attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for cloudwego/kitex

Objective: Achieve RCE, DoS, or Data Exfiltration on Kitex Service

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Achieve RCE, DoS, or Data Exfiltration on Kitex Service ├── 1. Remote Code Execution (RCE) [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.1 Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Kitex's Handling of Thrift/Protobuf Deserialization (IF vulnerable) │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1 Craft Malicious Thrift/Protobuf Payload (Gadget Chain) [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.1.1.1.1 Send Payload to Vulnerable Kitex Service Endpoint │ │ ├── 1.1.2 Exploit Custom Deserialization Logic (If Application Uses It) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ │ ├── 1.1.2.2 Craft Payload Targeting Custom Logic [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── 1.1.2.3 Send Payload to Trigger Custom Deserialization │ ├── 1.3 Exploit Kitex Middleware/Extensions (IF vulnerable) │ │ └── 1.3.2 Craft Payload to Exploit Middleware Vulnerability [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.3.3 Send Payload to Trigger Middleware │ ├── 1.4 Exploit Kitex Server/Client Configuration [HIGH-RISK] │ │ └── 1.4.2 Insecure Transport Configuration (e.g., no TLS) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ └── 1.4.2.1 Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) to Inject Malicious Payloads [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.5 Exploit Kitex's internal RPC mechanism (IF vulnerable) │ │ └── 1.5.2 Craft malicious RPC request [CRITICAL] │ │ └── 1.5.2.1 Send crafted request to Kitex server ├── 3. Data Exfiltration [CRITICAL] └── 3.2 Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities (Indirect Data Exfiltration) [HIGH-RISK] └── 3.2.1 Use Gadget Chains to Read Files or Access Internal Data (as in 1.1) └── 3.2.1.1 Craft Payload to Exfiltrate Data [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Remote Code Execution (RCE) [CRITICAL]

• 1.1 Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]

  • Description: This is the most critical attack vector. Deserialization vulnerabilities allow attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a maliciously crafted serialized object. Kitex uses Thrift and Protobuf, which can be vulnerable if not handled carefully. The biggest risk is often in custom deserialization logic implemented by the application developers.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • 1.1.1 Kitex's Handling of Thrift/Protobuf Deserialization: Exploiting vulnerabilities in Kitex's default deserialization process.
      • 1.1.1.1 Craft Malicious Thrift/Protobuf Payload (Gadget Chain) [CRITICAL]: The attacker creates a serialized object that, when deserialized, will execute a chain of existing code snippets ("gadgets") to achieve RCE.
        • 1.1.1.1.1 Send Payload: The crafted payload is sent to a Kitex endpoint that will deserialize it.
    • 1.1.2 Exploit Custom Deserialization Logic: Targeting vulnerabilities in application-specific deserialization code.
      • 1.1.2.2 Craft Payload Targeting Custom Logic [CRITICAL]: Similar to 1.1.1.1, but tailored to the specific flaws in the custom code.
        • 1.1.2.3 Send Payload: The crafted payload is sent to trigger the vulnerable custom deserialization.
  • Mitigations:
    • Strict input validation before deserialization.
    • Use a whitelist of allowed classes for deserialization, if possible.
    • Avoid custom deserialization logic if at all possible.
    • Keep Kitex and all dependencies up-to-date.
    • Regular security audits and penetration testing.

• 1.3 Exploit Kitex Middleware/Extensions (IF vulnerable)

  • Description: Kitex middleware can intercept and modify requests and responses. If a middleware component is vulnerable, it can be exploited to achieve RCE.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • 1.3.2 Craft Payload to Exploit Middleware Vulnerability [CRITICAL]: The attacker crafts a payload specifically designed to trigger a vulnerability in a particular middleware.
      • 1.3.3 Send Payload to Trigger Middleware: The crafted payload is sent.
  • Mitigations:
    • Use only well-vetted and maintained middleware.
    • Thoroughly review the source code of any custom middleware.
    • Apply the principle of least privilege to middleware.

• 1.4 Exploit Kitex Server/Client Configuration [HIGH-RISK]

  • Description: Misconfigurations can create vulnerabilities. The most critical is the lack of TLS.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • 1.4.2 Insecure Transport Configuration (e.g., no TLS) [HIGH-RISK]: If TLS is not used, communication is unencrypted.
      • 1.4.2.1 Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) to Inject Malicious Payloads [CRITICAL]: An attacker can intercept the communication and inject malicious data, potentially leading to RCE.
  • Mitigations:
    • Enforce TLS for all communication.
    • Use strong cipher suites and proper certificate validation.
    • Regularly audit configuration settings.

• 1.5 Exploit Kitex's internal RPC mechanism (IF vulnerable)

  • Description: Vulnerability in Kitex RPC protocol implementation.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • 1.5.2 Craft malicious RPC request [CRITICAL]: The attacker crafts a malformed RPC request.
      • 1.5.2.1 Send crafted request to Kitex server: The crafted request is sent to Kitex server.
  • Mitigations:
    • Regularly update Kitex and its dependencies to get the latest security patches.
    • Report any found vulnerabilities to Kitex developers.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Data Exfiltration [CRITICAL]

• 3.2 Exploit Deserialization Vulnerabilities (Indirect Data Exfiltration) [HIGH-RISK]

  • Description: Deserialization vulnerabilities can be used not only for RCE but also to leak data. An attacker might craft a payload that, upon deserialization, reads sensitive files or accesses internal data structures.
  • Sub-Vectors:
    • 3.2.1 Use Gadget Chains to Read Files or Access Internal Data: The attacker uses a gadget chain to access and exfiltrate data.
      • 3.2.1.1 Craft Payload to Exfiltrate Data [CRITICAL]: The payload is specifically designed to read and return sensitive information.
  • Mitigations: Same as for RCE via deserialization (1.1).