Attack Surface: 1. Insecure Network Configuration
Description: Exposing CockroachDB ports or using insecure communication protocols.
CockroachDB Contribution: CockroachDB relies on network communication for inter-node and client-node interactions. Default ports and insecure configurations (especially disabling TLS) directly expose the database.
Example: Exposing port 26257 (client-node) to the public internet without TLS encryption. An attacker could sniff network traffic and intercept data, including credentials and sensitive query results. Alternatively, using weak TLS cipher suites allows for man-in-the-middle attacks.
Impact: Data breach, unauthorized access, man-in-the-middle attacks, complete cluster compromise.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* Developers: Enforce TLS 1.3+ with strong cipher suites for all CockroachDB communication (inter-node and client-node). Properly configure the --certs-dir and ensure certificates are valid and managed (rotation, revocation). Document network security requirements clearly.
* Users: Use a firewall (e.g., iptables, cloud provider firewalls) to strictly limit access to CockroachDB ports (26257, 8080) to only authorized clients and networks. Never expose the Admin UI (8080) directly to the public internet. Use a VPN, private network, or reverse proxy with strong authentication for administrative access. Regularly verify TLS configuration using cockroach cert list.
Attack Surface: 2. Weak Authentication and Authorization
Description: Using weak passwords, default credentials, or overly permissive SQL roles within CockroachDB.
CockroachDB Contribution: CockroachDB provides SQL-based user management and role-based access control (RBAC). Misconfiguration of these features directly leads to unauthorized database access.
Example: Using the default root user with a weak or empty password. An attacker could easily brute-force the password and gain full administrative control of the database. Granting ALL PRIVILEGES to a user or application that only requires SELECT access on specific tables.
Impact: Data breach, data modification, data deletion, privilege escalation, complete database compromise.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
* Developers: Enforce strong password policies within the application for any user accounts that interact with CockroachDB. Design database schemas and application logic with the principle of least privilege in mind. Provide tools or interfaces for administrators to easily manage user roles and permissions within CockroachDB.
* Users: Use strong, unique passwords for all SQL users within CockroachDB. Never use default credentials. Regularly rotate passwords. Strictly adhere to the principle of least privilege when granting roles and permissions. Consider using certificate-based authentication for SQL users where appropriate. Regularly audit user privileges.
Attack Surface: 3. Insufficient Row-Level Security (RLS)
Description: Lack of granular access control at the row level, allowing unauthorized access to data within tables, even with valid SQL user credentials.
CockroachDB Contribution: CockroachDB supports Row-Level Security policies, but they must be explicitly implemented and configured. The absence of RLS is a direct vulnerability within CockroachDB's security model.
Example: A multi-tenant application where users can access all rows in a customers table, even those belonging to other tenants, despite having their own SQL user accounts. This bypasses table-level permissions.
Impact: Data leakage, violation of privacy regulations, unauthorized data access, potential for lateral movement within the database.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
* Developers: Implement RLS policies to restrict access to specific rows based on user attributes, tenant IDs, or other relevant criteria. Thoroughly test RLS policies to ensure they are correctly enforced and cannot be bypassed. Consider RLS as a fundamental part of the database schema design.
* Users: Understand and utilize RLS features if managing a multi-tenant or security-sensitive CockroachDB deployment. Regularly audit RLS policies.
Attack Surface: 4. Unpatched Vulnerabilities
Description: Failure to apply security updates and patches to the CockroachDB software, leaving the cluster vulnerable to known exploits. CockroachDB Contribution: CockroachDB, like all software, is subject to vulnerabilities. Running an outdated version directly exposes the database to known exploits. Example: Running an outdated version of CockroachDB with a known vulnerability that allows remote code execution (RCE) or SQL injection. Impact: System compromise, data breach, denial of service, complete cluster takeover. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies: * Developers: Integrate automated vulnerability scanning for CockroachDB into the CI/CD pipeline. Provide clear and easy-to-follow instructions for users on how to update CockroachDB to the latest stable release. * Users: Regularly update CockroachDB to the latest stable release. Subscribe to CockroachDB security announcements and mailing lists. Implement a robust and timely patching process for the database cluster.
Attack Surface: 5. Insecure Backup and Restore
Description: Unprotected backups or insecure restore procedures, leading to data exposure or compromise of the CockroachDB cluster.
CockroachDB Contribution: CockroachDB provides built-in BACKUP and RESTORE commands, but the security of these operations depends entirely on how they are used and configured.
Example: Storing unencrypted CockroachDB backups in a publicly accessible cloud storage bucket. Restoring a backup from an untrusted source without verifying its integrity or provenance.
Impact: Data theft, data tampering, data loss, potential introduction of malicious code into the restored cluster.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
* Developers: Provide guidance and best practices for secure backup and restore procedures within the application's documentation. Consider integrating backup encryption directly into the application's workflow.
* Users: Always encrypt CockroachDB backups at rest and in transit. Store backups in a secure location with strictly limited access controls. Verify the integrity and authenticity of backups before restoring them. Use secure channels (e.g., encrypted connections) for transferring backups. Implement a robust backup retention policy.