attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for baseflow/flutter-permission-handler

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to protected resources or functionalities by manipulating permissions in a Flutter application using flutter_permission_handler.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Permission Manipulation

• (OR) Exploit Application's Misuse of flutter_permission_handler [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • (AND) Insufficient Permission Checks in Application Code [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Common Vulnerability]
    • (OR) Client-Side Only Permission Enforcement [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - High Likelihood & Impact]
      • Bypassing Client-Side Checks [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • Actionable Insight: Never rely solely on client-side permission checks for critical security decisions. Implement server-side validation and authorization where necessary.
        • Actionable Insight: Assume client-side permission status can be manipulated. Design application logic to be resilient to unauthorized access attempts even if permissions are bypassed client-side.
    • (OR) Storing Sensitive Data Based on Permission Status (Vulnerable if Status is Manipulated) [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - High Impact Potential]
      • Unprotected Data Storage Based on Permission Assumption [HIGH RISK PATH]
        • Actionable Insight: Do not rely on permission status as the sole security mechanism for sensitive data. Implement encryption and proper access control mechanisms for data at rest and in transit.
        • Actionable Insight: Assume permission status can be compromised. Design data storage and access logic to be secure even if an attacker gains unauthorized permission access.
• (OR) Exploit Vulnerabilities in flutter_permission_handler Library
  • (AND) Dependency Vulnerabilities (Less Likely, but Consider) [CRITICAL NODE - High Impact Potential]
    • Vulnerabilities in Underlying Native Permission Handling Code (Indirect) [CRITICAL NODE - High Impact Potential]
      • Actionable Insight: While less direct, be aware of potential vulnerabilities in the native platform's permission handling mechanisms that the library might rely on. Stay updated on platform security advisories.
      • Actionable Insight: Keep the flutter_permission_handler library updated to benefit from bug fixes and security patches that might address underlying platform issues.
• (OR) Social Engineering Attacks Leveraging Permission Requests
  • (AND) UI/UX Manipulation of Permission Dialogs (Less Likely via Library, but Consider App Implementation) [CRITICAL NODE - High Impact Potential]
    • Application-Level UI Overlays or Spoofing (Not Directly Library Issue) [CRITICAL NODE - High Impact Potential]
      • Actionable Insight: While not directly related to flutter_permission_handler, be aware of general UI/UX security best practices to prevent overlay attacks or UI spoofing within the application itself.
      • Actionable Insight: Educate users about common social engineering tactics and encourage them to be cautious when granting permissions, especially if requests seem suspicious or out of context.

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Application's Misuse of flutter_permission_handler -> Insufficient Permission Checks in Application Code -> Client-Side Only Permission Enforcement -> Bypassing Client-Side Checks [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector:
  • Developers rely solely on the flutter_permission_handler library's client-side checks to enforce permissions.
  • The application logic assumes that if the client-side check passes (e.g., PermissionStatus.granted is returned), the user is authorized to access protected resources.
  • An attacker can bypass these client-side checks by:
    • Modifying the application code directly (if possible, e.g., rooted/jailbroken devices, repackaging).
    • Intercepting and manipulating network requests from the client to the server, forging permission status or responses.
    • Using debugging tools or frameworks to alter the application's runtime behavior and permission state.
• Impact:
  • Complete bypass of the intended permission system.
  • Unauthorized access to sensitive data, functionalities, or resources that should be protected by permissions.
  • Potential data breaches, privacy violations, and compromise of application integrity.
• Mitigation (Actionable Insights):
  • Server-Side Validation and Authorization: Implement robust server-side checks to verify user authorization before granting access to protected resources. The server should be the authoritative source of truth for permissions.
  • Assume Client-Side Manipulation: Design the application with the assumption that client-side permission status can be manipulated by an attacker. Do not trust client-side checks for critical security decisions.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Application's Misuse of flutter_permission_handler -> Insufficient Permission Checks in Application Code -> Storing Sensitive Data Based on Permission Status (Vulnerable if Status is Manipulated) -> Unprotected Data Storage Based on Permission Assumption [HIGH RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector:
  • Developers store sensitive data on the device and rely on permission status as the primary security mechanism.
  • The application logic assumes that if a permission is not granted, the sensitive data is protected because the application won't access it (or won't store it in the first place).
  • However, if an attacker can manipulate the permission status (even client-side), they can potentially gain access to this sensitive data because it is stored without proper encryption or access controls.
• Impact:
  • Unauthorized access to sensitive data stored on the device.
  • Data breaches and privacy violations.
  • Compromise of user confidentiality.
• Mitigation (Actionable Insights):
  • Encryption and Access Control: Implement strong encryption for sensitive data at rest. Use proper access control mechanisms that are independent of permission status.
  • Assume Permission Compromise: Design data storage and access logic with the assumption that permission status can be compromised. Do not rely on permission status as the sole security mechanism for sensitive data.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Vulnerabilities in flutter_permission_handler Library -> Dependency Vulnerabilities (Less Likely, but Consider) -> Vulnerabilities in Underlying Native Permission Handling Code (Indirect) [CRITICAL NODE - High Impact Potential]

• Attack Vector:
  • The flutter_permission_handler library relies on the underlying native platform's (Android or iOS) permission handling mechanisms.
  • If a vulnerability exists in the native platform's permission system, it could be indirectly exploitable through the flutter_permission_handler library.
  • This is less direct because the vulnerability is not in the library itself, but in the platform it depends on.
• Impact:
  • Potentially system-wide permission bypass on affected platforms.
  • High impact due to the fundamental nature of platform-level vulnerabilities.
  • Could affect many applications using the vulnerable platform and permission mechanisms.
• Mitigation (Actionable Insights):
  • Stay Updated on Platform Security Advisories: Monitor security advisories from Android and iOS vendors for any reported vulnerabilities in their permission systems.
  • Keep flutter_permission_handler Updated: Update the library regularly to benefit from bug fixes and security patches that might address or mitigate underlying platform issues. While the library might not directly fix platform bugs, updates could include workarounds or adjustments to minimize the impact of known platform vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Social Engineering Attacks Leveraging Permission Requests -> UI/UX Manipulation of Permission Dialogs (Less Likely via Library, but Consider App Implementation) -> Application-Level UI Overlays or Spoofing (Not Directly Library Issue) [CRITICAL NODE - High Impact Potential]

• Attack Vector:
  • Attackers use techniques like UI overlays or spoofing to manipulate the permission request dialogs presented to the user.
  • This is typically done at the application level, not directly exploiting the flutter_permission_handler library itself.
  • For example, an attacker might create an overlay that mimics a legitimate permission dialog but is actually designed to trick the user into granting permissions to a malicious application or process running in the background.
• Impact:
  • Users can be tricked into granting permissions they would not normally grant.
  • This can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data, device functionalities, or even installation of malware.
  • High impact because it bypasses user consent through deception.
• Mitigation (Actionable Insights):
  • UI/UX Security Best Practices: Follow general UI/UX security best practices to prevent overlay attacks and UI spoofing within the application. This might involve techniques to detect and prevent overlays or ensure the integrity of UI elements.
  • User Education: Educate users about common social engineering tactics, including deceptive permission requests and UI manipulation. Encourage users to be cautious when granting permissions and to verify the context and legitimacy of permission requests.