attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for stackexchange/stackexchange.redis

Objective: Compromise application using StackExchange.Redis.

Attack Tree Visualization

Root Goal: Compromise Application via StackExchange.Redis
    ├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 1. Exploit StackExchange.Redis Library Vulnerabilities
    │   └───(OR)─ **[CRITICAL NODE]** 1.1. Code Injection/Command Injection
    │       └───(AND)─ **[CRITICAL NODE]** 1.1.1. Identify Input Vector to StackExchange.Redis
    │           └───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 1.1.1.1. Application passes unsanitized user input directly to Redis commands (e.g., KEYS, EVAL, etc.)
    │
    ├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 2. Exploit Application Misuse of StackExchange.Redis
    │   ├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]** 2.1. Insecure Configuration and Credential Management
    │   │   └───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 2.1.1. Hardcoded Redis Credentials in Application Code or Configuration
    │   │
    │   ├───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]** 2.2. Vulnerable Application Logic Interacting with StackExchange.Redis
    │   │   └───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 2.2.1. Command Injection via Application Logic
    │   │       └───(AND)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]** 2.2.1.1. Application constructs Redis commands dynamically based on user input without proper sanitization
    │
    └───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]** 3. Network and Communication Issues Related to StackExchange.Redis
        └───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]** 3.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks
            └───(AND)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE]** 3.1.1. Communication between Application and Redis is not encrypted (No TLS/SSL)
            └───(OR)─ **[HIGH RISK PATH]** 3.1.4. Modify Redis commands or responses in transit to manipulate application behavior or data

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit StackExchange.Redis Library Vulnerabilities (High-Risk Path)

• 1.1. Code Injection/Command Injection (Critical Node)
  • Attack Vector: The attacker aims to inject malicious Redis commands that will be executed by the Redis server via the StackExchange.Redis library. Successful injection grants the attacker direct control over the Redis server and potentially the application.
  • 1.1.1. Identify Input Vector to StackExchange.Redis (Critical Node)
    • Attack Vector: The attacker needs to find a way to influence the Redis commands sent by the application through StackExchange.Redis. This involves identifying points in the application where user input or external data can be incorporated into Redis commands.
      • 1.1.1.1. Application passes unsanitized user input directly to Redis commands (e.g., KEYS, EVAL, etc.) (High-Risk Path)
        • Attack Vector: This is the most direct and common form of command injection. If the application takes user-provided data and directly uses it to construct Redis commands without proper sanitization or validation, an attacker can inject arbitrary commands. For example, if the application uses user input to build a KEYS command, an attacker could inject commands like FLUSHALL or CONFIG SET dir /tmp/ && CONFIG SET dbfilename shell.php && SAVE to potentially gain code execution on the Redis server (if server is misconfigured and allows this).

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Application Misuse of StackExchange.Redis (High-Risk Path)

• 2.1. Insecure Configuration and Credential Management (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)

  • Attack Vector: Weaknesses in how the application is configured and how Redis credentials are managed can lead to unauthorized access to Redis, which can then be leveraged to compromise the application.
    • 2.1.1. Hardcoded Redis Credentials in Application Code or Configuration (High-Risk Path)
      • Attack Vector: If Redis credentials (username, password) are directly embedded in the application's source code or configuration files (especially in version control or publicly accessible locations), an attacker who gains access to these resources can easily obtain valid Redis credentials. This allows them to directly connect to the Redis server and potentially manipulate data or perform administrative actions if the user has sufficient privileges.

• 2.2. Vulnerable Application Logic Interacting with StackExchange.Redis (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)

  • Attack Vector: Flaws in the application's code that uses StackExchange.Redis, particularly in how it constructs and processes Redis commands and data, can be exploited.
    • 2.2.1. Command Injection via Application Logic (High-Risk Path)
      • Attack Vector: Similar to 1.1, but the injection point is within the application's logic itself. If the application dynamically builds Redis commands based on user input without proper sanitization, it creates a command injection vulnerability.
        • 2.2.1.1. Application constructs Redis commands dynamically based on user input without proper sanitization (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)
          • Attack Vector: This is a specific instance of 2.2.1. The application's code takes user input and uses string concatenation or similar methods to build Redis command strings. If this input is not carefully sanitized to remove or escape Redis command syntax, an attacker can inject their own commands into the constructed string. For example, if the application intends to use GET user:{userInput} but doesn't sanitize userInput, an attacker could provide input like user:1} ; FLUSHALL ; -- which might result in Redis executing GET user:user:1} ; FLUSHALL ; --.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Network and Communication Issues Related to StackExchange.Redis (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)

• 3.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)
  • Attack Vector: If the communication channel between the application and the Redis server is not encrypted, an attacker positioned on the network can intercept and potentially manipulate the traffic.
    • 3.1.1. Communication between Application and Redis is not encrypted (No TLS/SSL) (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)
      • Attack Vector: This is the fundamental vulnerability enabling MitM attacks. If TLS/SSL is not configured for the StackExchange.Redis connection to Redis, all communication, including commands, data, and potentially credentials (though StackExchange.Redis aims to avoid sending credentials in plaintext), is transmitted in plaintext.
    • 3.1.4. Modify Redis commands or responses in transit to manipulate application behavior or data (High-Risk Path)
      • Attack Vector: With a successful MitM attack (enabled by 3.1.1), an attacker can intercept and modify Redis commands sent by the application or responses from the Redis server. This allows them to alter application behavior, manipulate data stored in Redis, or potentially bypass business logic. For example, an attacker could intercept a SET command and change the value being stored, or intercept a GET command and modify the returned data before it reaches the application.