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Threat Model Analysis for rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server

Threat: Unauthorized Broker Access (Spoofing)

  • Threat: Unauthorized Broker Access (Spoofing)

    • Description: An attacker gains access to the RabbitMQ broker by guessing or stealing credentials, or by exploiting a misconfiguration that allows unauthenticated access. The attacker could then publish malicious messages, consume legitimate messages, or disrupt the service.
    • Impact:
      • Data breaches (reading sensitive messages, assuming the application didn't encrypt them).
      • Data corruption (injecting malicious messages).
      • Denial of service (flooding queues, exhausting resources).
      • System compromise (if combined with other vulnerabilities).
    • Affected Component:
      • rabbit_auth_backend_internal: The internal authentication backend.
      • rabbit_access_control: The module responsible for enforcing access control rules.
      • Network listeners (e.g., rabbit_amqp_connection for AMQP connections).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Authentication: Enforce strong, unique passwords or, preferably, use client-side certificate authentication (mutual TLS).
      • Disable Default User: Delete or change the password of the default guest user immediately after installation.
      • Virtual Hosts (vhosts): Use vhosts to isolate different applications and limit the scope of access.
      • Firewall Rules: Restrict network access to the RabbitMQ ports (5672, 15672) to only authorized clients.

Threat: Denial of Service via Connection Exhaustion (DoS)

  • Threat: Denial of Service via Connection Exhaustion (DoS)

    • Description: An attacker opens a large number of connections to the RabbitMQ broker, exhausting available resources (file descriptors, memory) and preventing legitimate clients from connecting.
    • Impact:
      • Service unavailability.
      • Potential for cascading failures if other systems depend on RabbitMQ.
    • Affected Component:
      • rabbit_networking: The core networking module.
      • rabbit_listener: The component that manages listeners for different protocols.
      • Operating system resources (file descriptors, sockets).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Connection Limits: Configure maximum connection limits per user, vhost, and globally.
      • Firewall Rules: Limit the number of connections from a single IP address.
      • Resource Monitoring: Monitor connection counts and resource usage to detect and respond to attacks.

Threat: Denial of Service via Message Flooding (DoS)

  • Threat: Denial of Service via Message Flooding (DoS)

    • Description: An attacker publishes a large volume of messages to a queue or exchange, overwhelming the broker's resources (memory, disk space) and causing it to become unresponsive.
    • Impact:
      • Service unavailability.
      • Data loss (if messages are not durable and the broker crashes).
      • Disk space exhaustion.
    • Affected Component:
      • rabbit_queue: The queue component.
      • rabbit_exchange: The exchange component.
      • Memory management (rabbit_memory_monitor).
      • Disk space management.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Queue Length Limits: Set maximum queue lengths and define policies for handling overflow (reject, drop, dead-letter).
      • Message TTL (Time-To-Live): Set TTLs for messages to automatically expire old messages.
      • Resource Monitoring: Monitor queue lengths, memory usage, and disk space.

Threat: Information Disclosure via Management Interface (Information Disclosure)

  • Threat: Information Disclosure via Management Interface (Information Disclosure)

    • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the RabbitMQ management interface, exposing sensitive information about the broker's configuration, queues, exchanges, connections, and users.
    • Impact:
      • Exposure of sensitive configuration details (e.g., credentials, vhost settings).
      • Leakage of message metadata (e.g., routing keys, queue names).
      • Potential for reconnaissance and further attacks.
    • Affected Component:
      • rabbitmq_management: The management plugin.
      • rabbitmq_management_agent: The agent that handles management requests.
      • HTTP server (used by the management interface).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Management Interface: Use strong authentication (username/password, or preferably, client certificates) for the management interface.
      • Restrict Access: Limit access to the management interface to specific IP addresses or networks.
      • Disable Unnecessary Features: Disable any management features that are not required.
      • HTTPS: Use HTTPS for the management interface to encrypt communication.

Threat: Exploitation of Vulnerabilities in RabbitMQ (Elevation of Privilege)

  • Threat: Exploitation of Vulnerabilities in RabbitMQ (Elevation of Privilege)

    • Description: An attacker exploits a known or unknown vulnerability in the RabbitMQ server code or its dependencies to gain elevated privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise.
    • Impact:
      • Complete system compromise.
      • Data theft.
      • Data destruction.
      • Installation of malware.
    • Affected Component:
      • Potentially any component of RabbitMQ, depending on the vulnerability. This could include core modules, plugins, or external libraries.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep RabbitMQ Updated: Regularly update RabbitMQ to the latest stable version to patch known vulnerabilities.
      • Run as Non-Root: Run RabbitMQ as a dedicated, non-privileged user.
      • Harden Host System: Secure the underlying operating system.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan the RabbitMQ server and its dependencies for vulnerabilities.