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Threat Model Analysis for flutter/packages

Threat: Malicious Code Injection via Package

  • Description: An attacker publishes a malicious package or compromises an existing package on pub.dev (or another package repository). The malicious code could be directly in the package's main code, in a dependency, or even injected during the build process via a malicious build script. The attacker might use obfuscation techniques. The attacker's goal is to execute arbitrary code within the application's context.
    • Impact:
      • Complete application compromise.
      • Data theft (user credentials, personal information, API keys).
      • Remote code execution on the user's device.
      • Installation of malware or ransomware.
      • Cryptojacking.
      • Reputational damage.
    • Affected Component: Any part of the package's code: lib directory, build scripts (build.dart), and transitive dependencies. Functions/modules handling sensitive data or system API interactions are high-risk.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Thorough Package Vetting: Prioritize packages from trusted authors/organizations with strong history and positive feedback. Examine source code (if available) for suspicious patterns.
      • Version Pinning: Specify exact package versions in pubspec.yaml (e.g., package_name: 1.2.3). Avoid version ranges unless absolutely necessary.
      • Dependency Auditing: Regularly audit dependencies using dart pub outdated and vulnerability databases (OSV, Snyk, GitHub Security Advisories).
      • Static Analysis: Employ static analysis tools to detect malicious code patterns or known vulnerable dependencies.
      • Limited Permissions: Application should request only minimum necessary permissions.
      • Code Reviews: Review critical dependencies' code, especially those handling sensitive data or security operations.

Threat: Exploitation of Vulnerable Dependency

  • Description: A package (or its transitive dependency) contains a known or unknown security vulnerability (e.g., buffer overflow, injection flaw, insecure deserialization). An attacker crafts input or exploits a condition to trigger the vulnerability. The attacker exploits an existing flaw, not modifying the package.
    • Impact:
      • Similar to malicious code injection (but unintentional vulnerability).
      • Data breaches.
      • Denial of service.
      • Remote code execution.
      • Privilege escalation.
    • Affected Component: The specific module/function/class within the package (or its dependency) containing the vulnerability.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depends on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Updates: Keep packages up-to-date: dart pub upgrade. Prioritize security updates.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Use automated scanners (OWASP Dependency-Check, Snyk, Dependabot) to find known vulnerabilities.
      • Dependency Tree Analysis: Understand the full dependency tree (dart pub deps) to identify weak points and assess transitive dependency vulnerabilities.
      • Security Advisories: Monitor security advisories/mailing lists for Flutter, Dart, and common packages.

Threat: Dependency Confusion Attack

  • Description: An attacker publishes a malicious package on a public repository (pub.dev) with the same name as a private/internal package. The attacker relies on misconfigured package managers/build systems to prioritize the public (malicious) package.
    • Impact:
      • Execution of attacker's malicious code instead of internal code.
      • Data theft.
      • Remote code execution.
      • Application compromise.
    • Affected Component: The entire package being "confused" is replaced. Attacker's code replaces the legitimate internal package.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Scoped Packages: Use scoped package names (e.g., @your-company/your-package) to prevent naming collisions. This is the best mitigation.
      • Private Package Repositories: Host private packages on a secure, private repository (private pub.dev, private GitHub repo, JFrog Artifactory).
      • Explicit Source Configuration: Configure pub to prioritize the private repository. Use dependency_overrides in pubspec.yaml during development. Configure CI/CD to use correct sources.
      • Verification of Package Sources: Review package source URLs during installation/updates to ensure they're from the expected location (your private repo).

Threat: Typo-Squatting Attack

  • Description: An attacker publishes a malicious package with a name very similar to a popular package (e.g., http_client vs. http-client). The attacker relies on developer typos when adding dependencies.
    • Impact:
      • Execution of attacker's malicious code.
      • Data theft.
      • Remote code execution.
      • Application compromise.
    • Affected Component: The entire typo-squatted package. Attacker's code replaces the intended package.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Careful Package Name Entry: Double-check package names in pubspec.yaml.
      • Code Completion: Use IDE code completion/auto-import to avoid typos.
      • Package Verification: Before adding a dependency, verify name and author on pub.dev.
      • Copy and Paste: Copy the package name directly from pub.dev into your pubspec.yaml.