Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
152 lines (125 loc) · 12.8 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

152 lines (125 loc) · 12.8 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server

Objective: Compromise Application via RabbitMQ Server Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via RabbitMQ Server Exploitation ├───[OR] Gain Unauthorized Access to RabbitMQ Broker [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] Exploit Authentication/Authorization Weaknesses [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Default Credentials Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Brute-Force/Credential Stuffing Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Weak Password Policies [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───[OR] Exploit Network Exposure [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Unprotected Management UI Exposure [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Exposed AMQP Ports without Proper Firewalling [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───[OR] Exploit Vulnerabilities in RabbitMQ Server Software [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[AND] Exploiting Known CVEs in RabbitMQ Server [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[OR] Message Injection into Queues [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[AND] Unauthorized Publish Access to Exchanges/Queues [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[AND] Exploiting Application Logic to Publish Malicious Messages [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[OR] Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks on RabbitMQ Broker [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[OR] Resource Exhaustion [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Message Flooding [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[AND] Connection Exhaustion [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] └───[OR] Application Logic Exploitation via Message Content [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[AND] Malicious Message Content Triggering Application Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Gain Unauthorized Access to RabbitMQ Broker (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers aim to bypass authentication and authorization mechanisms to gain control over the RabbitMQ broker. This is a critical path as broker access allows for message manipulation, data access, and DoS attacks.

  • Potential Impact: Full control over RabbitMQ broker, leading to data breaches, message manipulation, application disruption, and potential system compromise.

  • Mitigation Focus: Strong authentication, robust authorization, secure network configuration, and regular security updates.

    • 1.1. Default Credentials Exploitation (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vector: Using well-known default usernames and passwords for the RabbitMQ management UI and AMQP users.
      • Potential Impact: Immediate and complete access to the RabbitMQ broker.
      • Mitigation:
        • Immediately change default credentials upon deployment.
        • Regularly audit and enforce strong password policies.

    • 1.2. Brute-Force/Credential Stuffing Attacks (High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vector: Attempting to guess passwords through repeated login attempts or using lists of compromised credentials from other breaches.
      • Potential Impact: Successful password cracking leading to unauthorized broker access.
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strong password policies (complexity, length, rotation).
        • Enable account lockout mechanisms after multiple failed login attempts.
        • Consider rate limiting login attempts to slow down brute-force attacks.

    • 1.3. Weak Password Policies (Critical Node)

      • Attack Vector: Lack of strong password complexity requirements or regular password rotation, making passwords easier to guess or crack.
      • Potential Impact: Increased susceptibility to brute-force and dictionary attacks, leading to unauthorized broker access.
      • Mitigation:
        • Enforce strong password complexity requirements (minimum length, character types).
        • Implement regular password rotation policies.
        • Use password strength meters during password creation.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Network Exposure (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigurations that expose the RabbitMQ broker or its management interface to unauthorized networks or the public internet.

  • Potential Impact: Direct access to the broker or management UI, enabling unauthorized control and potential compromise.

  • Mitigation Focus: Network segmentation, firewalls, VPNs, and secure configuration of exposed services.

    • 2.1. Unprotected Management UI Exposure (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vector: Making the RabbitMQ management UI accessible from the public internet or untrusted networks without proper access controls.
      • Potential Impact: Easy access point for attackers to manage and control the RabbitMQ broker through the UI.
      • Mitigation:
        • Restrict access to the management UI to trusted networks only (e.g., internal network, VPN).
        • Implement strong authentication for the management UI.
        • Consider disabling the management UI if it's not essential for operations.

    • 2.2. Exposed AMQP Ports without Proper Firewalling (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vector: Exposing the AMQP ports (5672, 5671) to the public internet or untrusted networks without firewall rules to restrict access.
      • Potential Impact: Direct access to the AMQP broker service, allowing attackers to connect, publish, and consume messages without proper authorization.
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement firewall rules to restrict access to AMQP ports only from trusted clients and networks.
        • Use network segmentation to isolate the RabbitMQ broker within a secure network zone.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Vulnerabilities in RabbitMQ Server Software (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting known or zero-day vulnerabilities in the RabbitMQ server software or its plugins.

  • Potential Impact: System compromise, denial of service, or unauthorized access depending on the vulnerability.

  • Mitigation Focus: Regular patching, vulnerability scanning, and robust security practices.

    • 3.1. Exploiting Known CVEs in RabbitMQ Server (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)
      • Attack Vector: Utilizing publicly known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in outdated versions of RabbitMQ server for exploitation.
      • Potential Impact: System compromise, remote code execution, denial of service, depending on the specific CVE.
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement a robust patch management process.
        • Regularly monitor security advisories for RabbitMQ and its dependencies.
        • Promptly apply security updates and patches.
        • Use vulnerability scanning tools to identify outdated RabbitMQ instances.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Message Injection into Queues (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious or unauthorized messages into RabbitMQ queues to manipulate application logic, cause data corruption, or trigger unintended actions.

  • Potential Impact: Application logic bypass, data corruption, denial of service, or indirect system compromise.

  • Mitigation Focus: Strict access control, input validation, and secure application design.

    • 4.1. Unauthorized Publish Access to Exchanges/Queues (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigured RabbitMQ permissions or application vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized publishing access to exchanges or queues.
      • Potential Impact: Ability to inject arbitrary messages, leading to data corruption, application logic bypass, or denial of service.
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strict Access Control Lists (ACLs) in RabbitMQ to control who can publish to specific exchanges and queues.
        • Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning publish permissions.
        • Regularly audit and review RabbitMQ permissions.

    • 4.2. Exploiting Application Logic to Publish Malicious Messages (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vector: Leveraging vulnerabilities in the application's message publishing logic to inject malicious payloads or crafted messages.
      • Potential Impact: Application logic bypass, data corruption, indirect system compromise if malicious messages trigger vulnerabilities in message consumers.
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement robust input validation and sanitization in the application that publishes messages to RabbitMQ.
        • Prevent injection of malicious payloads through proper input handling.
        • Follow secure coding practices in message publishing components.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks on RabbitMQ Broker (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Overwhelming the RabbitMQ broker with requests or malicious messages to exhaust its resources and cause service disruption.

  • Potential Impact: RabbitMQ broker unavailability, application downtime, and business disruption.

  • Mitigation Focus: Resource limits, rate limiting, input validation, and DoS protection mechanisms.

    • 5.1. Message Flooding (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vector: Sending a large volume of messages to RabbitMQ queues to overwhelm the broker's processing capacity and exhaust resources.
      • Potential Impact: RabbitMQ broker slowdown or crash, application downtime due to message processing delays.
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement rate limiting on message publishing.
        • Configure message size limits in RabbitMQ.
        • Set queue limits (message count, queue length) to prevent queue overflow.
        • Implement backpressure mechanisms in the application to handle message overload.

    • 5.2. Connection Exhaustion (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)

      • Attack Vector: Opening a large number of connections to the RabbitMQ broker to exhaust connection limits and prevent legitimate clients from connecting.
      • Potential Impact: RabbitMQ broker becomes unresponsive, preventing applications from connecting and communicating.
      • Mitigation:
        • Limit the number of connections per user or vhost in RabbitMQ.
        • Implement connection pooling in the application to reuse connections efficiently and reduce connection overhead.
        • Monitor connection counts and set alerts for unusual connection spikes.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Application Logic Exploitation via Message Content (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector: Crafting malicious message content that, when processed by the application's message consumers, triggers vulnerabilities in the application logic.

  • Potential Impact: Application compromise, data breach, or system compromise if malicious messages exploit application vulnerabilities like command injection or SQL injection.

  • Mitigation Focus: Robust input validation and sanitization in message consumers, secure coding practices, and application-level security measures.

    • 6.1. Malicious Message Content Triggering Application Vulnerabilities (Critical Node, High-Risk Path)
      • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious code or payloads within message content that exploits vulnerabilities (e.g., command injection, SQL injection, cross-site scripting) in the application's message processing logic.
      • Potential Impact: Application compromise, data breach, or system compromise if vulnerabilities are successfully exploited.
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement robust input validation and sanitization in the application's message consumers.
        • Treat message content as untrusted input and sanitize it before processing.
        • Follow secure coding practices to prevent common application vulnerabilities when handling message content.
        • Use web application firewalls (WAFs) or similar security tools to detect and block malicious requests if applicable.