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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for cockroachdb/cockroach

Attack Surface: SQL Injection

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in application code that improperly handles user input when constructing SQL queries. Attackers inject malicious SQL code to manipulate database operations.
  • CockroachDB Contribution: CockroachDB's PostgreSQL wire-compatibility makes it susceptible to SQL injection if applications using it don't sanitize inputs.
  • Example: An application uses unsanitized user input in a WHERE clause. An attacker injects ' OR 1=1 -- to bypass filtering and access unauthorized data.
  • Impact: Data breach, data modification/deletion, potential denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Parameterized Queries (Prepared Statements).
    • Input Validation and Sanitization.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for database users.
    • Regular Security Audits and Code Reviews.

Attack Surface: Authentication Bypass on Admin UI

  • Description: Circumventing authentication on the CockroachDB Admin UI, granting unauthorized access to cluster management.
  • CockroachDB Contribution: CockroachDB provides the Admin UI. Weak default credentials or misconfigurations expose it to bypass.
  • Example: Default root password is used, and Admin UI is exposed. Attackers use default credentials to gain full cluster control.
  • Impact: Full cluster compromise, data breach, denial of service, configuration manipulation.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Authentication for Admin UI (strong passwords, MFA).
    • Access Control Lists (ACLs) and Network Segmentation.
    • Securely configure or disable external Admin UI exposure.
    • Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing.

Attack Surface: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks on Inter-Node Communication

  • Description: Interception of communication between CockroachDB nodes, potentially leading to data theft or manipulation.
  • CockroachDB Contribution: CockroachDB uses gRPC for inter-node communication. Lack of TLS enforcement makes it vulnerable.
  • Example: TLS is not enabled for inter-node communication. Attackers on the network intercept and read or modify data exchanged between nodes.
  • Impact: Data breach, data corruption, cluster instability, denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce TLS for Inter-Node Communication (Mandatory).
    • Consider Mutual TLS (mTLS) for stronger authentication.
    • Secure Network Infrastructure.
    • Regular Security Audits of TLS configuration.

Attack Surface: Privilege Escalation via Cluster Management APIs/Tools

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in CockroachDB management tools to gain unauthorized administrative privileges.
  • CockroachDB Contribution: CockroachDB provides CLI tools and APIs for management. Vulnerabilities can lead to privilege escalation.
  • Example: A user with limited privileges exploits a flaw in cockroach CLI to gain admin access.
  • Impact: Full cluster compromise, data breach, denial of service, configuration manipulation.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Principle of Least Privilege.
    • Regular Security Updates for CockroachDB and tools.
    • Input Validation in management tools/APIs.
    • Regular Security Audits and Penetration Testing.