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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for alistgo/alist

Threat: Malicious Storage Provider Configuration Injection

  • Threat: Malicious Storage Provider Configuration Injection

    • Description: An attacker gains access to the alist configuration file (e.g., data/config.json) and injects a malicious storage provider. The attacker could achieve this through server compromise, exploiting a separate vulnerability, or social engineering. The malicious provider could then steal data, modify files, or act as a launching point for further attacks. This directly involves alist because the configuration file and the loading of storage providers are core alist functions.
    • Impact: Data breach, data loss, data corruption, potential compromise of other systems connected to the malicious storage provider.
    • Affected Component: alist configuration file (data/config.json or similar), storage provider loading mechanism.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict File Permissions: Ensure the configuration file has the most restrictive permissions possible (e.g., read/write only by the alist user, no access for others).
      • Configuration Management: Use a configuration management tool (Ansible, Chef, Puppet) to manage the configuration file and enforce a known-good state.
      • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Implement FIM to detect any unauthorized modifications to the configuration file.
      • Regular Backups: Maintain regular, secure backups of the configuration file.
      • Input Validation (Feature Request): alist could implement input validation to check the validity of storage provider configurations before loading them.

Threat: Credential Exposure via Configuration File

  • Threat: Credential Exposure via Configuration File

    • Description: An attacker gains access to the alist configuration file, which contains credentials (API keys, passwords, tokens) for backend storage providers. The attacker might achieve this through server compromise, accidental exposure (e.g., committing the file to a public repository), or a separate vulnerability. This is a direct threat to alist because it's how alist stores and manages these credentials.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to all connected storage providers, data breach, data loss, data corruption.
    • Affected Component: alist configuration file (data/config.json or similar).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict File Permissions: As above, ensure restrictive file permissions.
      • Environment Variables: Store sensitive credentials in environment variables instead of directly in the configuration file.
      • Secrets Management: Use a dedicated secrets management solution (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, etc.). alist would need to be configured to retrieve credentials from the secrets manager.
      • Never Commit Credentials: Avoid committing the configuration file (or any file containing credentials) to version control.

Threat: Storage Provider Credential Spoofing

  • Threat: Storage Provider Credential Spoofing

    • Description: An attacker intercepts the communication between alist and a legitimate storage provider and injects their own credentials. This could involve a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. This is a direct threat if alist does not properly validate TLS certificates, making it vulnerable.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to the user's data, data breach, data modification.
    • Affected Component: Network communication between alist and storage providers, authentication modules for specific storage providers within alist.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • TLS Certificate Validation: Ensure alist rigorously validates TLS certificates for all storage provider connections. Reject connections with invalid or self-signed certificates (unless explicitly and securely configured).
      • HTTPS Enforcement: Enforce the use of HTTPS for all storage provider connections. alist should refuse to connect over plain HTTP.

Threat: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion

  • Threat: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion

    • Description: An attacker sends a large number of requests to alist, consuming server resources (CPU, memory, network bandwidth) and making it unresponsive. This directly targets the alist web server and its request handling capabilities.
    • Impact: alist service becomes unavailable.
    • Affected Component: alist web server, potentially all alist modules.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting within alist (feature request) or using a reverse proxy (Nginx, HAProxy).
      • Web Application Firewall (WAF): Deploy a WAF.
      • Resource Monitoring: Monitor server resources.
      • Load Balancing: Use a load balancer for multiple alist instances.

Threat: alist Binary/Dependency Tampering

  • Threat: alist Binary/Dependency Tampering

    • Description: An attacker replaces the alist executable or one of its dependencies with a malicious version. This directly targets the integrity of the alist application itself.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of the alist instance, potential server compromise, data breach.
    • Affected Component: alist executable, alist dependencies.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Official Sources: Download alist only from official sources.
      • Checksum Verification: Verify binary integrity using checksums.
      • Regular Updates: Keep alist and dependencies up-to-date.
      • Containerization: Use Docker to isolate alist.
      • System-Level Security: Implement SELinux, AppArmor.

Threat: Privilege Escalation via alist Vulnerability

  • Threat: Privilege Escalation via alist Vulnerability

    • Description: A vulnerability in alist (e.g., a buffer overflow, code injection) is exploited by an attacker to gain elevated privileges on the server. This is a direct threat to the security of the alist application and the system it runs on.
    • Impact: Complete server compromise, data breach, data loss, data corruption.
    • Affected Component: Potentially any part of the alist codebase.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Run alist as an unprivileged user.
      • Containerization: Use Docker to isolate alist.
      • Regular Updates: Keep alist up-to-date.
      • Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits of the alist codebase.
      • System Hardening: Implement system-level security measures (SELinux, AppArmor).