Mitigation Strategy: Root/Jailbreak Detection
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Description:
- Step 1: Integrate a library or implement custom code to detect if the device is rooted (Android) or jailbroken (iOS) by checking for indicators like
su
binary, Cydia app presence, or access to restricted system functionalities. - Step 2: Display a warning message to the user upon detection, explaining the increased security risks on compromised devices.
- Step 3: Consider limiting functionality (e.g., disabling auto-fill) or blocking application usage on rooted/jailbroken devices based on risk tolerance.
- Step 1: Integrate a library or implement custom code to detect if the device is rooted (Android) or jailbroken (iOS) by checking for indicators like
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Threats Mitigated:
- Malware Infection on Rooted/Jailbroken Devices - Severity: High
- Data Theft via Root Access - Severity: High
- Bypassing Security Controls due to Modified OS - Severity: High
-
Impact:
- Malware Infection on Rooted/Jailbroken Devices: Significantly Reduces
- Data Theft via Root Access: Moderately Reduces
- Bypassing Security Controls due to Modified OS: Moderately Reduces
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Currently Implemented: Partially - Likely implemented for warnings and potentially influencing biometric unlock.
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Missing Implementation: Stronger enforcement actions like feature limitations or blocking app usage on compromised devices.
Mitigation Strategy: Enforce Device Lock and Strong Passcode/Biometric Authentication Guidance
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Description:
- Step 1: Provide in-app guidance during onboarding and in settings on setting up strong device lock (PIN, password, pattern) and enabling biometric authentication (fingerprint, face unlock).
- Step 2: Include links to platform-specific instructions for device lock setup.
- Step 3: Consider in-app checks to detect if device lock is enabled and display reminders if not.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Access to Device and Application Data in Case of Loss or Theft - Severity: High
- Shoulder Surfing/Observational Attacks - Severity: Medium
-
Impact:
- Unauthorized Access to Device and Application Data in Case of Loss or Theft: Significantly Reduces
- Shoulder Surfing/Observational Attacks: Minimally Reduces
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Currently Implemented: Yes - Likely provides guidance and encourages device lock setup.
-
Missing Implementation: More proactive in-app checks for device lock enabled status and persistent reminders if disabled.
Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Secure Keystore/Keychain for Sensitive Data Storage
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Description:
- Step 1: For Android, use Android Keystore; for iOS, use iOS Keychain to store encryption keys for sensitive data (master password hash, vault data).
- Step 2: Generate keys within Keystore/Keychain for hardware-backed security.
- Step 3: Use Keystore/Keychain APIs for cryptographic operations without exposing key material.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Key Extraction from Application Data Storage - Severity: High
- Malware Accessing Encryption Keys - Severity: Medium
- Data Breach in Case of Device Compromise - Severity: High
-
Impact:
- Key Extraction from Application Data Storage: Significantly Reduces
- Malware Accessing Encryption Keys: Moderately Reduces
- Data Breach in Case of Device Compromise: Significantly Reduces
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Currently Implemented: Yes - Must be implemented for storing master key and sensitive data.
-
Missing Implementation: Continuous monitoring and audits of Keystore/Keychain usage, enhanced key rotation strategies.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Full Disk Encryption Check
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Description:
- Step 1: Use platform APIs to check if full disk encryption (FDE) is enabled on the device (Android APIs, iOS passcode presence as proxy).
- Step 2: Warn users if FDE is not enabled, highlighting data exposure risks in case of device loss/theft.
- Step 3: Provide instructions or links to enable FDE in device settings.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Data Exposure in Case of Device Loss or Theft (Without FDE) - Severity: High
- Physical Access Attacks to Device Storage - Severity: High
-
Impact:
- Data Exposure in Case of Device Loss or Theft (Without FDE): Significantly Reduces
- Physical Access Attacks to Device Storage: Significantly Reduces
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Currently Implemented: Likely Partially - Might check for device lock (related to FDE on iOS) and encourage it.
-
Missing Implementation: Explicitly check FDE status and warn if disabled, provide direct guidance to enable FDE.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Tamper Detection and Code Integrity Checks
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Description:
- Step 1: Integrate code signing into the build process using developer certificates from Google/Apple.
- Step 2: Implement runtime tamper detection by checksumming critical files, verifying app signature, or using anti-tampering libraries.
- Step 3: If tampering is detected, display a warning, terminate the application, and potentially report the event.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Malicious Application Modification/Repackaging - Severity: High
- Installation of Trojanized Bitwarden Application - Severity: High
- Code Injection Attacks - Severity: High
-
Impact:
- Malicious Application Modification/Repackaging: Significantly Reduces
- Installation of Trojanized Bitwarden Application: Significantly Reduces
- Code Injection Attacks: Moderately Reduces
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Currently Implemented: Yes - Code signing is mandatory. Runtime tamper detection less certain.
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Missing Implementation: Runtime tamper detection could be strengthened with more robust checks and automated responses.
Mitigation Strategy: Employ Code Obfuscation and Minification
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Description:
- Step 1: Integrate code obfuscation and minification tools into the build process.
- Step 2: Apply obfuscation (renaming, control flow changes) and minification (whitespace removal, code shortening) to the source code.
- Step 3: Regularly update obfuscation techniques against de-obfuscation methods.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Reverse Engineering of Application Logic - Severity: Medium
- Static Analysis of Code for Vulnerabilities - Severity: Medium
- Intellectual Property Theft (Code Copying) - Severity: Low
-
Impact:
- Reverse Engineering of Application Logic: Moderately Reduces
- Static Analysis of Code for Vulnerabilities: Moderately Reduces
- Intellectual Property Theft (Code Copying): Minimally Reduces
-
Currently Implemented: Likely Yes - Common practice for mobile apps, especially security-sensitive ones.
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Missing Implementation: Level of obfuscation might vary, consider more aggressive techniques, regular effectiveness assessment.
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Inter-Process Communication (IPC)
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Description:
- Step 1: Minimize IPC usage, prefer in-process communication.
- Step 2: If IPC is needed, use secure mechanisms:
LocalBroadcastManager
, explicitIntents
(Android), App Groups, custom URL schemes (iOS). Avoid implicit intents and pasteboard for sensitive data. - Step 3: Validate and sanitize all data received via IPC.
- Step 4: Implement authorization for IPC endpoints.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Injection Attacks via IPC (e.g., Intent Injection, URL Scheme Injection) - Severity: High
- Unauthorized Access to Application Components via IPC - Severity: Medium
- Data Leakage via Insecure IPC - Severity: Medium
-
Impact:
- Injection Attacks via IPC: Significantly Reduces
- Unauthorized Access to Application Components via IPC: Significantly Reduces
- Data Leakage via Insecure IPC: Moderately Reduces
-
Currently Implemented: Likely Yes - Developers likely aware of IPC security.
-
Missing Implementation: Regular security audits on IPC, penetration testing for IPC vulnerabilities, minimize IPC reliance.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Secure Input Handling for Virtual Keyboards
-
Description:
- Step 1: Use secure input types for sensitive fields (
android:inputType="textPassword"
,secureTextEntry
on iOS) to disable auto-correction and suggestions. - Step 2: Consider disabling clipboard functionality for sensitive input fields.
- Step 3: Educate users about risks of untrusted keyboards, recommend default device keyboard.
- Step 1: Use secure input types for sensitive fields (
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Threats Mitigated:
- Keylogging by Malicious Keyboards - Severity: High
- Clipboard Data Theft - Severity: Medium
- Auto-Correction/Suggestion Data Leakage - Severity: Low
-
Impact:
- Keylogging by Malicious Keyboards: Moderately Reduces
- Clipboard Data Theft: Moderately Reduces
- Auto-Correction/Suggestion Data Leakage: Minimally Reduces
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Currently Implemented: Yes - Secure input types for password fields, likely clipboard handling for sensitive fields.
-
Missing Implementation: More prominent warnings about untrusted keyboards, consider advanced keyboard attack mitigation.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Secure Data Storage at Rest
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Description:
- Step 1: Identify all sensitive data stored locally (vault data, settings).
- Step 2: Encrypt all sensitive data at rest using strong algorithms (AES-256).
- Step 3: Use platform encryption APIs:
EncryptedSharedPreferences
,Jetpack Security Crypto
(Android),Data Protection
,Keychain
(iOS). - Step 4: Securely manage encryption keys in Keystore/Keychain.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Data Exposure in Case of Device Loss or Theft - Severity: High
- Data Breach due to Physical Access to Device Storage - Severity: High
- Malware Accessing Locally Stored Data - Severity: Medium
-
Impact:
- Data Exposure in Case of Device Loss or Theft: Significantly Reduces
- Data Breach due to Physical Access to Device Storage: Significantly Reduces
- Malware Accessing Locally Stored Data: Moderately Reduces
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Currently Implemented: Yes - Core security feature, must be implemented for vault data.
-
Missing Implementation: Continuous verification of encryption, regular audits, consider hardware-backed encryption.
Mitigation Strategy: Minimize Data Storage on the Device
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Description:
- Step 1: Review all locally stored data.
- Step 2: Identify and minimize non-essential local data, retrieve from server on demand.
- Step 3: Store only minimum sensitive data locally for shortest duration.
- Step 4: Prefer server-side storage for sensitive data.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Data Exposure in Case of Device Compromise (Reduced Attack Surface) - Severity: Medium
- Data Breach Risk (Reduced Data Footprint) - Severity: Medium
- Privacy Concerns (Minimized Data Collection) - Severity: Low
-
Impact:
- Data Exposure in Case of Device Compromise: Moderately Reduces
- Data Breach Risk: Moderately Reduces
- Privacy Concerns: Minimally Reduces
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Currently Implemented: Likely Partially - Password managers need local vault data for offline access.
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Missing Implementation: Ongoing efforts to further minimize local data, review storage requirements, explore efficient sync/caching.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Secure Data Handling in Background Processes
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Description:
- Step 1: Identify background processes handling sensitive data (sync, auto-fill, notifications).
- Step 2: Ensure background processes follow same security practices as foreground.
- Step 3: Avoid logging sensitive data in background processes, secure logs if needed.
- Step 4: Protect temporary files created by background processes, delete promptly.
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Threats Mitigated:
- Data Leakage via Background Processes - Severity: Medium
- Exposure of Sensitive Data in Logs or Temporary Files - Severity: Medium
- Vulnerabilities in Background Task Logic - Severity: Medium
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Impact:
- Data Leakage via Background Processes: Moderately Reduces
- Exposure of Sensitive Data in Logs or Temporary Files: Significantly Reduces
- Vulnerabilities in Background Task Logic: Moderately Reduces
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Currently Implemented: Likely Partially - Awareness of secure background processing, but potentially less rigorous review.
-
Missing Implementation: Dedicated security reviews for background processes, automated testing, enhanced logging (without sensitive data).
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Secure Clipboard Handling
-
Description:
- Step 1: Minimize copying sensitive data to clipboard.
- Step 2: Implement auto-clipboard clearing for sensitive data after a short timeout.
- Step 3: Consider alternative secure data transfer methods instead of clipboard.
- Step 4: Warn users about clipboard security risks.
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Threats Mitigated:
- Clipboard Data Theft by Malicious Applications - Severity: Medium
- Accidental Exposure of Sensitive Data via Clipboard - Severity: Low
- Clipboard History Logging by System or Third-Party Apps - Severity: Low
-
Impact:
- Clipboard Data Theft by Malicious Applications: Moderately Reduces
- Accidental Exposure of Sensitive Data via Clipboard: Minimally Reduces
- Clipboard History Logging by System or Third-Party Apps: Minimally Reduces
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Currently Implemented: Yes - Likely auto-clipboard clearing for passwords.
-
Missing Implementation: More aggressive clearing timeouts, remove clipboard for very sensitive data, more prominent warnings.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement VPN Detection and Guidance (Optional)
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Description:
- Step 1: Detect if VPN is active on the device using network interface checks or platform APIs.
- Step 2: Recommend VPN usage, especially on public Wi-Fi, if not detected.
- Step 3: Provide links to VPN setup tutorials.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Eavesdropping on Public Wi-Fi Networks - Severity: Medium
- MITM Attacks on Public Wi-Fi Networks - Severity: Medium
- IP Address Tracking and Location Privacy on Public Wi-Fi - Severity: Low
-
Impact:
- Eavesdropping on Public Wi-Fi Networks: Moderately Reduces
- MITM Attacks on Public Wi-Fi Networks: Moderately Reduces
- IP Address Tracking and Location Privacy on Public Wi-Fi: Minimally Reduces
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Currently Implemented: No - Optional feature, not standard in most apps.
-
Missing Implementation: Implement VPN detection and user guidance as a configurable option.
Mitigation Strategy: Clearly Explain Permissions Requested by the Application
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Description:
- Step 1: Review all requested permissions.
- Step 2: Remove unnecessary permissions, adhere to least privilege.
- Step 3: Provide clear explanations for each permission request, especially runtime permissions on Android, detailing why and how it's used.
- Step 4: Avoid generic messages, provide context.
- Step 5: Explain if permission is optional and allow core functionality without it.
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Threats Mitigated:
- User Mistrust and Reluctance to Grant Permissions - Severity: Low
- Privacy Concerns due to Unclear Permission Usage - Severity: Medium
- Potential for Permission Abuse (If Permissions are Overly Broad) - Severity: Low
-
Impact:
- User Mistrust and Reluctance to Grant Permissions: Significantly Reduces
- Privacy Concerns due to Unclear Permission Usage: Moderately Reduces
- Potential for Permission Abuse: Minimally Reduces
-
Currently Implemented: Yes - Likely some explanation, especially for sensitive permissions like accessibility.
-
Missing Implementation: Enhance permission explanations for clarity and user-friendliness, provide explanations at request time, regular permission audits.