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Attack Tree Analysis for leoafarias/fvm

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code via FVM

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code via FVM ├── 1. Manipulate FVM Configuration [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 1. a. Overwrite .fvm/fvm_config.json │ │ ├── 1. a. i. Local File System Access (e.g., compromised IDE, malicious script) [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1. a. iii. Social Engineering [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1. b. Influence Environment Variables (e.g., FVM_HOME, FLUTTER_STORAGE_BASE_URL) [HIGH RISK] │ │ ├── 1. b. i. Compromised CI/CD Pipeline Configuration [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 1. b. ii. Malicious Shell Script/Profile Modification [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1. b. iii. Developer Workstation Compromise [CRITICAL] │ └── 1. c. Exploit Weaknesses in Configuration Parsing/Validation │ ├── 1. c. i. Craft Malicious fvm_config.json [CRITICAL] │ └── 1. c. ii. Craft Malicious Environment Variable Values [CRITICAL] ├── 2. Tamper with Flutter SDK Downloads [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 2. a. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack on Download │ │ ├── 2. a. i. Compromised Network [CRITICAL] │ │ ├── 2. a. ii. DNS Spoofing/Hijacking [CRITICAL] │ ├── 2. b. Exploit Weaknesses in Download Verification (if any) │ │ ├── 2. b. i. Bypass Checksum Verification [CRITICAL] │ └── 2. c. Influence FLUTTER_STORAGE_BASE_URL to Point to Malicious Server (see 1.b) [HIGH RISK] │ ├── 2. c. i. Compromised CI/CD Pipeline [CRITICAL] │ ├── 2. c. ii. Malicious Shell Script [CRITICAL] │ └── 2. c. iii. Developer Workstation Compromise [CRITICAL] ├── 3. Exploit Vulnerabilities in FVM's Code │ ├── 3. a. Command Injection │ │ ├── 3. a. i. Unsanitized User Input [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 3. a. ii. Improper Handling of External Commands [CRITICAL] │ ├── 3. b. Path Traversal │ │ ├── 3. b. i. Malicious Project Path or Version String [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 3. b. ii. Vulnerable File Operations within FVM [CRITICAL] │ ├── 3. c. Dependency Confusion/Hijacking │ │ ├── 3. c. i. FVM's Dependencies Pulled from Malicious Source [CRITICAL] └── 4. Symlink Attacks ├── 4. a. FVM creates predictable symlinks │ ├── 4. a. i. Attacker creates a malicious file/directory before FVM creates the symlink. [CRITICAL] │ └── 4. a. ii. Attacker replaces a legitimate file/directory with a symlink to a malicious location. [CRITICAL] └── 4. b. FVM follows symlinks insecurely ├── 4. b. i. Attacker places a symlink in a location FVM interacts with. [CRITICAL] ├── 4. b. ii. FVM reads/writes to the target of the symlink without proper validation. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Manipulate FVM Configuration [HIGH RISK]

  • 1.a. Overwrite .fvm/fvm_config.json
    • 1.a.i. Local File System Access [CRITICAL]: The attacker gains direct access to the developer's file system, allowing them to modify the fvm_config.json file. This could be achieved through a compromised IDE, a malicious script executed by the developer, or other malware.
    • 1.a.iii. Social Engineering [CRITICAL]: The attacker tricks the developer into using a malicious fvm_config.json file, perhaps by sending it as an attachment or providing a link to a compromised download.
  • 1.b. Influence Environment Variables [HIGH RISK]
    • 1.b.i. Compromised CI/CD Pipeline Configuration [CRITICAL]: The attacker gains access to the CI/CD system and modifies environment variables like FVM_HOME or FLUTTER_STORAGE_BASE_URL. This affects all builds and deployments.
    • 1.b.ii. Malicious Shell Script/Profile Modification [CRITICAL]: The attacker modifies the developer's shell profile or startup scripts to set malicious environment variables, affecting all FVM usage on that machine.
    • 1.b.iii. Developer Workstation Compromise [CRITICAL]: The attacker gains full control over the developer's workstation, allowing them to modify environment variables and any other aspect of the system.
  • 1.c. Exploit Weaknesses in Configuration Parsing/Validation * 1.c.i. Craft Malicious fvm_config.json [CRITICAL]: The attacker crafts a specially designed fvm_config.json file that exploits a vulnerability in FVM's parsing logic, potentially leading to code execution or other unintended behavior. * 1.c.ii. Craft Malicious Environment Variable Values [CRITICAL]: The attacker sets environment variables to values that exploit a vulnerability in how FVM handles them, potentially leading to code execution or other unintended behavior.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Tamper with Flutter SDK Downloads [HIGH RISK]

  • 2.a. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack
    • 2.a.i. Compromised Network [CRITICAL]: The attacker intercepts the network traffic between the developer's machine and the Flutter SDK download server, allowing them to replace the legitimate SDK with a malicious one.
    • 2.a.ii. DNS Spoofing/Hijacking [CRITICAL]: The attacker redirects the developer's DNS requests to a malicious server, causing FVM to download the SDK from an attacker-controlled location.
  • 2.b. Exploit Weaknesses in Download Verification
    • 2.b.i. Bypass Checksum Verification [CRITICAL]: The attacker finds a flaw in FVM's checksum verification process, allowing them to provide a malicious SDK that passes the (incorrect) verification.
  • 2.c. Influence FLUTTER_STORAGE_BASE_URL (see 1.b) [HIGH RISK] - Same attack vectors and mitigations as 1.b.i, 1.b.ii, and 1.b.iii.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Vulnerabilities in FVM's Code

  • 3.a. Command Injection
    • 3.a.i. Unsanitized User Input [CRITICAL]: FVM uses unsanitized user input (e.g., version strings, project paths) when constructing shell commands, allowing the attacker to inject arbitrary commands.
    • 3.a.ii. Improper Handling of External Commands [CRITICAL]: Even without direct user input, FVM might improperly handle external commands (e.g., git, flutter), leading to command injection vulnerabilities.
  • 3.b. Path Traversal
    • 3.b.i. Malicious Project Path or Version String [CRITICAL]: The attacker provides a malicious project path or version string that, due to a vulnerability in FVM, allows them to access or modify files outside of the intended directory.
    • 3.b.ii. Vulnerable File Operations within FVM [CRITICAL]: FVM has internal file operations that are vulnerable to path traversal, even without direct malicious input.
  • 3.c. Dependency Confusion/Hijacking
    • 3.c.i. FVM's Dependencies Pulled from Malicious Source [CRITICAL]: The attacker compromises the package repository or uses a malicious proxy to inject malicious code into one of FVM's dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Symlink Attacks

  • 4.a. FVM creates predictable symlinks
    • 4.a.i. Attacker creates a malicious file/directory before FVM creates the symlink. [CRITICAL]: FVM intends to create a symlink at a predictable location. The attacker, knowing this, creates a malicious file or directory at that location before FVM can create the symlink. FVM then ends up linking to the attacker's malicious content.
    • 4.a.ii. Attacker replaces a legitimate file/directory with a symlink to a malicious location. [CRITICAL]: The attacker replaces a file or directory that FVM expects to be legitimate with a symlink pointing to a malicious location.
  • 4.b. FVM follows symlinks insecurely
    • 4.b.i. Attacker places a symlink in a location FVM interacts with. [CRITICAL]: The attacker places a symlink in a location that FVM will access during its operation.
    • 4.b.ii. FVM reads/writes to the target of the symlink without proper validation. [CRITICAL]: FVM follows a symlink and performs operations on the target without verifying that the target is a safe and expected location.