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Attack Tree Analysis for caddyserver/caddy

Objective: To gain unauthorized access to, modify, or disrupt the web application's resources or data, or the underlying server, by exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations specific to the Caddy web server.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      [Compromise Application via Caddy]
                                                  |
          -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
          |																						 |
  [Exploit Caddyfile Misconfiguration]														  [Compromise Caddy Administration/API]
          |																						 |
  --------------------																						  --------------------------
  |        |         |																						  |                      |
[Dir.    [Insec.   [[Weak/                                                                               [[Unauth.              [Brute-Force
Listing]  Reverse  Default]]                                                                              Access to              Admin API
Enabled]  Proxy    Caddyfile]                                                                             Admin]]                 Credentials]
          Config.]																										  |
          |																						 ------|------
  --------|--------																													 |			 |
  |					   |																													 [Guess/Steal      [[Weak/
[[Expose   [Bypass																													 Admin            Default
Sensitive   Auth/																													 Password]]        Password]]
Files/Dirs]  ACLs]
							  |
                    ------|------
                    |				 |
              [Man-in-  [[Directly
              the-Middle  Access
              via		 Internal
              Misconfigured Services]]
              Reverse
              Proxy]

Attack Tree Path: Caddyfile Misconfiguration -> Weak/Default Caddyfile -> Expose Internal Services / Default Admin Interface Exposed

  • [[Weak/Default Caddyfile]] (Critical Node):

    • Description: Using a default or overly permissive Caddyfile without proper customization. This is a foundational error that can lead to many other vulnerabilities.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Common misconfiguration, especially in development or less experienced setups)
    • Impact: Very High (Can lead to exposure of internal services, admin interface, and other vulnerabilities)
    • Effort: Very Low (Using a default file requires no effort)
    • Skill Level: Script Kiddie
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires review of the Caddyfile, but might be overlooked)
    • Attack Vectors:
      • Expose Internal Services: A weak Caddyfile might inadvertently expose internal services or APIs.
      • Default Admin Interface Exposed: The default admin interface might be accessible without authentication.

  • [Expose Internal Services] (Part of High-Risk Path):

    • Description: Internal services or APIs that should not be publicly accessible are exposed due to the weak Caddyfile.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Direct consequence of a weak Caddyfile)
    • Impact: High (Direct access to sensitive data and functionality)
    • Effort: Low (If exposed, access might be trivial)
    • Skill Level: Beginner
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Might be detected in access logs)

  • [[Default Admin Interface Exposed]] (Critical Node):

    • Description: The Caddy admin interface is accessible without proper authentication or access control.
    • Likelihood: Low (Most users are aware of the need to secure it, but it does happen)
    • Impact: Very High (Complete control of the Caddy server)
    • Effort: Very Low (If exposed, access might be trivial)
    • Skill Level: Script Kiddie
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Default admin interface is easily identifiable)

Attack Tree Path: Caddyfile Misconfiguration -> Directory Listing Enabled -> Expose Sensitive Files/Dirs

  • [Directory Listing Enabled] (Part of High-Risk Path):

    • Description: Directory listing is unintentionally enabled, allowing attackers to browse the file system.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Common misconfiguration)
    • Impact: Variable, but potentially High
    • Effort: Very Low
    • Skill Level: Script Kiddie
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • [[Expose Sensitive Files/Dirs]] (Critical Node):

    • Description: Sensitive files, configuration files, source code, or backup files are exposed due to enabled directory listing.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Direct consequence of enabled directory listing)
    • Impact: High (Exposure of sensitive data)
    • Effort: Very Low (Simply browsing directories)
    • Skill Level: Script Kiddie
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Might be noticed in logs, but could be missed)

Attack Tree Path: Caddyfile Misconfiguration -> Insecure Reverse Proxy Config -> Directly Access Internal Services

  • [Insecure Reverse Proxy Config] (Part of High-Risk Path):

    • Description: Misconfigured reverse proxy settings, such as improper header handling or lack of authentication for internal services.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Common with complex setups)
    • Impact: Variable, but potentially High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Intermediate
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard

  • [[Directly Access Internal Services]] (Critical Node):

    • Description: An attacker can bypass security controls and directly access sensitive internal APIs or databases due to the misconfigured reverse proxy.
    • Likelihood: Medium (Direct consequence of insecure reverse proxy configuration)
    • Impact: High (Direct access to sensitive data and functionality)
    • Effort: Low (If misconfigured, access might be trivial)
    • Skill Level: Beginner
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Might be detected in access logs)
    • Attack Vectors:
      • Bypassing authentication and authorization mechanisms.
      • Directly querying internal databases or APIs.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Caddy Administration/API -> Unauthorized Access to Admin Interface -> Weak/Default Password

  • [[Unauthorized Access to Admin Interface]] (Critical Node): * Description: An attacker gains access to the Caddy admin interface, allowing them to reconfigure the server. * Likelihood: Low (Requires credential compromise or misconfiguration) * Impact: Very High (Complete control of the Caddy server) * Effort: Variable (Depends on the method of compromise) * Skill Level: Variable (Could range from Script Kiddie to Advanced) * Detection Difficulty: Medium (Failed login attempts might be logged)

  • [[Weak/Default Password]] (Critical Node):

    • Description: The default admin password is not changed, or a weak, easily guessable password is used.
    • Likelihood: Low (Most users are aware of the need to change it, but it still happens)
    • Impact: Very High (Complete control of the Caddy server)
    • Effort: Very Low (Trivial if the default password is unchanged)
    • Skill Level: Script Kiddie
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Default password usage is easily identifiable)

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Caddy Administration/API -> Brute-Force Admin API Credentials -> Weak/Default Password

  • [Brute-Force Admin API Credentials] (Part of High-Risk Path): * Description: An attacker attempts to guess the admin API credentials. * Likelihood: Low to Medium (Depends on password strength and rate limiting) * Impact: Very High (If successful, complete control of Caddy) * Effort: Medium (Depends on password complexity and rate limiting) * Skill Level: Beginner to Intermediate * Detection Difficulty: Medium (Failed login attempts might be logged)

  • [[Weak/Default Password]] (Critical Node):

    • Description: The default admin password is not changed, or a weak, easily guessable password is used.
    • Likelihood: Low (Most users are aware of the need to change it, but it still happens)
    • Impact: Very High (Complete control of the Caddy server)
    • Effort: Very Low (Trivial if the default password is unchanged)
    • Skill Level: Script Kiddie
    • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Default password usage is easily identifiable)