attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for containers/podman

Objective: Compromise Application Using Podman

Attack Tree Visualization

Root: Compromise Application Using Podman [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR]─> 1. Compromise Application Container Directly [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───[OR]─> 1.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Container Image [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND]─> 1.1.1 Vulnerable Base Image [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └───> 1.1.1.1 Outdated Packages in Base Image [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   └───> 1.1.1.2 Known Vulnerabilities in Base OS [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND]─> 1.1.2 Vulnerable Application Code in Image [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └───> 1.1.2.1 Application Code Vulnerabilities (e.g., SQLi, XSS, RCE) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   └───> 1.1.2.2 Exposed Secrets in Image (API keys, passwords) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[AND]─> 1.1.3 Malicious Image Source
│   │       └───> 1.1.3.1 Pulling Image from Untrusted Registry [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       └───> 1.1.3.2 Compromised Build Process of Image [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR]─> 1.2 Exploit Container Runtime Misconfiguration/Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND]─> 1.2.1 Privileged Container Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └───> 1.2.1.1 Running Container in Privileged Mode [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   └───> 1.2.1.2 Capabilities Misconfiguration (Excessive Capabilities) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   └───> 1.2.1.3 Container Escape Vulnerability in Podman Runtime [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND]─> 1.2.2 Volume Mount Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └───> 1.2.2.1 Mounting Host Sensitive Directories into Container [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   └───> 1.2.2.2 Writeable Host Mounts with Insufficient Container User Permissions [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND]─> 1.2.3 Network Namespace Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └───> 1.2.3.2 Exposed Container Ports without Proper Firewalling [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[AND]─> 1.2.4 Resource Limit Exploitation
│   │       └───> 1.2.4.1 Insufficient Resource Limits (DoS via Resource Exhaustion) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       └───> 1.2.4.2 Resource Limit Bypass Vulnerabilities in Podman [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR]─> 3. Compromise Host System via Podman Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   ├───[OR]─> 3.1 Container Escape to Host System [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├───[AND]─> 3.1.1 Kernel Vulnerabilities Exploited from Container [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   └───> 3.1.1.1 Exploiting Known Kernel Vulnerabilities (e.g., via `unshare`, `namespaces`) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND]─> 3.1.2 Podman Runtime Vulnerabilities Leading to Escape [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   └───> 3.1.2.1 Bugs in Podman's Container Isolation Mechanisms [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[AND]─> 3.1.3 Misconfigured Security Profiles (e.g., AppArmor, SELinux) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR]─> 3.2 Host Resource Exhaustion via Container [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[AND]─> 3.2.1 Resource Limit Bypass in Podman [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   └───> 3.2.1.1 Vulnerabilities Allowing Container to Exceed Limits [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[AND]─> 3.2.2 Lack of Host-Level Resource Monitoring/Limits [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[OR]─> 4. Supply Chain Attacks Targeting Podman Itself [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[AND]─> 4.1 Compromised Podman Binaries/Packages [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───> 4.1.1 Backdoored Podman Packages from Repositories [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[AND]─> 4.2 Vulnerabilities in Podman Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───> 4.2.1 Exploiting Vulnerable Libraries Used by Podman [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Application Container Directly [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

• Attack Vector: Attackers directly target the container instance running the application. This is a primary goal as it provides immediate access to the application and its data.

• Breakdown: This path encompasses exploiting vulnerabilities within the container image itself or misconfigurations/vulnerabilities in the container runtime environment provided by Podman.

  1.1 Exploit Vulnerabilities in Container Image [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting weaknesses residing within the container image, which is the blueprint for the running container.

  • Breakdown: This involves targeting vulnerabilities in the base OS image, application code packaged within the image, or even malicious components introduced during the image creation process.

    1.1.1 Vulnerable Base Image [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Targeting vulnerabilities within the operating system and base packages that form the foundation of the container image.
    • Breakdown:
      • 1.1.1.1 Outdated Packages in Base Image [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Exploiting known vulnerabilities present in outdated software packages included in the base image.
        • Details: Base images often contain older versions of packages. Attackers can leverage publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in these packages to compromise the container.
      • 1.1.1.2 Known Vulnerabilities in Base OS [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Exploiting inherent security flaws within the chosen base operating system of the container image.
        • Details: Operating systems themselves can have vulnerabilities. If the base image uses a vulnerable OS version, containers based on it will inherit these weaknesses.

    1.1.2 Vulnerable Application Code in Image [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities present in the application code that is packaged and deployed within the container image.
    • Breakdown:
      • 1.1.2.1 Application Code Vulnerabilities (e.g., SQLi, XSS, RCE) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Exploiting common web application vulnerabilities like SQL Injection, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), or Remote Code Execution (RCE) that exist in the application code.
        • Details: Standard web application security flaws can be present in containerized applications just as in traditional deployments. Successful exploitation can lead to data breaches, application takeover, or server compromise.
      • 1.1.2.2 Exposed Secrets in Image (API keys, passwords) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Discovering and exploiting accidentally exposed sensitive information like API keys, passwords, or cryptographic keys that are embedded within the container image.
        • Details: Developers might unintentionally commit secrets into container images. Attackers can extract these secrets from image layers and use them for unauthorized access to other systems or services.

    1.1.3 Malicious Image Source:

    • Attack Vector: Using container images from untrusted or compromised sources, leading to the deployment of malicious software.
    • Breakdown:
      • 1.1.3.1 Pulling Image from Untrusted Registry [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Downloading and using container images from public or private registries that are not properly vetted or controlled, potentially containing backdoors or malware.
        • Details: Public container registries can host malicious images. If developers unknowingly pull and use these images, they can introduce malware into their application environment.
      • 1.1.3.2 Compromised Build Process of Image [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: The image build process itself is compromised, leading to the injection of malicious code or backdoors into the image even if the source code appears clean.
        • Details: If the CI/CD pipeline used to build container images is compromised, attackers can inject malicious code during the build process, resulting in backdoored images from seemingly trusted sources.

  1.2 Exploit Container Runtime Misconfiguration/Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigurations or vulnerabilities in how Podman manages and runs containers, bypassing intended security boundaries.

  • Breakdown: This includes issues related to container privileges, volume mounts, network configurations, and resource limits.

    1.2.1 Privileged Container Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Abusing overly permissive container configurations, especially privileged mode or excessive Linux capabilities, to gain elevated access and potentially escape container isolation.
    • Breakdown:
      • 1.2.1.1 Running Container in Privileged Mode [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Running containers with the --privileged flag, which disables many container security features and grants near-host access to the container.
        • Details: Privileged mode essentially removes most container isolation, making it very easy for an attacker to escape the container and compromise the host.
      • 1.2.1.2 Capabilities Misconfiguration (Excessive Capabilities) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Granting unnecessary Linux capabilities to the container, which can be misused for privilege escalation or container escape.
        • Details: Linux capabilities provide fine-grained control over privileges. However, granting excessive capabilities can create security risks if these capabilities are exploited by a compromised container.
      • 1.2.1.3 Container Escape Vulnerability in Podman Runtime [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Exploiting bugs or vulnerabilities within Podman's runtime itself to break out of container isolation and gain access to the host system.
        • Details: Vulnerabilities in Podman's core runtime code (related to namespaces, cgroups, etc.) could potentially allow a container to escape its isolation and directly access the host.

    1.2.2 Volume Mount Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Misusing volume mounts to gain unauthorized access to sensitive files and directories on the host system from within the container.
    • Breakdown:
      • 1.2.2.1 Mounting Host Sensitive Directories into Container [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Mounting sensitive host directories (like /, /etc, /var) into the container, granting the container excessive access to the host filesystem.
        • Details: Mounting sensitive host directories into containers is a major security risk. A compromised container can read, modify, or delete critical host files, leading to host compromise.
      • 1.2.2.2 Writeable Host Mounts with Insufficient Container User Permissions [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Mounting host directories with write access from the container, while the container user has sufficient permissions on the host filesystem to modify those files.
        • Details: Even if not mounting sensitive directories directly, writeable mounts can be exploited if the container user has permissions to modify important files on the host through the mounted volume.

    1.2.3 Network Namespace Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vector: Exploiting network configurations to bypass network isolation and gain access to the host network or other containers on the same network.
    • Breakdown:
      • 1.2.3.2 Exposed Container Ports without Proper Firewalling [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Exposing container ports to the network without implementing proper firewall rules to restrict access, making the application directly accessible and vulnerable to network-based attacks.
        • Details: Exposing container ports without proper firewalling is a common misconfiguration. It directly exposes the application to the internet or internal network, making it vulnerable to attacks targeting those exposed services.

    1.2.4 Resource Limit Exploitation:

    • Attack Vector: Abusing or bypassing resource limits set for containers to cause denial of service or other resource-related issues.
    • Breakdown:
      • 1.2.4.1 Insufficient Resource Limits (DoS via Resource Exhaustion) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Not setting or setting too high resource limits (CPU, memory, etc.) for containers, allowing a compromised container to consume excessive resources and impact the host or other applications.
        • Details: Insufficient resource limits can lead to denial of service. A compromised container can consume all available resources, starving other applications or even the host system.
      • 1.2.4.2 Resource Limit Bypass Vulnerabilities in Podman [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in Podman that allow containers to bypass resource limits set by the container runtime.
        • Details: If vulnerabilities exist that allow containers to bypass resource limits, attackers can use these to launch resource exhaustion attacks even if limits are configured.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Compromise Host System via Podman Exploitation [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

• Attack Vector: Using a compromised container as a stepping stone to gain control over the underlying host system.

• Breakdown: This path focuses on container escape techniques and host resource exhaustion attacks originating from a container.

  3.1 Container Escape to Host System [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

  • Attack Vector: Breaking out of the container's isolation to gain direct access to the host operating system.
  • Breakdown:

    • 3.1.1 Kernel Vulnerabilities Exploited from Container [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the host kernel from within a container to achieve container escape.
      • Breakdown:
        • 3.1.1.1 Exploiting Known Kernel Vulnerabilities (e.g., via unshare, namespaces) [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: Utilizing known vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel, particularly those related to namespaces or unshare system calls, to escape container isolation.
          • Details: Kernel vulnerabilities that allow namespace manipulation or privilege escalation can be exploited from within a container to break out and gain host access.

    • 3.1.2 Podman Runtime Vulnerabilities Leading to Escape [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Attack Vector: Exploiting bugs or flaws in Podman's container runtime implementation that directly lead to container escape.
      • Breakdown:
        • 3.1.2.1 Bugs in Podman's Container Isolation Mechanisms [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: Discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities in Podman's implementation of namespaces, cgroups, security profiles, or other isolation technologies that allow for container escape.
          • Details: Bugs in Podman's runtime code that manages container isolation can be exploited to bypass these mechanisms and escape to the host.

    • 3.1.3 Misconfigured Security Profiles (e.g., AppArmor, SELinux) [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Attack Vector: Weak or disabled security profiles (like AppArmor or SELinux) make container escape vulnerabilities easier to exploit by providing fewer restrictions.
      • Breakdown:
        • 3.1.3.1 Weak or Disabled Security Profiles Allowing Escape [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: If AppArmor or SELinux profiles are too permissive or disabled entirely, they fail to provide effective confinement, making container escape vulnerabilities more easily exploitable.
          • Details: Security profiles are designed to limit container capabilities and system calls. Weak or disabled profiles reduce the security barrier, making it easier for attackers to exploit other vulnerabilities to escape.

  3.2 Host Resource Exhaustion via Container [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Using a compromised container to consume excessive host resources, leading to denial of service at the host level and impacting other applications or the host itself.
  • Breakdown:

    • 3.2.1 Resource Limit Bypass in Podman [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Attack Vector: Bypassing resource limits set by Podman to consume excessive host resources from within a container.
      • Breakdown:
        • 3.2.1.1 Vulnerabilities Allowing Container to Exceed Limits [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in Podman that allow containers to bypass CPU, memory, or other resource limits enforced by Podman.
          • Details: If vulnerabilities exist that allow containers to circumvent resource limits, attackers can launch resource exhaustion attacks even with configured limits.

    • 3.2.2 Lack of Host-Level Resource Monitoring/Limits [CRITICAL NODE]:

      • Attack Vector: Insufficient resource monitoring and limits at the host OS level, allowing a container to monopolize resources even if Podman sets limits.
      • Breakdown:
        • 3.2.2.1 Host OS Not Properly Limiting Container Resource Usage [CRITICAL NODE]:
          • Attack Vector: The host operating system itself is not configured to effectively limit resource usage by containers, even if Podman is configured to set limits.
          • Details: Resource limits need to be enforced at both the container runtime level (Podman) and the host OS level. If host-level limits are missing or misconfigured, containers can still exhaust host resources.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Supply Chain Attacks Targeting Podman Itself [CRITICAL NODE]:

• Attack Vector: Compromising the Podman software supply chain to distribute malicious versions of Podman or its dependencies, affecting all users who download and use these compromised components.

• Breakdown: This is a high-impact, though less likely, attack vector targeting the integrity of the Podman software itself.

  4.1 Compromised Podman Binaries/Packages [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers compromise the distribution channels or build process of Podman to distribute malicious versions of the Podman binaries or packages.
  • Breakdown:
    • 4.1.1 Backdoored Podman Packages from Repositories [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Official or unofficial package repositories are compromised, and backdoored Podman packages are distributed to users.
      • Details: If package repositories are compromised, attackers can replace legitimate Podman packages with malicious versions, affecting all users who download from these repositories.

  4.2 Vulnerabilities in Podman Dependencies [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the libraries and dependencies that Podman relies upon to compromise Podman's functionality or security.
  • Breakdown:
    • 4.2.1 Exploiting Vulnerable Libraries Used by Podman [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Known vulnerabilities in libraries used by Podman (e.g., Go libraries, container runtime libraries) are exploited to compromise Podman's functionality or security.
      • Details: Podman depends on various libraries. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can indirectly affect Podman's security. Exploiting these vulnerabilities could lead to Podman instability or even allow for exploits within Podman itself.

This detailed breakdown provides a comprehensive understanding of the high-risk attack paths and critical vulnerabilities associated with using Podman, enabling security teams to prioritize mitigation efforts effectively.