
      • Lazy Loading (Nodes): Load child nodes only when the parent node is expanded by the user. This avoids rendering the entire tree upfront.
      • Input Validation: Strictly validate any user input that controls the structure of the tree.

Threat: Threat 3: Terminal Escape Sequence Injection via Text Display

  • Description: The application uses Spectre.Console to display untrusted text that may contain terminal escape sequences. Spectre.Console might not fully sanitize these sequences. An attacker crafts input containing malicious escape sequences that, when rendered, could alter the terminal's behavior, potentially leading to arbitrary command execution (depending on the terminal emulator). This is most dangerous if the output is redirected or piped to another process.
    • Impact: Ranges from minor display corruption to arbitrary code execution on the user's system. Severity depends heavily on the terminal emulator and the context in which the output is used.
    • Spectre.Console Component Affected: AnsiConsole.Markup, AnsiConsole.Write, AnsiConsole.WriteLine, and any other methods that display text, if they are used with untrusted input. The Text class itself might be involved.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if untrusted input is displayed without sanitization)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Input Sanitization (Primary Defense): Before passing any untrusted text to Spectre.Console, rigorously sanitize it to remove or escape all potentially harmful terminal escape sequences. Use a dedicated library for this purpose; do not attempt to implement this manually. Consider a whitelist approach (allowing only known-safe sequences) rather than a blacklist.
      • Avoid Untrusted Output: The best approach is to avoid using Spectre.Console to display data from untrusted sources. If absolutely necessary, treat the input as hostile.
      • Contextual Encoding: If specific escape sequences are needed for formatting, ensure they are generated and encoded correctly within the application, and never directly from user input.