attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for alistgo/alist

Objective: To achieve unauthorized access to sensitive data managed by the application using AList, or to disrupt the availability and integrity of the application and its data.

Attack Tree Visualization

• Gain Initial Access to AList Application
  • Exploit Authentication/Authorization Weaknesses [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Exploit Default Credentials [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Actionable Insight: Force change of default admin credentials upon initial setup. Document this clearly.
    • Vulnerability in Authentication Logic (e.g., bypass, injection) [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Actionable Insight: Regular security audits and penetration testing of AList's authentication mechanisms. Stay updated with AList security patches.
  • Exploit Web Interface Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] (XSS, CSRF are medium likelihood & significant impact)
• Exploit Storage Provider Integration Weaknesses [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • Misconfigured Storage Provider Permissions [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Likelihood & Impact]
    • Overly Permissive Access Control Lists (ACLs) on Storage Buckets/Folders [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Actionable Insight: Follow least privilege principle when configuring storage provider permissions. Regularly audit storage ACLs.
    • Publicly Accessible Storage Buckets/Folders [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Actionable Insight: Regularly audit storage provider configurations to ensure no buckets or folders are unintentionally publicly accessible.
    • Exposed API Keys/Secrets for Storage Providers [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Stored Insecurely in AList Configuration (e.g., plain text in config files) [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Actionable Insight: Encrypt sensitive configuration data, including API keys and secrets. Use secure configuration management practices.
      • Exposed via Web Interface or Logs (e.g., in error messages, debug logs) [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Actionable Insight: Sanitize logs and error messages to prevent exposure of sensitive information. Disable debug mode in production.
• Exploit Misconfigurations and Operational Weaknesses [HIGH RISK PATH]
  • Insecure Deployment Practices [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Running AList with Root Privileges (unnecessary and dangerous) [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Actionable Insight: Run AList with the least necessary privileges. Use a dedicated user account with limited permissions.
    • Exposing AList Admin Interface to Public Network (if not intended) [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Actionable Insight: Restrict access to the AList admin interface to trusted networks or IP addresses. Use a VPN or firewall.
    • Insufficient Logging and Monitoring [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
      • Actionable Insight: Implement comprehensive logging and monitoring for AList. Monitor for suspicious activity, authentication failures, and errors.
  • Lack of Regular Security Updates and Patching [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]
    • Actionable Insight: Establish a process for regularly updating AList to the latest versions, including security patches. Subscribe to AList security announcements or watch the GitHub repository for updates.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Authentication/Authorization Weaknesses [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Vectors: * Exploit Default Credentials [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack Vector: Attackers attempt to log in using well-known default usernames and passwords (e.g., "admin"/"password", "administrator"/"admin"). AList, like many applications, might have default credentials set during initial setup. If these are not changed, it provides immediate, high-privilege access. * Impact: Critical - Full administrative access to AList, allowing complete control over the application, data, and potentially the underlying system. * Vulnerability in Authentication Logic (e.g., bypass, injection) [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Attackers look for flaws in AList's authentication code. This could include: * Authentication Bypass: Exploiting logic errors to circumvent the login process without valid credentials. * SQL Injection (if applicable): Injecting malicious SQL code into login forms to bypass authentication or extract user credentials. * Other Injection Vulnerabilities: Exploiting other injection points in the authentication process to gain unauthorized access. * Impact: Critical - Complete bypass of authentication, allowing attackers to gain access as any user, including administrators.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Web Interface Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Vectors: * Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): * Attack Vector: Attackers inject malicious JavaScript code into AList's web pages. This can be achieved through: * Stored XSS: Injecting malicious scripts into data stored by AList (e.g., file names, descriptions if allowed). When other users view this data, the script executes in their browsers. * Reflected XSS: Tricking users into clicking malicious links containing JavaScript code in parameters. The script is then reflected back by the server and executed in the user's browser. * Impact: Significant - Can lead to session hijacking, account takeover, data theft (including session cookies, credentials), website defacement, and redirection to malicious sites. * Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF): * Attack Vector: Attackers trick authenticated users into performing unintended actions on AList without their knowledge. This is done by embedding malicious requests in websites or emails that the user might visit while logged into AList. * Impact: Moderate - Attackers can perform actions on behalf of the victim user, such as modifying data, changing settings, or performing administrative tasks if the victim has sufficient privileges.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Storage Provider Integration Weaknesses [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Vectors: * Misconfigured Storage Provider Permissions [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Likelihood & Impact]: * Overly Permissive Access Control Lists (ACLs) on Storage Buckets/Folders [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Administrators misconfigure storage provider permissions, granting excessive access to storage buckets or folders used by AList. This can include granting public read/write access or overly broad access to groups or roles. * Impact: Significant to Critical - Data Breach, Unauthorized Access to sensitive data stored in the cloud storage. Attackers can read, modify, or delete data depending on the misconfiguration. * Publicly Accessible Storage Buckets/Folders [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack Vector: Storage buckets or folders are unintentionally made publicly accessible due to misconfiguration. This makes the data directly accessible to anyone on the internet without any authentication. * Impact: Critical - Data Breach, Public Data Exposure. Sensitive data becomes publicly available, leading to potential reputational damage, compliance violations, and data theft. * Exposed API Keys/Secrets for Storage Providers [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Stored Insecurely in AList Configuration (e.g., plain text in config files) [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: API keys or secrets required for AList to access storage providers are stored insecurely, such as in plain text configuration files, environment variables without proper protection, or in easily accessible locations. * Impact: Critical - Full Storage Access, Account Takeover. Attackers who obtain these keys can directly access and control the storage provider account, bypassing AList entirely. * Exposed via Web Interface or Logs (e.g., in error messages, debug logs) [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: API keys or secrets are unintentionally exposed through error messages displayed in the web interface, debug logs that are not properly secured, or other information disclosure vulnerabilities. * Impact: Critical - Full Storage Access, Account Takeover. Similar to insecure storage, exposed keys grant direct access to the storage provider.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Misconfigurations and Operational Weaknesses [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Vectors: * Insecure Deployment Practices [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Running AList with Root Privileges (unnecessary and dangerous) [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: AList is deployed and run with root or administrator privileges. This is unnecessary for its operation and significantly increases the impact of any vulnerability. If an attacker gains code execution through any vulnerability in AList, they will have root-level access to the entire system. * Impact: Critical - Full System Compromise if exploited. Any vulnerability in AList becomes a path to complete system takeover. * Exposing AList Admin Interface to Public Network (if not intended) [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: The administrative interface of AList, which should be restricted to administrators on trusted networks, is exposed to the public internet. This makes it a much easier target for brute-force attacks, vulnerability scanning, and exploitation. * Impact: Significant - Easier Target for Attacks. Publicly exposed admin interfaces are prime targets for attackers seeking to compromise the application. * Insufficient Logging and Monitoring [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack Vector: Logging and monitoring are not properly configured or implemented for AList. This means that security incidents, attacks, and suspicious activities may go undetected. * Impact: Moderate - Delayed Incident Response, Difficulty in Detection. Lack of logs hinders the ability to detect attacks in progress, investigate security incidents, and perform effective incident response. * Lack of Regular Security Updates and Patching [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH]: * Attack Vector: Administrators fail to regularly update AList to the latest versions and apply security patches. This leaves the application vulnerable to known vulnerabilities that have been publicly disclosed and for which patches are available. * Impact: Significant to Critical - Vulnerability Exploitation. Unpatched vulnerabilities are easy targets for attackers, who can use readily available exploit code to compromise the application.