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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for alistgo/alist

Attack Surface: Credential Compromise (via alist Vulnerabilities)

  • Description: Unauthorized access to credentials stored by alist due to vulnerabilities within alist itself, such as insecure storage or information leakage.
  • How alist Contributes: alist stores and manages these credentials, making its internal security paramount.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in alist's configuration file parsing logic to read the encrypted credential store, then uses a separate vulnerability to obtain the decryption key.
  • Impact: Complete access to all data within the compromised storage providers connected to alist. Data breaches, data loss, reputational damage.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Strong Encryption at Rest: Encrypt all stored credentials using strong, industry-standard encryption (e.g., AES-256) with a robust, separate key management system. The decryption key must not be stored alongside the encrypted data.
      • Secure Configuration Storage: Protect configuration files and databases with strict file system permissions and access controls. Consider using a dedicated secrets management solution (external to alist's codebase) to further isolate secrets.
      • Prevent Information Leakage: Rigorously audit alist's code to ensure that credentials (or any part of them, including encryption keys) are never logged, displayed in error messages, or exposed through the UI or API in any way.
      • Input Validation and Sanitization: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all user-provided input, especially anything related to credential management, to prevent injection attacks that might expose or manipulate credentials.
      • Audit Logging: Log all credential-related actions (creation, modification, access, attempted access) with sufficient detail for forensic analysis, but without logging the credentials themselves.
      • Code Review and Static Analysis: Perform regular code reviews and static analysis to identify potential vulnerabilities related to credential handling.

Attack Surface: Storage Provider API Exploitation (via alist's Intermediary Role)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in how alist constructs and sends API requests to connected storage providers, allowing attackers to bypass intended security controls. This focuses on vulnerabilities within alist's code, not the storage providers themselves.
  • How alist Contributes: alist acts as a proxy, and flaws in its request handling can be exploited.
  • Example: An attacker crafts a malicious file path that, due to improper sanitization within alist, is passed to the storage provider's API, triggering a path traversal vulnerability on the provider side, but initiated through alist.
  • Impact: Data breaches, data modification, denial of service, and potential compromise of connected storage.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Strict Input Validation (Whitelist Approach): Implement extremely strict input validation for all user-supplied data used in constructing API calls. Use a whitelist approach, allowing only known-good characters and patterns, rather than trying to blacklist bad ones.
      • Parameterized API Calls: Use parameterized API calls or libraries that inherently prevent injection vulnerabilities whenever possible. Avoid string concatenation for building API requests.
      • SSRF Prevention: Implement robust Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) prevention. Validate all URLs and hostnames, and use a whitelist of allowed destinations if feasible. alist should never allow arbitrary requests to be made through it.
      • Error Handling (No Leakage): Ensure that error messages returned from storage provider APIs are handled gracefully within alist and do not leak sensitive information to the user. Log errors securely for internal debugging.
      • Code Review and Dynamic Analysis: Conduct regular code reviews and dynamic analysis (e.g., fuzzing) specifically targeting alist's API interaction logic.

Attack Surface: Authorization Bypass (within alist's Logic)

  • Description: Users circumventing alist's internal authorization checks to access files or folders they shouldn't have permission to, due to flaws within alist's code.
  • How alist Contributes: alist implements its own authorization layer on top of the storage providers' permissions. This layer must be robust.
  • Example: A user discovers a bug in alist's URL handling that allows them to bypass permission checks and directly access a file URL, even though alist's UI would normally prevent this.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data, potentially violating privacy and confidentiality.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Server-Side Authorization Checks: Implement all authorization checks on the server-side, within alist's core logic. Never rely on client-side checks, as these can be easily bypassed.
      • Least Privilege Enforcement: Ensure that alist's internal authorization system adheres strictly to the principle of least privilege.
      • Comprehensive Testing: Thoroughly test all authorization logic, including edge cases and boundary conditions, to ensure that there are no bypass vulnerabilities. Include negative test cases (attempts to access unauthorized resources).
      • Code Review (Authorization Focus): Conduct code reviews with a specific focus on the authorization logic, looking for potential bypasses or flaws.

Attack Surface: Management Interface Compromise (Direct alist Vulnerabilities)

  • Description: Unauthorized access to the alist management interface due to vulnerabilities within the interface itself, such as weak authentication or injection flaws.
  • How alist Contributes: The management interface is a core part of alist and a high-value target.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the alist management interface to steal an administrator's session cookie and gain full control.
  • Impact: Complete control over alist, including the ability to modify configurations, access credentials, and potentially compromise connected storage.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers:
      • Strong Authentication and MFA: Enforce strong password policies and strongly recommend (or require) multi-factor authentication (MFA) for the management interface.
      • Secure Session Management: Implement secure session management practices, including using strong session IDs, setting appropriate session timeouts, and protecting against session fixation and hijacking.
      • Input Validation and Output Encoding: Rigorously validate all input to the management interface and properly encode output to prevent injection attacks (XSS, etc.).
      • Rate Limiting (Brute-Force Protection): Implement rate limiting on login attempts to mitigate brute-force attacks against the management interface.
      • Code Review and Security Testing: Conduct regular code reviews and security testing (including penetration testing) specifically targeting the management interface.