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Attack Tree Analysis for argoproj/argo-cd

Objective: [[Gain Unauthorized Control over Target Kubernetes Cluster(s)]]

Attack Tree Visualization

[[Gain Unauthorized Control over Target Kubernetes Cluster(s)]] === [[Compromise Argo CD Instance]] | === [Abuse Argo CD API] | | ||||| [[Direct API Calls (if exposed)]] | === [Compromise Argo CD Credentials] | --- [Stolen Token] | --- [Phishing] === [[Exploit Misconfigured Argo CD Access/Permissions]] === [[Overly Permissive RBAC]] | || [[Cluster-wide Admin]] === [[Weak/Default App Project Config]] || [[No App Restrictions]]

Attack Tree Path: [[Gain Unauthorized Control over Target Kubernetes Cluster(s)]]

  • Description: The ultimate objective of the attacker. Successful exploitation of any of the child nodes leads to this outcome.
  • Impact: Very High - Complete control over the Kubernetes cluster(s), allowing for malicious deployments, data exfiltration, and service disruption.

Attack Tree Path: [[Compromise Argo CD Instance]]

  • Description: Gaining administrative or operational control over the Argo CD server itself. This is a critical stepping stone to controlling the managed clusters.
  • Impact: Very High - Provides a direct path to manipulating deployments and accessing cluster resources.

Attack Tree Path: [Abuse Argo CD API] === ||||| [[Direct API Calls (if exposed)]]

  • Description: If the Argo CD API is exposed to the internet or an untrusted network without proper authentication and authorization, an attacker can directly interact with it using standard HTTP requests.
  • Impact: Very High - Allows the attacker to create, modify, or delete applications, sync deployments, and potentially access sensitive information.
  • Likelihood: Medium (High if exposed, otherwise Low)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (API calls are logged, but might be missed without proper monitoring and alerting).
  • Mitigation:
    • Never expose the Argo CD API directly to the public internet.
    • Use a reverse proxy or API gateway with strong authentication (e.g., OIDC, OAuth 2.0, mTLS).
    • Implement strict authorization policies using Argo CD's RBAC.
    • Enable and monitor API access logs.
    • Use network policies to restrict access to the API server.

Attack Tree Path: [Compromise Argo CD Credentials] === [Stolen Token]

  • Description: An attacker obtains a valid Argo CD API token through various means, such as theft from a compromised system, interception of network traffic, or social engineering.
  • Impact: High - Grants the attacker access to Argo CD with the permissions associated with the stolen token.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (unusual activity from the token's associated user/service account might be detected).
  • Mitigation:
    • Use short-lived tokens.
    • Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA).
    • Regularly rotate tokens.
    • Monitor for suspicious login activity and token usage.
    • Educate users about the risks of token theft and phishing.
    • Store tokens securely (e.g., using a secrets management system).

Attack Tree Path: [Compromise Argo CD Credentials] === [Phishing]

  • Description: An attacker tricks a legitimate Argo CD user into revealing their credentials (username/password or API token) through a deceptive email, website, or other communication.
  • Impact: High - Grants the attacker access to Argo CD with the compromised user's permissions.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Effort: Low to Medium
  • Skill Level: Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (depends on email security, user reporting, and anomaly detection).
  • Mitigation:
    • User education and awareness training on phishing techniques.
    • Implement strong email security measures (e.g., spam filtering, DMARC, DKIM, SPF).
    • Use multi-factor authentication (MFA).
    • Encourage users to report suspicious emails and communications.

Attack Tree Path: [[Exploit Misconfigured Argo CD Access/Permissions]]

  • Description: Leveraging overly permissive or incorrectly configured access controls within Argo CD to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.
  • Impact: Very High - Can lead to complete control over managed clusters, depending on the misconfiguration.

Attack Tree Path: [[Overly Permissive RBAC]] === || [[Cluster-wide Admin]]

  • Description: The Argo CD service account, or a user account used to interact with Argo CD, is granted the cluster-admin role within the target Kubernetes cluster(s). This grants excessive privileges.
  • Impact: Very High - Provides full control over the target cluster(s), bypassing any intended restrictions.
  • Likelihood: Medium (a common misconfiguration)
  • Effort: Very Low (if the role is already granted)
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (requires auditing RBAC configurations)
  • Mitigation:
    • Never grant the cluster-admin role to Argo CD or its users.
    • Create custom roles and role bindings with the minimum necessary permissions for Argo CD to function.
    • Regularly review and audit RBAC configurations.
    • Use the principle of least privilege.

Attack Tree Path: [[Weak/Default App Project Config]] === || [[No App Restrictions]]

  • Description: Argo CD AppProjects are not configured with appropriate restrictions, or the default AppProject is used without modification, allowing applications to be deployed to any cluster, namespace, or with any resources.
  • Impact: Very High - An attacker can deploy malicious applications, potentially gaining control of the cluster or accessing sensitive data.
  • Likelihood: Medium (a common misconfiguration)
  • Effort: Very Low
  • Skill Level: Beginner
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (requires auditing AppProject configurations)
  • Mitigation:
    • Always define specific AppProjects with restrictions on:
      • Source repositories (allowed Git repos).
      • Destination clusters and namespaces.
      • Allowed Kubernetes resource types (e.g., Deployments, Services, Secrets).
    • Avoid using the default AppProject with overly broad permissions.
    • Regularly review and audit AppProject configurations.