attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for alistgo/alist

Attack Surface: Unauthenticated File Listing Exposure

• Description: Exposure of file listings to unauthenticated users, allowing them to browse files and directories hosted on configured storage providers without login.
• How alist contributes: Alist's configuration can be set to allow unauthenticated access to file listings. This is a configuration choice within alist itself.
• Example: An administrator deploys alist and forgets to configure authentication, leaving the default open access. An anonymous user can access the alist instance and browse all files and folders from connected cloud storage services.
• Impact: Information disclosure, potential data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive files.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers: Ensure default configuration enforces authentication. Provide prominent warnings and clear documentation about the security implications of disabling authentication.
  • Users: Mandatory: Configure authentication for alist access. Enable and enforce user login requirements for accessing file listings.

Attack Surface: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Storage Provider Interactions

• Description: Alist's interaction with storage provider APIs can be manipulated to make requests to unintended resources, potentially internal networks or external services.
• How alist contributes: Alist's code handles user input or configuration related to storage provider interactions (e.g., paths, filenames, API parameters) and uses these to construct requests to external storage provider APIs. Insufficient input validation in alist's code is the direct cause.
• Example: An attacker manipulates a file path parameter in a download request to force alist to make a request to an internal server on the same network, potentially scanning for open ports or accessing internal services because alist's request construction is vulnerable.
• Impact: Internal network scanning, access to internal services, potential data exfiltration from storage providers, denial of service.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers: Implement strict input validation and sanitization within alist's codebase for all parameters related to storage provider interactions. Use allowlists for allowed storage provider domains if feasible within alist's logic.
  • Users: Configure storage provider access with the minimum necessary permissions. While user configuration helps, the primary mitigation is secure coding within alist itself.

Attack Surface: Path Traversal via File Operations

• Description: Manipulation of file paths during file operations (download, preview, etc.) to access files outside of the intended storage directory or even system files on the server.
• How alist contributes: Alist's code processes file paths provided by users or derived from storage provider responses for file operations. Vulnerabilities in alist's path handling logic are the direct cause of this attack surface.
• Example: An attacker modifies a download request to include "../../../etc/passwd" in the file path. If alist's path validation is insufficient, it might attempt to download the server's /etc/passwd file instead of the intended file from the storage provider.
• Impact: Unauthorized file access, information disclosure, potential arbitrary file read, sensitive data exposure.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers: Implement strict path validation and sanitization within alist's code for all file operations. Ensure that file paths are always resolved relative to the intended storage directory using secure path manipulation functions in alist's codebase.
  • Users: Ensure alist is deployed with proper file system permissions. User-side mitigation is limited; the primary responsibility lies in secure development of alist.

Attack Surface: API Endpoint Vulnerabilities (Authentication Bypass, Injection)

• Description: Security flaws in alist's API endpoints, potentially allowing unauthorized access or injection attacks.
• How alist contributes: Alist implements API endpoints for various functionalities. Vulnerabilities in alist's API implementation, such as weak authentication or input sanitization, are the direct source of these risks.
• Example (Authentication Bypass): A vulnerability in alist's API authentication logic allows an attacker to bypass authentication and access administrative API endpoints without valid credentials.
• Example (Command Injection): An API endpoint within alist that processes user input to execute system commands is vulnerable to command injection if alist's input sanitization is lacking.
• Impact: Full system compromise, data breaches, denial of service, unauthorized administrative access.
• Risk Severity: Critical (for Authentication Bypass and Command Injection), High (for other injection types)
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers: Implement strong and secure API authentication mechanisms within alist's API. Thoroughly validate and sanitize all user input processed by API endpoints in alist's code to prevent injection vulnerabilities. Follow secure coding practices and perform regular security audits of alist's API implementation.
  • Users: Use strong and unique API keys if applicable. User-side mitigation is limited; the primary responsibility is secure API development within alist.

Attack Surface: Insecure Storage of Storage Provider Credentials

• Description: Storage provider credentials (API keys, access tokens, passwords) are stored insecurely, making them vulnerable to compromise.
• How alist contributes: Alist requires storing these credentials to function. If alist's design chooses insecure storage methods (plaintext, weak encryption), it directly introduces this vulnerability.
• Example: Storage provider API keys are stored in plaintext in alist's configuration file as designed by alist. An attacker gains access to the server and reads the configuration file, obtaining the API keys and gaining full access to the connected storage provider accounts.
• Impact: Full access to configured storage provider accounts, data breaches, potential compromise of other services if credentials are reused.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers: Mandatory: Never design alist to store storage provider credentials in plaintext. Implement secure storage mechanisms like encryption at rest using strong encryption algorithms within alist. Provide options for using environment variables or dedicated secrets management solutions as part of alist's configuration.
  • Users: Utilize secure configuration methods provided by alist. Avoid storing credentials in plaintext configuration files if possible based on alist's options.

Attack Surface: Default Credentials and Weak Default Configurations

• Description: Alist ships with default administrative credentials or insecure default configurations that are not changed upon deployment.
• How alist contributes: If alist itself includes default credentials or insecure defaults in its distribution, it directly creates an easily exploitable vulnerability.
• Example: Alist is distributed with a default username and password ("admin"/"password") as part of its initial setup. An attacker uses these default credentials to log in and gain administrative access to the alist instance.
• Impact: Unauthorized access, system compromise, full control over alist instance and connected storage.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Developers: Mandatory: Ensure alist does not ship with default administrative credentials. Force users to set strong passwords during initial setup within alist itself. Provide secure default configurations and clear guidance on hardening the deployment in alist's documentation.
  • Users: Mandatory: Change all default credentials immediately after installing alist. Review and harden default configurations according to security best practices and alist documentation.