Mitigation Strategy: Strict RBAC Implementation (Argo CD's RBAC)
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1. Strict RBAC Implementation (Argo CD's RBAC)
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Description:
- Identify Roles: Define clear roles within your team (e.g., Developer, Operator, Security Admin, Auditor).
- Map Permissions: For each role, identify the minimum Argo CD permissions required. Use the Argo CD documentation to understand the specific actions allowed by each permission (
get
,create
,update
,delete
,sync
,override
, etc.) on each resource type (Applications, Projects, Repositories, Clusters, etc.). - Create Argo CD Policies: Define Argo CD policies (using the
policy.csv
file or the UI) that map roles to permissions. Example:p, role:developer, applications, get, my-project/*, allow p, role:developer, applications, sync, my-project/*, allow p, role:operator, applications, *, my-project/*, allow g, alice, role:developer g, bob, role:operator
- Integrate with SSO/OIDC: Configure Argo CD to authenticate users via your SSO/OIDC provider. Map groups from your identity provider to Argo CD roles. This ensures centralized user management.
- Regular Review: Schedule recurring reviews (e.g., quarterly) of the RBAC configuration. Use scripts to compare the current configuration with a known-good baseline.
- Test: Thoroughly test the RBAC configuration by having users with different roles attempt various actions within Argo CD.
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Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Access: (Severity: High) - Prevents users from accessing or modifying resources they shouldn't.
- Privilege Escalation: (Severity: High) - Limits the ability of a compromised user account to gain higher privileges within Argo CD.
- Accidental Misconfiguration: (Severity: Medium) - Reduces the risk of users accidentally making changes that could disrupt deployments.
- Insider Threats: (Severity: Medium) - Limits the damage a malicious insider can do.
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Impact:
- Unauthorized Access: Risk significantly reduced. Users are restricted to their defined permissions.
- Privilege Escalation: Risk significantly reduced. Attackers cannot easily elevate their privileges.
- Accidental Misconfiguration: Risk reduced. Fewer users have permission to make critical changes.
- Insider Threats: Risk reduced. The scope of potential damage is limited.
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Currently Implemented:
- Basic RBAC policies defined in
policy.csv
. - SSO integration with Okta is configured.
- Group mapping from Okta to Argo CD roles is partially implemented (only for developers).
- Basic RBAC policies defined in
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Missing Implementation:
- No regular, automated review of RBAC policies.
- Group mapping is not implemented for all roles (e.g., operators, security admins).
- Testing of RBAC configuration is ad-hoc, not systematic.
- No project-level permissions are defined; all permissions are currently global.
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Mitigation Strategy: Secure Handling of Secrets (Argo CD's Secret Management)
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2. Secure Handling of Secrets (Argo CD's Secret Management)
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Description:
- Choose a Secrets Manager: Select a secrets management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager).
- Install and Configure Plugin: Install the appropriate Argo CD plugin for your chosen secrets manager (e.g., Argo CD Vault Plugin). Configure the plugin with the necessary credentials and connection details within Argo CD.
- Define Secret Paths: Determine the paths within your secrets manager where secrets will be stored. Use a consistent naming convention.
- Modify Application Manifests: Update your Kubernetes manifests (or Helm charts, Kustomize files) to reference secrets using the plugin's syntax. Example (using Argo CD Vault Plugin):
apiVersion: v1 kind: Secret metadata: name: my-secret annotations: vault.argocd.argoproj.io/secret-path: secret/my-app/database-password type: Opaque data: password: <placeholder> # This will be replaced by the plugin
- Configure Argo CD Service Account: Ensure the service account used by Argo CD has the necessary permissions to read secrets from your secrets manager. Use the principle of least privilege. This is often done outside of Argo CD, but the configuration within the manifests is key.
- Test: Deploy a test application that uses secrets and verify that the secrets are correctly injected via Argo CD.
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Threats Mitigated:
- Secret Exposure: (Severity: High) - Prevents secrets from being stored in plain text in Git repositories or Argo CD's configuration.
- Credential Theft: (Severity: High) - Reduces the risk of attackers stealing credentials.
- Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Data: (Severity: High) - Protects sensitive data accessed by applications.
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Impact:
- Secret Exposure: Risk significantly reduced. Secrets are stored securely in a dedicated secrets manager.
- Credential Theft: Risk significantly reduced. Attackers cannot easily obtain credentials.
- Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Data: Risk significantly reduced. Access to sensitive data is controlled.
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Currently Implemented:
- HashiCorp Vault is used as the secrets manager.
- The Argo CD Vault Plugin is installed and configured.
- Some application manifests are updated to use the plugin.
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Missing Implementation:
- Not all application manifests have been updated to use the plugin. Some secrets are still stored in Git (encrypted with SOPS, but this is less secure).
- The Argo CD service account has broader permissions to Vault than necessary.
- No testing procedure to verify secret injection.
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Mitigation Strategy: Secure Configuration of Argo CD components
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3. Secure Configuration of Argo CD components:
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Description:
- Disable Default Admin: After setting up SSO/OIDC, disable the default
admin
user within Argo CD's configuration. - Secure Redis:
- If using the bundled Redis, change the default password immediately via Argo CD's configuration.
- Consider using an external, managed Redis service.
- API Server TLS: Ensure that the Argo CD API server is configured to use TLS (HTTPS) with a valid certificate within Argo CD's configuration.
- Regular Updates: Keep Argo CD and its components up-to-date via Argo CD deployments to patch security vulnerabilities.
- Disable Default Admin: After setting up SSO/OIDC, disable the default
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Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Access (Argo CD Components): (Severity: High) - Prevents attackers from accessing or compromising Argo CD's internal components.
- Data Breach (Redis): (Severity: Medium) - Protects sensitive data stored in Redis (e.g., session tokens).
- Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: (Severity: High) - TLS protects against eavesdropping on API communication.
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Impact:
- Unauthorized Access (Argo CD Components): Risk significantly reduced. Access to components is restricted.
- Data Breach (Redis): Risk reduced. Redis is secured with a strong password.
- Man-in-the-Middle Attacks: Risk significantly reduced. TLS encrypts communication.
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Currently Implemented:
- Argo CD API server is configured with TLS.
- Argo CD is regularly updated.
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Missing Implementation:
- The default
admin
user is still enabled. - The bundled Redis is used with the default password.
- The default
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Mitigation Strategy: Monitoring and Alerting (Argo CD Specific)
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4. Monitoring and Alerting (Argo CD Specific):
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Description:
- Enable Prometheus Metrics: Ensure Argo CD is configured to expose its metrics in Prometheus format (usually enabled by default).
- Audit Logs: Enable Argo CD's audit logs within Argo CD's configuration.
- Application Health Monitoring: Integrate application health checks into your deployments and monitor them through Argo CD. Use Argo CD's health checks to ensure applications are running as expected.
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Threats Mitigated:
- Undetected Security Incidents: (Severity: Medium) - Provides early warning of potential security issues.
- Performance Degradation: (Severity: Medium) - Helps identify performance bottlenecks.
- Resource Exhaustion: (Severity: Medium) - Alerts on resource usage approaching limits.
- Unauthorized Activity: (Severity: Medium) - Audit logs provide a record of all actions performed within Argo CD.
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Impact:
- Undetected Security Incidents: Risk reduced. Alerts provide timely notification of potential problems.
- Performance Degradation: Risk reduced. Performance issues can be identified and addressed quickly.
- Resource Exhaustion: Risk reduced. Alerts allow for proactive resource management.
- Unauthorized Activity: Risk reduced. Audit logs provide a trail for investigation.
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Currently Implemented:
- Prometheus is configured to scrape Argo CD metrics.
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Missing Implementation:
- Audit logs are not enabled.
- Application health monitoring is not consistently implemented.
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Mitigation Strategy: Configuration as Code (GitOps for Argo CD)
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5. Configuration as Code (GitOps for Argo CD)
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Description:
- Create a Git Repository: Create a dedicated Git repository to store your Argo CD configuration (projects, applications, RBAC policies).
- Define Configuration as Code: Use YAML files to define your Argo CD configuration. Example:
# argocd-project.yaml apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1 kind: AppProject metadata: name: my-project spec: sourceRepos: - 'https://github.com/my-org/my-repo' destinations: - namespace: my-app server: https://kubernetes.default.svc # ... other project settings ...
- Deploy Argo CD Itself with Argo CD: Use Argo CD to deploy and manage its own configuration from this Git repository. This is known as "bootstrapping" or "managing Argo CD with Argo CD."
- Implement Change Control: Use pull requests and code reviews to manage changes to your Argo CD configuration.
- Automated Synchronization: Configure Argo CD to automatically synchronize its configuration from the Git repository.
- Rollback Capability: Leverage Git's version history and Argo CD's sync history to easily roll back to a previous, known-good configuration if necessary.
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Threats Mitigated:
- Configuration Drift: (Severity: Medium) - Ensures that the actual Argo CD configuration matches the desired state defined in Git.
- Unauthorized Configuration Changes: (Severity: Medium) - Prevents unauthorized modifications to Argo CD's configuration.
- Accidental Misconfiguration: (Severity: Medium) - Reduces the risk of errors when making configuration changes.
- Difficult Rollbacks: (Severity: Medium) - Makes it easy to revert to a previous configuration.
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Impact:
- Configuration Drift: Risk significantly reduced. Argo CD's configuration is continuously synchronized with Git.
- Unauthorized Configuration Changes: Risk reduced. Changes are tracked and reviewed through Git.
- Accidental Misconfiguration: Risk reduced. Changes are made through a controlled process (pull requests, code reviews).
- Difficult Rollbacks: Risk significantly reduced. Git and Argo CD provide a version history for easy rollbacks.
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Currently Implemented:
- None
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Missing Implementation:
- Argo CD's configuration is not managed as code.
- Changes to Argo CD's configuration are made directly through the UI or CLI.
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Mitigation Strategy: Resource Limits within Argo CD manifests
- 6. Resource Limits within Argo CD manifests
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Description:
- Argo CD Resource Limits:
- Edit the Argo CD deployment manifests (e.g.,
argocd-server
,argocd-repo-server
,argocd-application-controller
) that are managed by Argo CD. - Set resource requests and limits for CPU and memory for each container. Start with reasonable values and adjust based on monitoring. Example:
resources: requests: cpu: 100m memory: 256Mi limits: cpu: 500m memory: 1Gi
- Edit the Argo CD deployment manifests (e.g.,
- Argo CD Resource Limits:
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Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (Argo CD): (Severity: Medium) - Prevents Argo CD components from being overwhelmed.
- Resource Exhaustion: (Severity: Medium) - Prevents applications from consuming excessive resources.
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Impact:
- Denial of Service (Argo CD): Risk reduced. Argo CD components are protected from resource exhaustion.
- Resource Exhaustion: Risk reduced. Resource usage is controlled.
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Currently Implemented:
- None
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Missing Implementation:
- No resource limits are configured for Argo CD components.
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