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Attack Tree Analysis for unoplatform/uno

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code or Exfiltrate Data via Uno Platform Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code or Exfiltrate Data via Uno Platform Vulnerabilities ├── 1. Exploit Uno Platform's WASM Implementation (Client-Side) │ ├── 1.1 WASM Sandbox Escape │ │ └── 1.1.1 Exploit Undocumented/Vulnerable WASM Host APIs (e.g., Uno-specific bindings) │ │ └── 1.1.1.2 Analyze Uno's custom WASM host implementations for memory corruption bugs. [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.2 Manipulate Uno's WASM-to-Native Bridge (JavaScript Interop) [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1.2.1 Inject Malicious JavaScript via Uno's Interop Layer [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ └── 1.2.1.1 Find vulnerabilities in Uno's input sanitization for data passed between WASM and JavaScript. [CRITICAL] ├── 2. Exploit Uno Platform's Native Implementations (Client-Side - iOS, Android, macOS, etc.) │ ├── 2.1 Target Platform-Specific Uno Renderers │ │ ├── 2.1.1 (iOS) Exploit UIKit/AppKit Integration Vulnerabilities │ │ │ └── 2.1.1.1 Find memory corruption bugs in Uno's mapping of XAML to native iOS UI elements. [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 2.1.2 (Android) Exploit Android View Integration Vulnerabilities │ │ │ └── 2.1.2.1 Find memory corruption bugs in Uno's mapping of XAML to native Android UI elements. [CRITICAL] │ ├── 2.2 Exploit Uno's Native Interop Layer (P/Invoke, JNI, etc.) [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 2.2.1 Inject Malicious Code via Native Function Calls [HIGH RISK] │ │ │ └── 2.2.1.1 Find vulnerabilities in Uno's input sanitization for data passed to native functions. [CRITICAL] └── 3. Exploit Uno Platform's Build and Deployment Process ├── 3.1 Compromise Uno's NuGet Packages [HIGH RISK] └── 3.1.1 Supply Chain Attack: Inject malicious code into a compromised Uno NuGet package. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.2 Analyze Uno's custom WASM host implementations for memory corruption bugs. [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This involves reverse-engineering the Uno Platform's WASM host implementation (likely written in C/C++) to identify memory corruption vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, use-after-free errors, or double-frees. Successful exploitation could lead to a complete WASM sandbox escape.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: Very High
  • Skill Level: Expert
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Use memory-safe languages or libraries where possible.
    • Rigorous code reviews with a focus on memory safety.
    • Use static analysis tools (e.g., Coverity, clang-tidy) to detect potential memory corruption issues.
    • Employ dynamic analysis tools (e.g., AddressSanitizer, Valgrind) during development and testing.
    • Fuzzing the WASM host implementation with various inputs.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Manipulate Uno's WASM-to-Native Bridge (JavaScript Interop) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This attack path focuses on exploiting vulnerabilities in the communication layer between Uno's WASM code and the JavaScript environment. This is a critical area because it bridges two different security contexts.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Strict input validation and sanitization on both the WASM and JavaScript sides.
    • Type checking and enforcement to prevent type confusion vulnerabilities.
    • Principle of least privilege: Expose only the necessary APIs to WASM.
    • Regular security audits of the interop code.
    • Fuzzing the interop layer with various inputs.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.1.1 Find vulnerabilities in Uno's input sanitization for data passed between WASM and JavaScript. [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is a specific instance of the broader interop attack. The attacker attempts to inject malicious JavaScript code or data that bypasses Uno's input sanitization mechanisms, leading to code execution in the JavaScript context. This could be achieved through various injection techniques, depending on how Uno handles data transfer.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization using a whitelist approach (allow only known-good data).
    • Use context-aware output encoding to prevent XSS vulnerabilities.
    • Regularly review and update sanitization routines.
    • Use static analysis tools to identify potential injection vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.1 (iOS) Find memory corruption bugs in Uno's mapping of XAML to native iOS UI elements. [CRITICAL]

  • Description: (Applies to both iOS and Android) These attacks target the platform-specific renderers that translate Uno's XAML markup into native UI components. Memory corruption vulnerabilities in this mapping process could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code within the application's context on the native platform.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Rigorous code reviews with a focus on memory safety.
    • Use of memory-safe languages or libraries where possible.
    • Static analysis tools to detect potential memory corruption.
    • Dynamic analysis tools (e.g., AddressSanitizer on Android, Instruments on iOS).
    • Fuzzing the rendering engine with malformed XAML.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.2.1 (Android) Find memory corruption bugs in Uno's mapping of XAML to native Android UI elements. [CRITICAL]

  • Description: (Applies to both iOS and Android) These attacks target the platform-specific renderers that translate Uno's XAML markup into native UI components. Memory corruption vulnerabilities in this mapping process could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code within the application's context on the native platform.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Rigorous code reviews with a focus on memory safety.
    • Use of memory-safe languages or libraries where possible.
    • Static analysis tools to detect potential memory corruption.
    • Dynamic analysis tools (e.g., AddressSanitizer on Android, Instruments on iOS).
    • Fuzzing the rendering engine with malformed XAML.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2 Exploit Uno's Native Interop Layer (P/Invoke, JNI, etc.) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This attack path focuses on vulnerabilities in the mechanism used by Uno to call native code (e.g., P/Invoke on .NET, JNI on Android). Similar to WASM interop, this is a high-risk area due to the bridging of different security contexts.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Strict input validation and sanitization for all data passed to native functions.
    • Type checking and enforcement.
    • Principle of least privilege: Minimize the use of native calls and expose only necessary APIs.
    • Regular security audits of the interop code.
    • Fuzzing the interop layer.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1.1 Find vulnerabilities in Uno's input sanitization for data passed to native functions. [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is a specific instance of the native interop attack. The attacker attempts to inject malicious data that bypasses Uno's input sanitization, leading to vulnerabilities in the native code being called (e.g., buffer overflows, format string vulnerabilities).
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium
  • Mitigation:
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization using a whitelist approach.
    • Use safe string handling functions and avoid vulnerable APIs.
    • Regularly review and update sanitization routines.
    • Use static analysis tools to identify potential injection vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1 Compromise Uno's NuGet Packages [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This attack targets the supply chain of Uno Platform itself. If an attacker can compromise a NuGet package that Uno depends on, they can inject malicious code into any application that uses that package.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation:
    • Use package signing and verification to ensure the integrity of NuGet packages.
    • Use a private NuGet feed for internal dependencies.
    • Regularly audit dependencies for known vulnerabilities.
    • Implement software composition analysis (SCA) tools to identify vulnerable dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1 Supply Chain Attack: Inject malicious code into a compromised Uno NuGet package. [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the specific action within the supply chain attack. The attacker gains control of a legitimate Uno NuGet package (or a dependency) and modifies it to include malicious code.
  • Likelihood: Low
  • Impact: Very High
  • Effort: High
  • Skill Level: Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard
  • Mitigation: (Same as 3.1, with emphasis on)
    • Multi-factor authentication for NuGet package maintainers.
    • Strong access controls on the NuGet repository.
    • Regular security audits of the package publishing process.