Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
101 lines (87 loc) · 8.36 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

101 lines (87 loc) · 8.36 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for alistgo/alist

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to files and/or execute arbitrary code on the server hosting the alist application.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+                                     
                                     |  Gain Unauthorized Access to Files and/or Execute  |                                     
                                     |          Arbitrary Code on the Server             |                                     
                                     +-----------------------------------------------------+                                     
                                                        |
          +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+          
          |                                                                                         |          
+-------------------------+                                      +--------------------------------+                +---------------------------------+          
|  Exploit Vulnerabilities |                                      |   Abuse Misconfigurations    |                |    Social Engineering/User Error   |          
|     in alist Code       |                                      |        in alist/Server      |                |         Related to alist         |          
+-------------------------+                                      +--------------------------------+                +---------------------------------+          
          |                                                                |                                                 |          
+---------+---------+                                      +---------+---------+                 +---------+---------+          
|  WebDAV/API  |                                      |  Storage Provider |  |  Authentication |  |  Phishing/  |  |  Credential |
| Vulnerabilities|                                      |   Misconfig.   |  |   Misconfig.   |  |  Deception  |  |    Stuffing   |
+---------+---------+                                      +---------+---------+                 +---------+---------+          
          |                                                        |         |                         |         |          
+---------+---------+                                  +---------+ +---------+                 +---------+ +---------+          
| Path Traversal |                                  |  Exposed  | | Weak/Default|                 |  Tricking  | |  Using    |
| in API Handling|                                  |  Sensitive| | Credentials |                 |  User to   | |  Leaked   |
+---------+---------+                                  |  Files/   | |             |                 |  Reveal   | |  alist    |
                                                      |  Folders  | |             |                 |  Credentials| |  Credentials|
                                                      +---------+ +---------+                 +---------+ +---------+

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Vulnerabilities in alist Code (WebDAV/API Vulnerabilities): Path Traversal in API Handling

  • Description: An attacker manipulates file paths provided to the alist API (WebDAV or REST) to access files or directories outside the intended root directory. This is typically done by injecting ".." sequences into the path.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High to Very High (Access to arbitrary files, potential code execution)
  • Effort: Low (Well-known attack, tools readily available)
  • Skill Level: Low (Basic understanding of web vulnerabilities)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Can be detected with vulnerability scanners and penetration testing)
  • Mitigation:
    • Rigorously validate all file paths received from the client.
    • Normalize paths to remove any "../" sequences before accessing the file system.
    • Use a well-vetted library for path manipulation.
    • Implement a chroot jail or similar mechanism to restrict file system access.

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Misconfigurations in alist/Server: Storage Provider Misconfiguration (Exposed Sensitive Files/Folders)

  • Description: The underlying storage provider (e.g., S3 bucket, network share) is configured with overly permissive access controls, allowing unauthorized users to access files directly, bypassing alist's security mechanisms.
  • Likelihood: Medium to High (Common misconfiguration)
  • Impact: High to Very High (Direct data exposure)
  • Effort: Very Low (Automated scanners can find exposed resources)
  • Skill Level: Very Low (No special skills required)
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Low (Publicly exposed data is easily found)
  • Mitigation:
    • Regularly audit the permissions of all connected storage providers.
    • Follow the principle of least privilege.
    • Use automated tools to scan for misconfigured storage providers.
    • Implement strong authentication and authorization on the storage provider itself.

Attack Tree Path: Abuse Misconfigurations in alist/Server: Authentication Misconfiguration (Weak/Default Credentials)

  • Description: The alist administrative interface or the credentials used to access storage providers are set to weak, easily guessable passwords, or default credentials that haven't been changed.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Common, especially with default credentials)
  • Impact: High to Very High (Complete system compromise)
  • Effort: Very Low (Brute-force or guessing)
  • Skill Level: Very Low (No special skills required)
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Failed login attempts can be logged)
  • Mitigation:
    • Enforce strong password policies.
    • Disable or change default credentials immediately after installation.
    • Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA).
    • Regularly audit user accounts and credentials.

Attack Tree Path: Social Engineering/User Error Related to alist: Phishing/Deception (Tricking User to Reveal Credentials)

  • Description: An attacker crafts a fake alist login page or sends deceptive emails to trick users into providing their alist credentials.
  • Likelihood: High (Phishing is a very common attack)
  • Impact: High (Compromised user accounts)
  • Effort: Low to Medium (Creating a convincing phishing campaign)
  • Skill Level: Low to Medium (Basic social engineering skills)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires user awareness and security training)
  • Mitigation:
    • Educate users about phishing attacks and how to identify fake login pages.
    • Encourage users to use strong, unique passwords and to enable MFA.
    • Implement email security measures (SPF, DKIM, DMARC) to reduce the likelihood of phishing emails reaching users.
    • Use a web filter to block known phishing sites.

Attack Tree Path: Social Engineering/User Error Related to alist: Credential Stuffing (Using Leaked alist Credentials)

  • Description: If a user's alist credentials have been compromised in a previous data breach (and they reuse passwords), an attacker could use those credentials to gain access.
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Mitigation:
      • Encourage users to use strong, unique passwords.
      • Consider implementing a system to detect and block credential stuffing attacks (e.g., by monitoring for multiple failed login attempts from the same IP address or using a service that checks against known breached credentials).
      • Implement Multi-Factor Authentication.