attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for leoafarias/fvm

Attack Surface: 1. Insecure Download of Flutter SDKs

• Description: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks during the download of Flutter SDKs by fvm, leading to the installation of a compromised SDK. This attack surface is directly created by fvm's responsibility to fetch and install Flutter SDKs from remote sources.
• fvm Contribution: fvm initiates and manages the download process of Flutter SDKs. If this process lacks security measures, it becomes vulnerable.
• Example: An attacker positioned on the network intercepts fvm's SDK download request and injects a malicious Flutter SDK. fvm, without proper verification, installs this compromised SDK. When a developer uses this SDK, their projects and system can be compromised.
• Impact: Installation of malicious Flutter SDKs, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution during Flutter development, data theft, or system compromise.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers (fvm maintainers):
    • Enforce HTTPS for Downloads: Ensure fvm only uses HTTPS for downloading SDKs to prevent eavesdropping and tampering during transit.
    • Implement Checksum Verification: fvm should download and verify checksums (e.g., SHA-256) of SDKs from a trusted source and compare them against the downloaded SDK files before installation to ensure integrity.
  • Users:
    • Ensure fvm is configured to use HTTPS for downloads (this should be the default and enforced by fvm).

Attack Surface: 2. Local Path Manipulation and File System Access

• Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities arising from improper handling of file paths and file system operations by fvm, such as path traversal, leading to unauthorized file access or modification. This attack surface is directly related to fvm's core function of managing SDK installations within the local file system.
• fvm Contribution: fvm manipulates file paths to install, manage, and switch between Flutter SDK versions. Insecure path handling within fvm can be exploited.
• Example: If fvm uses user-provided input (e.g., in configuration or commands) to construct file paths without proper sanitization, an attacker could inject a path like ../../../../sensitive_file to access or overwrite files outside of fvm's intended SDK directories.
• Impact: Unauthorized file access, modification, or deletion; potential privilege escalation if sensitive system files are targeted; data corruption.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers (fvm maintainers):
    • Strict Path Sanitization and Validation: fvm must rigorously sanitize and validate all file paths, especially those derived from user input or configuration. Use secure path manipulation functions provided by the programming language to prevent path traversal.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (File Permissions): fvm should apply the principle of least privilege when setting file permissions for SDK directories and files, restricting access to only necessary users and processes.

Attack Surface: 3. Command Execution and Injection

• Description: Command injection vulnerabilities arising from insecure construction and execution of system commands by fvm. This is a direct attack surface because fvm likely needs to execute system commands to interact with Flutter SDKs and the operating system.
• fvm Contribution: fvm might execute system commands to perform actions like running Flutter commands, managing SDK installations, or interacting with the shell. If these commands are constructed insecurely, injection is possible.
• Example: If fvm constructs a command using unsanitized user input from a configuration file or command-line argument, an attacker could inject malicious commands. For example, if fvm uses user input to build a command like fvm run flutter <user_provided_argument>, and the user provides ; malicious_command, this could lead to execution of malicious_command.
• Impact: Arbitrary code execution on the developer's system with the privileges of the fvm process, potentially leading to system compromise, data theft, or denial of service.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers (fvm maintainers):
    • Avoid Shell Execution: fvm should prioritize using programming language APIs that directly execute commands without invoking a shell to minimize injection risks.
    • Input Sanitization and Parameterization: If shell execution is necessary, fvm must rigorously sanitize all inputs used to construct commands. Use parameterized commands or escaping mechanisms provided by the operating system or programming language to prevent command injection.

Attack Surface: 4. Configuration File Vulnerabilities (fvm_config.json)

• Description: Vulnerabilities arising from insecure parsing or processing of fvm's configuration files (fvm_config.json), potentially leading to code execution or unauthorized actions. This is directly related to how fvm handles and interprets its configuration.
• fvm Contribution: fvm relies on fvm_config.json to store project-specific settings. Insecure parsing or validation of this file can introduce vulnerabilities.
• Example: If fvm's JSON parsing library has a vulnerability, a maliciously crafted fvm_config.json could exploit it. Furthermore, if fvm_config.json allows specifying paths or commands that are not properly validated, an attacker could manipulate these settings to execute arbitrary code when fvm processes the configuration.
• Impact: Arbitrary code execution, unauthorized file access or modification, denial of service, depending on the nature of the vulnerability in configuration parsing or processing.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers (fvm maintainers):
    • Secure JSON Parsing: fvm should use well-vetted and regularly updated secure JSON parsing libraries.
    • Configuration Validation: fvm must thoroughly validate all configuration options read from fvm_config.json against a strict schema. Restrict allowed values and formats to prevent malicious configurations.

Attack Surface: 5. Update Mechanism Vulnerabilities (if applicable)

• Description: Vulnerabilities in fvm's update mechanism, allowing attackers to distribute malicious updates. This is a direct attack surface if fvm provides an update feature, as it controls the software users receive.
• fvm Contribution: If fvm has an update mechanism, it is responsible for fetching and installing updates. Insecure updates can lead to users installing compromised versions of fvm.
• Example: An attacker compromises the update server used by fvm or performs a MITM attack during the update process, delivering a malicious version of fvm to users. Users unknowingly install this compromised fvm version.
• Impact: Distribution of compromised fvm versions to users, potentially leading to widespread system compromise, data theft, or supply chain attacks affecting all users of the compromised fvm version.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers (fvm maintainers):
    • Secure Update Channel (HTTPS): fvm's update mechanism must use HTTPS for downloading updates.
    • Cryptographic Verification (Digital Signatures): Implement a robust update verification mechanism using digital signatures. fvm updates should be signed by the fvm developers, and the application should verify these signatures before applying updates.