-
1. Threat: URL Redirection/SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery)
- Description: An attacker crafts malicious input that, when used to construct the URL for an
http
request, redirects the request to an unintended destination. The attacker might target internal services, cloud metadata endpoints (e.g.,169.254.169.254
on AWS, GCP, Azure), or other servers the application server can reach but the attacker cannot directly access. They might use schemes likefile://
orgopher://
to interact with local services. Thehttp
package's functions are directly used to make the manipulated request. - Impact: Unauthorized access to internal resources, data exfiltration, potential remote code execution on internal systems, denial of service against internal or external targets.
- Affected Component:
http.get()
,http.post()
,http.put()
,http.delete()
,http.head()
,http.patch()
, and any other functions that accept a URL as input (directly or indirectly through aRequest
object). TheUri
class is also directly involved, as it's used to construct URLs. - Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the network environment and accessible resources).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Strict Input Validation: Validate all user-supplied input used in URL construction using a whitelist approach. Allow only specific, expected characters and patterns. Reject any input containing suspicious characters or schemes.
- Use
Uri
Class Correctly: Always use theUri
class's named constructors (e.g.,Uri.https()
,Uri.http()
) to build URLs. Avoid string concatenation. Use thequeryParameters
argument for query parameters, rather than manually encoding them. - URL Allowlist: If possible, maintain a list of allowed URLs or URL prefixes. Reject any request that doesn't match the allowlist.
- Network Segmentation: Limit the network access of the application server to reduce the impact of successful SSRF attacks.
- Avoid Relative URLs with Untrusted Base URLs: If using relative URLs, ensure the base URL is a trusted, hardcoded value, not derived from user input.
- Description: An attacker crafts malicious input that, when used to construct the URL for an
Threat: Insecure TLS Configuration
-
2. Threat: Insecure TLS Configuration
- Description: The attacker exploits a misconfigured TLS setup within the
http
package usage. This could involve the application accepting invalid or self-signed certificates without proper verification, or using weak cipher suites. This is most likely to occur when developers override the default TLS behavior usingIOClient
and a customSecurityContext
, or by misusingbadCertificateCallback
. The vulnerability is directly tied to how TLS is handled within thehttp
client's configuration. - Impact: Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, allowing the attacker to intercept and modify communication between the client and server, leading to data breaches and potential compromise of credentials.
- Affected Component:
IOClient
(when used with a customSecurityContext
),badCertificateCallback
(if improperly implemented). - Risk Severity: Critical.
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Never Disable Certificate Verification in Production: Use the default
http
client behavior, which relies on the system's trusted certificate store. - Use
SecurityContext.defaultContext
: If you need a customSecurityContext
, start withSecurityContext.defaultContext
and modify it carefully. - Certificate Pinning: Implement certificate pinning to verify that the server's certificate matches a known, trusted certificate.
- Strong Cipher Suites: Ensure that the application and server are configured to use strong, modern cipher suites.
- Regularly Update CA Certificates: Keep the system's trusted CA certificates up to date.
- Avoid
badCertificateCallback
Unless Absolutely Necessary: If you must usebadCertificateCallback
(e.g., for testing), ensure it's implemented securely and only used in controlled environments. Never blindly returntrue
.
- Never Disable Certificate Verification in Production: Use the default
- Description: The attacker exploits a misconfigured TLS setup within the
- 3. Threat: Header Injection (Focus on Client-Side)
- Description: While header injection is often a server-side concern, misuse of the
http
package can enable it. If an attacker can control the values passed to theheaders
parameter ofhttp
methods (or theRequest
object), they might be able to inject headers that, while not directly exploitable on the client, could be used to exploit vulnerabilities on the server. This is a subtle but important distinction. Thehttp
package is the conduit for the injected headers. The focus here is on the client-side creation of the malicious request. - Impact: Potentially bypassing security controls on the server, cache poisoning, request smuggling (though less likely), influencing application logic on the server-side. The impact is realized on the server, but the vulnerability originates in the client's use of
http
. - Affected Component: The
headers
parameter ofhttp.get()
,http.post()
, etc., and theheaders
property of theRequest
object. - Risk Severity: High (because the impact is on the server, and could be severe).
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Input Validation: Rigorously validate any user-supplied data used to construct headers. Avoid directly using user input as header values without sanitization.
- Whitelist Allowed Headers: If possible, restrict the set of headers that the application is allowed to set.
- Use a Dedicated Header Management Function: Create a function or class that handles setting headers, ensuring consistent and secure header construction, and preventing the injection of arbitrary headers.
- Avoid CRLF Sequences: Ensure that user input cannot inject carriage return/line feed (CRLF) characters (
http
package andUri
class should handle this correctly if used properly, it's crucial to be aware of this potential issue and validate input accordingly.
- Description: While header injection is often a server-side concern, misuse of the