Attack Surface: 1. Automatic HTTPS (ACME) Misconfiguration/Abuse
- Description: Exploitation of Caddy's automatic HTTPS provisioning mechanism to obtain fraudulent certificates or disrupt certificate management.
- Caddy's Contribution: Caddy's core feature is automatic HTTPS. This reliance on external CAs and challenge mechanisms, managed by Caddy, creates this specific attack surface.
- Example: An attacker uses DNS hijacking to pass the DNS-01 challenge and obtain a valid certificate for a domain they don't control, leveraging Caddy's automated process.
- Impact: Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, phishing, data breaches, loss of user trust.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Use DNSSEC: Implement DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC).
- CAA Records: Configure Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) records.
- Monitor Certificate Transparency Logs: Regularly monitor CT logs.
- Secure DNS Provider API Keys: Protect API keys used for DNS-01 challenges.
- Network Segmentation: Isolate the Caddy server where possible.
- Use a Reputable ACME CA: Stick with well-known CAs.
- Regularly Update Caddy: Keep Caddy updated.
Attack Surface: 2. Caddyfile Misconfiguration (Reverse Proxy)
- Description: Incorrectly configured
reverse_proxy
directives expose internal services or applications. - Caddy's Contribution: Caddy's
reverse_proxy
directive, a core Caddy component, is the direct source of this risk if misconfigured. - Example: A Caddyfile uses
reverse_proxy * http://localhost:8080
, exposing an internal application on port 8080. - Impact: Unauthorized access to internal services, data breaches.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Principle of Least Privilege: Only expose necessary paths/resources.
- Use Specific Path Matching: Avoid broad matches.
- Implement Authentication/Authorization: Use Caddy's authentication modules.
- Regularly Review Caddyfile: Conduct code reviews.
- Use a Staging Environment: Test changes before production.
- Input Validation: Validate any user input used in proxy configurations.
Attack Surface: 3. Caddyfile Misconfiguration (File Server)
- Description: Improperly configured
file_server
directives expose sensitive files. - Caddy's Contribution: Caddy's
file_server
directive, a core Caddy component, is the direct source of this risk. - Example:
file_server
serves a directory containing.git
folders. - Impact: Information disclosure, source code leakage.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Specify a Root Directory: Always define the root.
- Restrict Access to Sensitive Files: Use
handle
orroute
to deny access. - Disable Directory Listings: Ensure listings are off.
- Regularly Review Served Files: Check for exposed sensitive data.
Attack Surface: 4. Vulnerabilities in Caddy or Plugins
- Description: Exploitable vulnerabilities in Caddy's core code or plugins.
- Caddy's Contribution: This is a direct risk stemming from Caddy itself and its plugin architecture.
- Example: A buffer overflow in a Caddy plugin allows code execution.
- Impact: DoS, RCE, data breaches, system compromise.
- Risk Severity: Critical (for RCE), High (for DoS)
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Keep Caddy Updated: Regular updates are crucial.
- Use Trusted Plugins: Only install from reputable sources.
- Review Plugin Code (if possible): For open-source plugins.
- Monitor Security Advisories: Stay informed.
- Limit Plugin Usage: Reduce the attack surface.
- Vulnerability Scanning: Use scanners to identify issues.
Attack Surface: 5. Unsecured Admin API
- Description: Unauthorized access to Caddy's administrative API.
- Caddy's Contribution: Caddy's built-in admin API is the direct source of this risk.
- Example: The admin API is exposed on port 2019 without authentication.
- Impact: Complete control over the Caddy instance.
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Disable the Admin API (if not needed): Best practice if unused.
- Restrict Access: Use firewall rules or network ACLs.
- Enable Authentication: Configure strong authentication.
- Change the Default Port: Use a non-standard port.
- Monitor API Access: Log and monitor all access.
Attack Surface: 6. Weak TLS Configuration
- Description: Caddy configured to use outdated or weak TLS protocols and ciphers.
- Caddy's Contribution: While Caddy defaults to strong settings, it allows configuration of weaker options within the Caddyfile.
- Example: Caddyfile explicitly allows TLS 1.0 and weak ciphers.
- Impact: Increased risk of MITM attacks and eavesdropping.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Use Caddy's Defaults: Rely on the secure defaults.
- Explicitly Configure Strong Ciphers: If overriding, be explicit.
- Regularly Review TLS Configuration: Keep it up-to-date.
- Use TLS Testing Tools: Assess the configuration's strength.