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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for apache/couchdb

Attack Surface: Unauthenticated HTTP API Access

Description: CouchDB's HTTP API is exposed without requiring authentication, allowing anyone to interact with the database.

  • CouchDB Contribution: CouchDB, by default, can be configured to allow unauthenticated access to its API. Misconfiguration or failure to enable authentication mechanisms directly leads to this attack surface.
  • Example: A CouchDB instance is deployed on a public cloud server with default settings and no authentication configured. An attacker scans the internet, finds the open port (5984), and can directly access and manipulate databases, read sensitive data, or even gain administrative control if _users database is accessible without authentication.
  • Impact: Full data breach, data manipulation, data deletion, denial of service, potential server compromise if administrative functions are accessible.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable and Enforce Authentication: Configure CouchDB to require authentication for all API access. Use strong authentication mechanisms like Cookie Authentication or JWT Authentication.
    • Restrict Network Access: Use firewalls or network security groups to limit access to CouchDB's port (default 5984) only from trusted networks or application servers.
    • Regularly Audit Security Configuration: Review CouchDB's configuration files (e.g., local.ini) and security settings to ensure authentication is properly enabled and enforced.

Attack Surface: Default Futon Web Interface Credentials

Description: The Futon web interface, used for CouchDB administration, is accessible with default administrator credentials that are not changed.

  • CouchDB Contribution: CouchDB includes Futon as a built-in administration interface. If enabled and accessible, and if the default administrator password is not changed during setup, it becomes a major vulnerability.
  • Example: An administrator deploys CouchDB and enables Futon but forgets to change the default administrator password (often admin:password or similar). An attacker discovers the Futon interface, attempts default credentials, and gains full administrative access to CouchDB.
  • Impact: Full administrative control over CouchDB, including data breach, data manipulation, data deletion, server compromise, creation of new administrative users.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Disable Futon in Production: For production environments, disable Futon entirely if it's not required for ongoing administration. Use command-line tools or API for administration instead.
    • Change Default Administrator Password Immediately: If Futon is necessary, change the default administrator password to a strong, unique password during initial setup.
    • Restrict Futon Access: Limit network access to Futon to only authorized administrators' IP addresses or trusted networks. Use a reverse proxy with authentication in front of Futon.

Attack Surface: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Futon

Description: Vulnerabilities within the Futon web interface allow attackers to inject malicious JavaScript code that executes in the context of an administrator's browser.

  • CouchDB Contribution: Futon is a web application built into CouchDB. Like any web application, it can be susceptible to XSS vulnerabilities if input sanitization and output encoding are not properly implemented.
  • Example: An attacker finds an XSS vulnerability in Futon (e.g., in a database name field or document editor). They craft a malicious URL or inject malicious data that, when viewed by an administrator in Futon, executes JavaScript to steal session cookies, perform actions on behalf of the administrator, or deface the interface.
  • Impact: Account takeover of administrators, data manipulation, CSRF attacks launched from the administrator's session, information disclosure.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep CouchDB Updated: Regularly update CouchDB to the latest version to patch known XSS vulnerabilities in Futon.
    • Disable Futon in Production (Recommended): As mentioned before, disabling Futon significantly reduces this risk.
    • Use Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement a strong Content Security Policy for Futon to mitigate the impact of potential XSS vulnerabilities by restricting the sources from which scripts can be loaded.

Attack Surface: Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks during Replication

Description: Replication traffic between CouchDB nodes is intercepted when not using encryption (HTTPS/TLS), allowing attackers to eavesdrop on sensitive data.

  • CouchDB Contribution: CouchDB replication can be configured to use either HTTP or HTTPS. If HTTP is used, the communication channel is unencrypted and vulnerable to interception.
  • Example: Two CouchDB nodes are replicating data over a network using HTTP. An attacker positioned on the network intercepts the replication stream and captures sensitive data being transmitted, including database documents and potentially authentication credentials if they are being passed during replication setup.
  • Impact: Data breach, exposure of sensitive information, potential compromise of authentication credentials used for replication.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Always Use HTTPS/TLS for Replication: Configure CouchDB replication to use HTTPS/TLS to encrypt the communication channel and protect data in transit.
    • Verify TLS Certificates: Ensure proper TLS certificate verification is enabled to prevent MitM attacks using forged certificates.
    • Secure Network Infrastructure: Deploy CouchDB nodes in a secure network environment and use network segmentation to limit the potential for MitM attacks.

Attack Surface: Insecure Default Configuration

Description: Using CouchDB with default configurations without proper hardening leaves the system vulnerable to various attacks.

  • CouchDB Contribution: CouchDB, like many software systems, comes with default configurations that are often geared towards ease of setup and development, rather than maximum security. Relying on these defaults in production environments creates vulnerabilities.
  • Example: Deploying CouchDB with default ports open to the public internet, without enabling authentication, using default administrator credentials, and without proper firewall rules. This exposes the system to a wide range of attacks as described in other points.
  • Impact: Wide range of impacts depending on the specific default configuration weaknesses exploited, including data breach, data manipulation, denial of service, and server compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the specific defaults and exposure)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Harden CouchDB Configuration: Review and modify CouchDB's configuration files (local.ini) to implement security best practices.
    • Follow Security Hardening Guides: Consult official CouchDB security documentation and hardening guides to ensure proper configuration.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits of CouchDB configurations to identify and remediate any misconfigurations or weaknesses.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Apply the principle of least privilege in configuration, granting only necessary permissions and access.