Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
154 lines (111 loc) · 11.7 KB

mitigations.md

File metadata and controls

154 lines (111 loc) · 11.7 KB

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for alistgo/alist

Mitigation Strategy: Strong Authentication and Authorization (within alist)

Description:

  1. Enable Built-in Authentication: Use alist's built-in authentication system. This is configured in the alist configuration file (e.g., config.json). Do not run alist without authentication enabled unless it's on a completely isolated, trusted network (and even then, it's not recommended).
  2. Strong Passwords: Set strong, unique passwords for all alist user accounts directly within the alist configuration. Avoid default passwords.
  3. Configure Permissions (Built-in): Use alist's built-in permission system (read, write, manage) to grant the least privilege necessary to each user within the alist configuration. Define permissions for each user and storage provider combination.
  4. Regular Review (of alist Config): Periodically review the alist configuration file to ensure user accounts and permissions are still appropriate. Remove or disable unused accounts directly within the configuration.
  5. Disable Guest Access (Configuration): Explicitly disable guest access in the alist configuration file unless it is absolutely required and its limitations are fully understood.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Unauthorized Access to Files: (Severity: Critical)
    • Data Breach: (Severity: Critical)
    • Malicious File Upload/Modification: (Severity: High)

  • Impact:

    • Significantly reduces the risk of unauthorized access, data breaches, and malicious file operations.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • alist has built-in authentication and authorization features, configurable through its configuration file.

  • Missing Implementation (within alist's scope):

    • Password Complexity Enforcement: alist might not enforce strong password policies (minimum length, character requirements) at the application level. This relies on the administrator setting strong passwords.
    • Account Lockout: alist likely does not have built-in account lockout mechanisms to prevent brute-force attacks. This is a significant limitation within alist.
    • Two-Factor Authentication (2FA): alist does not natively support 2FA. This is a major missing security feature that cannot be addressed solely within alist's current design.
    • Session Management Review: A thorough review of alist's session management code is needed to ensure proper session invalidation and secure cookie attributes.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Storage Provider Configuration (within alist's config)

Description:

  1. Least Privilege (Credentials in Config): When configuring storage providers within the alist configuration file, ensure that the credentials provided have the absolute minimum permissions required. If alist only needs read access, the credentials should not have write or delete permissions. This is a configuration setting within alist.
  2. Review and Audit (Config File): Regularly review the alist configuration file to ensure that storage provider credentials and settings remain appropriate.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Unauthorized Access to Storage Providers: (Severity: Critical)
    • Privilege Escalation: (Severity: High)

  • Impact:

    • Reduces the risk of unauthorized access and limits the potential damage if alist is compromised.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • alist allows configuring storage providers and their credentials within its configuration file.

  • Missing Implementation (within alist's scope):

    • Credential Validation: alist should ideally validate the provided credentials before attempting to use them, to catch misconfiguration errors early. This would be a code-level improvement within alist.
    • Native Secrets Management Integration: alist does not have built-in integration.

Mitigation Strategy: Careful Path Configuration and Validation (within alist)

Description:

  1. Precise Paths (in alist Config): When configuring accessible paths for storage providers within the alist configuration file, be extremely specific. Avoid overly broad wildcards.
  2. Whitelist Approach (in alist Config): Use a "whitelist" approach in the alist configuration, explicitly defining allowed paths rather than excluding paths.
  3. Regular Review (of alist Config): Periodically review the alist configuration file to ensure that the configured paths are still appropriate and do not expose unintended files.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Path Traversal: (Severity: Critical)
    • Exposure of Sensitive Files: (Severity: High)
    • Information Disclosure: (Severity: Medium)

  • Impact:

    • Reduces the risk of path traversal attacks and unintentional exposure of sensitive files.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • alist allows configuring accessible paths for each storage provider within its configuration file.

  • Missing Implementation (within alist's scope):

    • Robust Input Validation (Code Level): alist's code should include robust input validation to prevent path traversal attacks, especially if any user-provided input influences path selection. This is a code-level improvement, not just a configuration issue.
    • Automated Path Testing: Ideally, alist would have internal mechanisms to test path configurations for vulnerabilities, but this is unlikely and would be a significant code addition.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Logging Practices (within alist)

Description:

  1. Avoid Sensitive Information (Configuration): Configure alist's logging (likely through the configuration file or command-line flags) to never include sensitive information like passwords or API keys.
  2. Appropriate Log Level (Configuration): Set the logging level appropriately within the alist configuration. Avoid excessive verbosity (DEBUG) in production. Use INFO or WARN.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Data Leakage via Logs: (Severity: Medium)

  • Impact:

    • Reduces the risk of sensitive information being exposed in log files.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • alist likely has logging capabilities, configurable through its configuration or command-line arguments.

  • Missing Implementation (within alist's scope):

    • Structured Logging (Code Level): alist should ideally use structured logging (e.g., JSON format) for easier parsing and analysis. This is a code-level change.
    • Log Sanitization (Code Level): alist's code should include log sanitization to automatically remove or redact any sensitive information that might accidentally be logged. This is a code-level improvement.

Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize File Metadata and Preview Content (Code Level)

Description:

  1. HTML Sanitization (Code Level): If alist displays any HTML content (previews, metadata), its code must use a robust HTML sanitization library to remove or escape malicious code. This is a code-level implementation detail.
  2. Input Validation (Code Level): alist's code must validate any user-provided input used for metadata or previews.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): (Severity: High)
    • Client-Side Attacks: (Severity: High)

  • Impact:

    • Reduces the risk of XSS and client-side attacks.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • alist may have some sanitization, but its effectiveness needs verification through code review and testing.

  • Missing Implementation (within alist's scope):

    • Comprehensive Sanitization (Code Level): alist's code likely needs more comprehensive sanitization of all potentially untrusted input. This is a code-level requirement.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP) (Headers): While CSP is typically set via HTTP headers (often by a reverse proxy), alist could be modified to include a basic CSP header in its responses. This is a code-level change, though less common.

Mitigation Strategy: Validate and Restrict Storage Provider URLs (Code Level)

  • Description: 1. Strict Validation (Code Level): alist's code must implement strict validation of URLs used for storage provider configurations. This includes protocol, domain, IP address, and path validation. This is a code-level implementation. 2. Whitelist (If Feasible, Code Level): If possible, alist's code should implement a whitelist of allowed domains or IP addresses for storage provider URLs.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): (Severity: High)
    • Information Disclosure: (Severity: Medium)
    • Denial of Service (DoS): (Severity: Low)

  • Impact:

    • Reduces the risk of SSRF attacks and related vulnerabilities.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • alist likely has some URL validation, but it may not be sufficient to prevent SSRF.

  • Missing Implementation (within alist's scope):

    • Comprehensive URL Validation (Code Level): alist's code needs robust URL validation, potentially including whitelisting. This is a code-level requirement.
    • SSRF Prevention Library (Code Level): Consider using a dedicated SSRF prevention library within alist's code.

Mitigation Strategy: Enforce Strong TLS/SSL Configuration (within alist)

Description: 1. Configure TLS Certificate (Configuration): Configure alist, via its configuration file, to use a valid TLS certificate and private key. 2. Disable Weak Protocols (Configuration/Code): Configure alist, ideally through its configuration file (or, if necessary, through code modifications), to disable support for outdated TLS/SSL protocols (SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1). Only allow TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3. 3. Use Strong Ciphers (Configuration/Code): Configure alist, ideally through its configuration file (or code), to use strong cipher suites.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks: (Severity: Critical)
    • Data Breach: (Severity: Critical)
    • Impersonation: (Severity: High)

  • Impact:

    • Significantly reduces risks associated with insecure communication.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • alist supports HTTPS and allows configuring a TLS certificate and private key in its configuration.

  • Missing Implementation (within alist's scope):

    • Strong Cipher Suite Enforcement (Configuration/Code): alist may not enforce a strong set of cipher suites by default. This needs to be explicitly configured, either in the configuration file (if supported) or through code modifications.
    • HSTS Configuration (Code Level): alist could be modified to include the Strict-Transport-Security header in its responses, although this is often handled by a reverse proxy. This is a code-level change.
    • OCSP Stapling (Code Level): alist likely does not support OCSP stapling by default. This would require code modifications.
    • Automatic Certificate Renewal: alist does not have built-in support.