sec-design-deep-analysis.md

Here is a deep security analysis of CouchDB based on the provided security design review, tailored to your request:

Deep Security Analysis of CouchDB Deployment

1. Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Objective:

This deep security analysis aims to provide a thorough evaluation of the security posture of a CouchDB deployment, based on the provided security design review. The objective is to identify potential security vulnerabilities and risks associated with the architecture, components, and deployment of CouchDB, and to recommend specific, actionable mitigation strategies tailored to CouchDB. This analysis will focus on ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data managed by CouchDB, aligning with the business and security postures outlined in the design review.

Scope:

The scope of this analysis encompasses the following aspects of the CouchDB deployment, as described in the security design review:

• C4 Context Diagram: Analysis of external systems interacting with CouchDB and their security implications.
• C4 Container Diagram: Examination of CouchDB's internal components and their respective security considerations.
• Deployment Diagram: Review of the clustered deployment on virtual machines in a cloud environment and associated security risks.
• Build Process Diagram: Assessment of the software build pipeline and its security controls.
• Risk Assessment: Alignment of identified threats with the business and data risks outlined.
• Existing and Recommended Security Controls: Evaluation of the adequacy and implementation of security controls.

This analysis will specifically focus on security considerations relevant to CouchDB and will not extend to general infrastructure security beyond its direct interaction with CouchDB.

Methodology:

This deep analysis will employ the following methodology:

1. Component Decomposition: Break down the CouchDB system into its key components based on the provided diagrams (Context, Container, Deployment, Build).
2. Threat Modeling: For each component, identify potential security threats and vulnerabilities, considering common attack vectors and CouchDB-specific weaknesses. This will involve inferring data flow and interactions between components.
3. Control Mapping: Map existing and recommended security controls from the design review to the identified threats and components. Assess the effectiveness and coverage of these controls.
4. Gap Analysis: Identify gaps in security controls and areas where the current security posture is insufficient to mitigate identified risks.
5. Mitigation Strategy Formulation: Develop specific, actionable, and CouchDB-tailored mitigation strategies for each identified threat and security gap. These strategies will be aligned with the recommended security controls and best practices for CouchDB security.
6. Prioritization: Prioritize mitigation strategies based on the severity of the risk, the likelihood of exploitation, and the business impact.

2. Security Implications of Key Components

2.1 C4 Context Diagram - External Interactions

Components: User Applications, Administrators, Operating System, Network Infrastructure, Monitoring System, Backup System, Internet.

Security Implications & Threats:

• User Applications (External System):

  • Threat: Vulnerable user applications can become attack vectors to CouchDB. Compromised applications can be used to inject malicious data, bypass authentication, or perform unauthorized actions on CouchDB.
  • Threat: If applications do not properly handle data retrieved from CouchDB, they can expose sensitive data to unauthorized users or introduce vulnerabilities like XSS.
  • Threat: Lack of application-level input validation can lead to vulnerabilities that are then exploited against CouchDB through API calls.
  • Data Flow: User Applications interact with CouchDB via the HTTP API, sending requests and receiving data.

• Administrators (Person):

  • Threat: Compromised administrator accounts can lead to complete system compromise, data breaches, and denial of service.
  • Threat: Human error by administrators (misconfiguration, weak passwords, accidental data deletion) can lead to security incidents.
  • Data Flow: Administrators manage CouchDB via the Admin Interface and potentially direct API access for configuration.

• Operating System (System):

  • Threat: OS vulnerabilities can be exploited to gain unauthorized access to the CouchDB instance and the underlying data.
  • Threat: Insufficient OS hardening can leave CouchDB exposed to attacks.
  • Data Flow: CouchDB runs on the OS and relies on it for resource management and security features.

• Network Infrastructure (System):

  • Threat: Network vulnerabilities (e.g., misconfigured firewalls, lack of network segmentation) can allow unauthorized access to CouchDB from internal or external networks.
  • Threat: Lack of DDoS protection can lead to service disruptions.
  • Data Flow: Network infrastructure provides connectivity between users, applications, and CouchDB.

• Monitoring System (System):

  • Threat: If the monitoring system is compromised, attackers can gain insights into system vulnerabilities, disable security alerts, or manipulate monitoring data to hide malicious activity.
  • Threat: Exposure of sensitive monitoring data (e.g., logs, performance metrics) to unauthorized users.
  • Data Flow: Monitoring system collects logs and metrics from CouchDB and the underlying infrastructure.

• Backup System (System):

  • Threat: Unsecured backups can be accessed by unauthorized individuals, leading to data breaches.
  • Threat: Compromised backup system can be used to inject malicious data into backups or delete backups, leading to data loss or integrity issues.
  • Data Flow: Backup system retrieves data from CouchDB for backup and restoration.

• Internet (External):

  • Threat: Direct exposure of CouchDB to the internet without proper security controls (like a Load Balancer with HTTPS termination and DDoS protection) increases the attack surface and risk of external attacks.
  • Data Flow: Internet represents external users and applications accessing CouchDB.

Mitigation Strategies (Context Level):

• For User Applications:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Implement robust input validation and output sanitization in all user applications interacting with CouchDB. Follow secure coding practices and perform regular security audits of application code. Utilize parameterized queries or ORM features to prevent NoSQL injection.
• For Administrators:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Enforce strong password policies and implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all administrator accounts. Implement principle of least privilege for administrator roles. Regularly review and audit administrator activities.
• For Operating System:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Harden the operating system based on security best practices (CIS benchmarks, vendor hardening guides). Regularly patch the OS and kernel for security vulnerabilities. Implement host-based intrusion detection/prevention systems (HIDS/HIPS).
• For Network Infrastructure:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Implement network segmentation to isolate CouchDB within a secure network zone. Configure firewalls to restrict access to CouchDB ports only from authorized sources. Deploy DDoS protection mechanisms. Utilize a Web Application Firewall (WAF) in front of the Load Balancer to filter malicious HTTP traffic.
• For Monitoring System:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Secure access to the monitoring system with strong authentication and authorization. Encrypt sensitive monitoring data in transit and at rest. Implement audit logging for monitoring system activities.
• For Backup System:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Encrypt backups at rest and in transit. Securely store backups in a separate, hardened environment with strict access controls. Regularly test backup and restore procedures.
• For Internet Exposure:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Never directly expose CouchDB instances to the internet. Always use a Load Balancer with HTTPS termination and DDoS protection. Consider using a WAF for enhanced web traffic filtering.

2.2 C4 Container Diagram - CouchDB Internals

Components: Erlang Runtime, Database Server, Query Engine, Replication Engine, HTTP API, Admin Interface, Storage Engine.

Security Implications & Threats:

• Erlang Runtime (Container):

  • Threat: Vulnerabilities in the Erlang Runtime can directly impact CouchDB's security and stability.
  • Threat: Resource exhaustion in the Erlang Runtime (due to poorly written Erlang code or attacks) can lead to denial of service.
  • Data Flow: Foundation for all other CouchDB containers.

• Database Server (Container):

  • Threat: Vulnerabilities in the core database server logic can lead to data breaches, unauthorized access, and data corruption.
  • Threat: Improper access control enforcement within the database server can allow unauthorized users to access or modify data.
  • Data Flow: Central component, manages databases, documents, and access control.

• Query Engine (Container):

  • Threat: Query injection vulnerabilities (NoSQL injection) if query parameters are not properly sanitized.
  • Threat: Denial of service through resource-intensive queries.
  • Threat: Information disclosure through query errors or poorly designed views.
  • Data Flow: Processes queries against the Storage Engine.

• Replication Engine (Container):

  • Threat: Man-in-the-middle attacks during replication if replication traffic is not encrypted.
  • Threat: Unauthorized access to replicated data if replication authentication is weak or misconfigured.
  • Threat: Replication conflicts leading to data integrity issues if conflict resolution is not properly handled.
  • Data Flow: Synchronizes data between CouchDB instances, interacts with Storage Engine and Network.

• HTTP API (Container):

  • Threat: API vulnerabilities (e.g., injection, authentication bypass, authorization flaws) can be exploited to gain unauthorized access to CouchDB.
  • Threat: Lack of input validation on API endpoints can lead to various injection attacks.
  • Threat: Session hijacking or session fixation vulnerabilities if session management is not secure.
  • Data Flow: Entry point for external interactions, receives requests and sends responses.

• Admin Interface (Container):

  • Threat: XSS, CSRF, and other web application vulnerabilities in the Admin Interface can be exploited to compromise administrator accounts or perform unauthorized actions.
  • Threat: Default credentials or weak authentication for the Admin Interface.
  • Threat: Lack of proper authorization checks in the Admin Interface can allow unauthorized users to perform administrative tasks.
  • Data Flow: Web interface for administrators to manage CouchDB, interacts with Database Server.

• Storage Engine (Container):

  • Threat: Data breaches if data at rest is not encrypted and physical access to storage is compromised.
  • Threat: File system permission vulnerabilities allowing unauthorized access to data files.
  • Threat: Data corruption or integrity issues due to storage engine bugs or failures.
  • Data Flow: Manages physical storage of data on disk.

Mitigation Strategies (Container Level):

• For Erlang Runtime:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Keep the Erlang Runtime updated to the latest stable version with security patches. Implement resource limits and monitoring for Erlang processes to prevent resource exhaustion.
• For Database Server:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Regularly review and audit CouchDB configuration for access control settings. Implement granular RBAC and ACLs. Enable audit logging for database server activities. Perform security code reviews of any custom Erlang modules.
• For Query Engine:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Sanitize all query inputs to prevent NoSQL injection attacks. Implement query complexity limits to prevent denial of service. Carefully design views and search indexes to minimize information disclosure risks.
• For Replication Engine:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Enforce HTTPS for all replication traffic. Implement strong authentication for replication (e.g., using shared secrets or certificates). Monitor replication processes for errors and security events.
• For HTTP API:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Enforce HTTPS for all API communication. Implement robust input validation and output sanitization on all API endpoints. Implement API authentication (username/password, OAuth 2.0) and authorization. Apply rate limiting to API endpoints to mitigate brute-force and DoS attacks.
• For Admin Interface:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Disable the Admin Interface in production environments if not strictly necessary. If required, restrict access to the Admin Interface to a dedicated administrative network. Enforce strong authentication and authorization for the Admin Interface. Implement CSRF protection and sanitize inputs to prevent XSS. Regularly update CouchDB to patch Admin Interface vulnerabilities.
• For Storage Engine:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Implement database encryption at rest. Configure appropriate file system permissions to restrict access to data files. Regularly perform data integrity checks. Consider using disk encryption at the OS level as an additional layer of security.

2.3 Deployment Diagram - Clustered Deployment on VMs

Components: Load Balancer, Virtual Machines (VMs), CouchDB Instances, Persistent Storage, Internet.

Security Implications & Threats:

• Load Balancer (Infrastructure):

  • Threat: Misconfigured load balancer can lead to traffic misdirection, exposing backend instances directly, or creating denial of service vulnerabilities.
  • Threat: Load balancer vulnerabilities can be exploited to bypass security controls or gain access to backend systems.
  • Data Flow: Entry point for external traffic, distributes requests to CouchDB instances.

• Virtual Machines (VMs) (Infrastructure):

  • Threat: VM escape vulnerabilities can allow attackers to break out of the VM and access the hypervisor or other VMs.
  • Threat: Compromised VMs can be used to attack other VMs or the underlying infrastructure.
  • Threat: Insufficient VM hardening can leave CouchDB instances vulnerable.
  • Data Flow: Hosts CouchDB instances and provides compute resources.

• CouchDB Instances (Container Instance):

  • Threat: Security vulnerabilities within the CouchDB instances themselves (as detailed in Container Diagram section).
  • Threat: Misconfiguration of CouchDB instances can weaken security posture.
  • Data Flow: Runs within VMs, processes requests, and stores data in Persistent Storage.

• Persistent Storage (Infrastructure):

  • Threat: Data breaches if persistent storage is not encrypted and physical access is compromised.
  • Threat: Storage access control misconfigurations can allow unauthorized access to data.
  • Threat: Data loss or corruption due to storage failures or attacks.
  • Data Flow: Stores CouchDB data persistently.

Mitigation Strategies (Deployment Level):

• For Load Balancer:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Properly configure the load balancer with HTTPS termination and enforce TLS 1.2 or higher. Implement DDoS protection and rate limiting at the load balancer level. Regularly update load balancer firmware and software. Implement access control lists to restrict access to the load balancer management interface.
• For Virtual Machines (VMs):
  • Actionable Mitigation: Harden VMs using security best practices and cloud provider recommendations. Regularly patch VMs for OS and hypervisor vulnerabilities. Implement VM-level firewalls and intrusion detection/prevention systems. Isolate VMs in secure network segments.
• For CouchDB Instances:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Apply all container-level mitigation strategies to each CouchDB instance. Ensure consistent security configurations across all instances in the cluster. Regularly update CouchDB instances to the latest patched versions.
• For Persistent Storage:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Enable encryption at rest for persistent storage volumes. Implement access control lists to restrict access to storage volumes. Regularly backup persistent storage. Consider using immutable storage for backups to protect against ransomware.

2.4 Build Diagram - Build Process

Components: Developer, Code Changes, GitHub Repository, GitHub Actions CI, Build Process, Unit Tests, SAST Scanners, Dependency Check, Build Artifacts, Artifact Repository.

Security Implications & Threats:

• GitHub Repository (Code Repository):

  • Threat: Compromised repository can lead to injection of malicious code into the codebase, compromising the entire software supply chain.
  • Threat: Exposure of sensitive information (credentials, API keys) in the repository.
  • Data Flow: Stores source code and build scripts.

• GitHub Actions CI (CI/CD System):

  • Threat: Compromised CI/CD pipeline can be used to inject malicious code into build artifacts or deploy compromised software.
  • Threat: Leaky CI/CD configurations can expose sensitive information or credentials.
  • Threat: Lack of secure configuration of CI/CD workflows can lead to unauthorized modifications of the build process.
  • Data Flow: Automates the build, test, and security scanning process.

• Build Process (Process):

  • Threat: Vulnerabilities in build tools or dependencies used in the build process can be exploited to compromise build artifacts.
  • Threat: Lack of integrity checks on build artifacts can allow for tampering.
  • Data Flow: Compiles code, runs tests, and generates build artifacts.

• SAST Scanners & Dependency Check (Security Tools):

  • Threat: Misconfigured or outdated security tools can fail to detect vulnerabilities.
  • Threat: False positives from security tools can lead to alert fatigue and missed critical vulnerabilities.
  • Data Flow: Analyzes code and dependencies for vulnerabilities.

• Artifact Repository (Artifact Storage):

  • Threat: Compromised artifact repository can lead to distribution of malicious or vulnerable software.
  • Threat: Unauthorized access to the artifact repository can lead to data breaches or tampering with artifacts.
  • Data Flow: Stores and distributes build artifacts.

Mitigation Strategies (Build Level):

• For GitHub Repository:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Enable branch protection and require code reviews for all code changes. Implement strong access controls to the repository. Enable audit logging for repository activities. Scan the repository for secrets and remove any found.
• For GitHub Actions CI:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Securely configure CI/CD workflows, following security best practices for GitHub Actions. Use least privilege for CI/CD service accounts. Implement secrets management for CI/CD pipelines (e.g., GitHub Secrets). Regularly audit CI/CD configurations.
• For Build Process:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Use hardened and up-to-date build environments. Implement integrity checks for build artifacts (e.g., signing artifacts). Use dependency management tools to track and manage dependencies. Regularly update build tools and dependencies.
• For SAST Scanners & Dependency Check:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Integrate SAST and dependency scanning tools into the CI/CD pipeline. Regularly update security scanning tools and vulnerability databases. Configure tools to fail the build on critical vulnerabilities. Establish a process for triaging and remediating vulnerabilities identified by security tools.
• For Artifact Repository:
  • Actionable Mitigation: Implement strong access controls to the artifact repository. Enable audit logging for artifact repository access and modifications. Scan artifacts for vulnerabilities before publishing. Consider signing artifacts to ensure integrity and authenticity.

3. Actionable and Tailored Mitigation Strategies Summary

Based on the component-level analysis, here's a summary of actionable and tailored mitigation strategies for CouchDB:

Authentication & Authorization:

• Actionable Mitigation: Enforce strong password policies and consider multi-factor authentication for CouchDB users and administrators.
• Actionable Mitigation: Implement granular Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and Access Control Lists (ACLs) within CouchDB to enforce the principle of least privilege.
• Actionable Mitigation: Integrate with external authentication providers (LDAP, OAuth 2.0) for centralized user management if applicable to your organization's infrastructure.

Input Validation & Sanitization:

• Actionable Mitigation: Enhance input validation on all CouchDB API endpoints to prevent NoSQL injection and other injection attacks.
• Actionable Mitigation: Sanitize user inputs before storing them in CouchDB to prevent XSS attacks.
• Actionable Mitigation: Implement query sanitization within the Query Engine to prevent injection through views and search queries.

Cryptography:

• Actionable Mitigation: Enforce HTTPS for all communication with CouchDB, including API access, Admin Interface, and replication.
• Actionable Mitigation: Implement database encryption at rest to protect sensitive data stored on disk. Explore CouchDB-native encryption options or OS-level disk encryption.
• Actionable Mitigation: Ensure secure key management practices for encryption keys.

Logging & Monitoring:

• Actionable Mitigation: Implement comprehensive audit logging to track access and modifications to data and system configurations within CouchDB.
• Actionable Mitigation: Integrate CouchDB logs with a centralized monitoring and security information and event management (SIEM) system for real-time threat detection and incident response.

Security Scanning & Testing:

• Actionable Mitigation: Regularly perform security vulnerability scanning and penetration testing of the CouchDB deployment.
• Actionable Mitigation: Integrate Static Application Security Testing (SAST) and Dependency Check into the CI/CD pipeline for continuous security assessment.

Configuration Hardening & Patching:

• Actionable Mitigation: Harden the CouchDB configuration based on security best practices and vendor recommendations.
• Actionable Mitigation: Regularly apply security patches and updates to CouchDB, Erlang Runtime, Operating System, and all other components in the deployment.

Backup & Recovery:

• Actionable Mitigation: Implement regular and secure backups of CouchDB data.
• Actionable Mitigation: Encrypt backups at rest and in transit. Securely store backups in a separate, hardened environment.
• Actionable Mitigation: Regularly test backup and restore procedures to ensure data recovery capabilities.

Build Pipeline Security:

• Actionable Mitigation: Secure the entire software build pipeline, from code repository to artifact repository, following security best practices for CI/CD.
• Actionable Mitigation: Implement security scanning and integrity checks at each stage of the build pipeline.

By implementing these tailored mitigation strategies, you can significantly enhance the security posture of your CouchDB deployment and address the identified threats and business risks. Remember to prioritize these actions based on your organization's risk appetite and compliance requirements.