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Attack Surface Analysis for bitwarden/mobile

  • Description: Weaknesses in how Bitwarden stores encrypted vault data locally on the mobile device, potentially allowing unauthorized access.
  • Mobile Contribution: Mobile devices are often less secure than desktop environments. They are more prone to physical theft, malware infections from app stores or sideloading, and users may have weaker security configurations (no screen lock, outdated OS).
  • Example: Malware installed on the user's Android phone exploits an OS vulnerability to bypass app sandboxing and reads the encrypted Bitwarden vault file from local storage.
  • Impact: Exposure of the user's entire password vault, leading to widespread account compromise and potential identity theft.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Employ strong encryption algorithms (e.g., AES-256) for local data storage.
      • Utilize platform-specific secure storage mechanisms (Keychain on iOS, Keystore on Android) for encryption keys.
      • Implement robust code obfuscation and anti-tampering measures to hinder reverse engineering and malware analysis.
      • Regularly audit and patch for storage-related vulnerabilities.
    • Users:
      • Enable strong device security measures: strong screen lock (PIN, password, biometric), keep OS and apps updated.
      • Avoid installing apps from untrusted sources (sideloading).
      • Use device security software (antivirus/anti-malware) if available and reputable.
  • Description: Abuse of IPC mechanisms used by Bitwarden to communicate with other apps or system components, potentially leading to unauthorized actions or data leakage.
  • Mobile Contribution: Mobile platforms rely heavily on IPC for app integration (e.g., autofill, browser extensions). Vulnerabilities in custom URL schemes, intents, or content providers can be exploited by malicious apps installed on the same device.
  • Example: A malicious app registers a custom URL scheme similar to Bitwarden's and intercepts password autofill requests, stealing credentials intended for legitimate websites.
  • Impact: Credential theft, unauthorized actions within Bitwarden (e.g., vault unlocking, settings changes), potential denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Thoroughly validate and sanitize all data received through IPC mechanisms.
      • Implement robust input validation and output encoding to prevent injection attacks.
      • Use secure IPC mechanisms provided by the platform and avoid custom, potentially vulnerable implementations.
      • Carefully define and restrict the scope of IPC interactions.
      • Implement proper permission checks and authorization for IPC requests.
    • Users:
      • Grant permissions to apps cautiously and review permissions regularly.
      • Be wary of apps requesting unusual or excessive permissions.
      • Keep the Bitwarden app and other related apps (browsers) updated.
  • Description: Man-in-the-middle attacks on mobile networks (Wi-Fi, cellular) to intercept communication between the Bitwarden app and Bitwarden servers, potentially exposing sensitive data.
  • Mobile Contribution: Mobile devices frequently connect to untrusted Wi-Fi networks (public hotspots). Mobile networks themselves can also be targeted by sophisticated attackers.
  • Example: An attacker sets up a rogue Wi-Fi hotspot and intercepts network traffic from a user connecting with the Bitwarden app, capturing login credentials or vault data during synchronization if encryption is weak or certificate validation is bypassed.
  • Impact: Exposure of login credentials, vault data, and other sensitive communication, leading to account compromise and data breaches.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Enforce HTTPS for all communication with Bitwarden servers.
      • Implement certificate pinning to validate the server's SSL/TLS certificate and prevent MITM attacks by rogue certificates.
      • Use strong and up-to-date TLS/SSL protocols and cipher suites.
      • Consider implementing end-to-end encryption for sensitive data transmission.
    • Users:
      • Avoid using public, untrusted Wi-Fi networks for sensitive activities like accessing Bitwarden.
      • Use a VPN when connecting to public Wi-Fi networks to encrypt network traffic.
      • Verify that the Bitwarden app is communicating over HTTPS (look for the padlock icon in the app's interface if applicable).
  • Description: Compromising the app update mechanism or distribution channels, leading to the installation of a malicious or backdoored version of the Bitwarden app.
  • Mobile Contribution: While app stores are generally secure, users might be tempted to install apps from unofficial sources (sideloading). Vulnerabilities in the update process itself could also be exploited.
  • Example: An attacker compromises an unofficial app store or website and distributes a modified version of the Bitwarden app containing malware. Users who sideload the app from this source unknowingly install the compromised version.
  • Impact: Widespread distribution of malware, credential theft, data compromise on a large scale affecting many users.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Distribute the Bitwarden app exclusively through official app stores (Google Play Store, Apple App Store).
      • Implement code signing and integrity checks to ensure the app is not tampered with during updates.
      • Use secure update mechanisms and infrastructure.
      • Educate users about the risks of sideloading and encourage updates through official channels.
    • Users:
      • Only install the Bitwarden app from official app stores (Google Play Store, Apple App Store).
      • Enable automatic app updates to ensure you are always using the latest version.
      • Avoid sideloading apps from untrusted sources.
      • Verify the app developer and publisher information in the app store before installation.