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Attack Surface Analysis for unoplatform/uno

  • Description: Attackers analyze and modify the application's WebAssembly code to understand its logic, bypass security, or inject malicious code.
    • Uno Contribution: Uno compiles .NET code to Wasm, which is more susceptible to reverse engineering than native code. Uno's interpreted mode (for hot-reload) further increases this risk.
    • Example: An attacker decompiles the Wasm module, finds a hardcoded API key, and uses it to access sensitive data. Or, they modify a function that validates user input to always return "true," bypassing authentication.
    • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized access, application compromise, intellectual property theft.
    • Risk Severity: High (for most applications, Critical for those handling sensitive data)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Use strong code obfuscation (both .NET and Wasm-specific tools). Minimize client-side sensitive logic; perform critical operations server-side. Validate all inputs on the server, even if validated client-side. Consider AOT compilation where feasible. Implement runtime integrity checks (though these can be bypassed, they raise the bar).
  • Description: Vulnerabilities in the .NET runtime (for Wasm), Uno Platform itself, or third-party libraries (both .NET and native) are exploited.
    • Uno Contribution: Uno relies on the .NET runtime and platform-specific native libraries. Uno itself is a dependency.
    • Example: A known vulnerability in a .NET Wasm library used for networking is exploited to perform a denial-of-service attack. Or, a vulnerability in a native Android library used by Uno for UI rendering allows for arbitrary code execution.
    • Impact: Application compromise, denial of service, data breaches, privilege escalation.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Use a Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tool to identify and track dependencies. Keep the .NET SDK, Uno Platform NuGet packages, and all third-party libraries up-to-date. Apply security patches promptly. Vet third-party libraries carefully before using them.
  • Description: Malicious JavaScript code interacts with the Uno.Wasm application through the interop layer, exploiting vulnerabilities to gain access or inject malicious code.
    • Uno Contribution: Uno provides a JavaScript interop layer to allow communication between Wasm and the browser's JavaScript environment.
    • Example: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript that calls an Uno interop function with crafted parameters, causing a buffer overflow in the Wasm module. Or, an XSS vulnerability in a different part of the website allows an attacker to inject JavaScript that manipulates the Uno application.
    • Impact: Application compromise, data breaches, cross-site scripting (XSS) amplification.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Treat the JavaScript interop layer as a security boundary. Strictly validate and sanitize all data passed between JavaScript and Wasm. Minimize the use of interop where possible. Use a strong Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict the origins of JavaScript that can interact with the application. Encode output properly to prevent XSS.
  • Description: Vulnerabilities in the Uno Platform's code that bridges .NET and the native platform APIs are exploited.
    • Uno Contribution: Uno's core functionality is to translate .NET code and XAML into native code and UI. This translation layer is a potential source of vulnerabilities.
    • Example: A bug in Uno's implementation of file system access on Android allows an attacker to read or write files outside the application's sandbox.
    • Impact: Application compromise, data breaches, privilege escalation, denial of service.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Keep the Uno Platform NuGet packages updated. Thoroughly test the application on all target platforms. Follow secure coding practices when interacting with native APIs through Uno. Be aware of platform-specific security best practices. Report any suspected vulnerabilities to the Uno Platform team.

Attack Surface: WASI Abuse (If Used)

  • Description: If the Uno.Wasm application uses the WebAssembly System Interface (WASI) for system-level access, misconfigured permissions or vulnerabilities in the WASI implementation could be exploited.
    • Uno Contribution: While not a direct contribution of Uno, if an Uno.Wasm application chooses to use WASI, it opens this attack surface.
    • Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the WASI file system API to gain access to files outside the application's designated sandbox.
    • Impact: System compromise, data breaches, unauthorized access.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Developer: Avoid using WASI if not absolutely necessary. If WASI is required, carefully review and restrict WASI permissions to the absolute minimum required. Keep the WASI runtime updated.