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Attack Tree Analysis for cortexproject/cortex

Objective: Disrupt or compromise the integrity, availability, or confidentiality of metrics data managed by Cortex, or the application relying on that data.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using Cortex
├── 1. Data Poisoning [HIGH-RISK]
│   ├── 1.1 Exploit Ingestion Path [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.1.1 Weak Authentication/Authorization on Distributor [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   ├── 1.1.1.2 Impersonate a legitimate client (e.g., weak API key management) [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   │   └── 1.1.2.2 Overwhelm rate limits (if not properly configured) [HIGH-RISK]
├── 2. Denial of Service (DoS) [HIGH-RISK]
│   ├── 2.1 Overwhelm Distributors [HIGH-RISK]
│   │   ├── 2.1.1 Flood with excessive write requests [HIGH-RISK]
│   ├── 2.2 Overwhelm Ingesters
│   │   ├── 2.2.1 Exhaust resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O) [HIGH-RISK]
│   ├── 2.3 Overwhelm Queriers/Query Frontend
│   │   ├── 2.3.1 Send complex or resource-intensive queries [HIGH-RISK]
│   └── 2.5 Network-Level DoS [HIGH-RISK]
│       └── 2.5.1 Flood network connections to Cortex components [HIGH-RISK]
├── 4. Privilege Escalation/Lateral Movement
│   └── 4.1 Compromise a Cortex Component (Distributor, Ingester, Querier) [CRITICAL]
└── 5. Configuration Manipulation [HIGH-RISK]
    ├── 5.1 Gain Access to Configuration Files/Store [CRITICAL]
    │   └── 5.1.3 Exploit misconfigured access controls on configuration storage [HIGH-RISK]
    ├── 5.2 Modify Configuration [HIGH-RISK]
    │   ├── 5.2.1 Disable authentication/authorization [HIGH-RISK]
    │   └── 5.2.2 Weaken rate limits or other security controls [HIGH-RISK]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Data Poisoning [HIGH-RISK]

  • 1.1 Exploit Ingestion Path [HIGH-RISK]
    • 1.1.1 Weak Authentication/Authorization on Distributor [CRITICAL]
      • Description: The distributor is the entry point for metrics data. Weak authentication or authorization allows attackers to bypass security controls and inject malicious data.
      • Attack Vectors:
        • 1.1.1.2 Impersonate a legitimate client (e.g., weak API key management) [HIGH-RISK]
          • Details: If API keys are poorly managed (e.g., hardcoded, easily guessable, stored insecurely), an attacker can obtain a valid key and use it to send data as if they were a legitimate client.
          • Likelihood: Medium
          • Impact: High
          • Effort: Low to Medium
          • Skill Level: Intermediate
          • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • 1.1.2.2 Overwhelm rate limits (if not properly configured) [HIGH-RISK]
          • Details: If rate limits are not enforced or are set too high, an attacker can send a large volume of (potentially malicious) data, overwhelming the system and potentially causing data loss or corruption, even if the data itself isn't inherently "malformed." This can also be a form of DoS.
          • Likelihood: Medium to High
          • Impact: Medium
          • Effort: Low
          • Skill Level: Novice
          • Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 2. Denial of Service (DoS) [HIGH-RISK]

  • 2.1 Overwhelm Distributors [HIGH-RISK]

    • Attack Vectors:
      • 2.1.1 Flood with excessive write requests [HIGH-RISK]
        • Details: Sending a massive number of write requests to the distributor can overwhelm its capacity, preventing legitimate clients from sending data.
        • Likelihood: High
        • Impact: Medium to High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Novice
        • Detection Difficulty: Easy

  • 2.2 Overwhelm Ingesters

    • Attack Vectors:
      • 2.2.1 Exhaust resources (CPU, memory, disk I/O) [HIGH-RISK]
        • Details: Ingesters are responsible for processing and storing incoming data. By sending a large volume of data or crafting data that is difficult to process, an attacker can exhaust the ingester's resources, causing it to slow down or crash.
        • Likelihood: Medium to High
        • Impact: Medium to High
        • Effort: Low to Medium
        • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium

  • 2.3 Overwhelm Queriers/Query Frontend

    • Attack Vectors:
      • 2.3.1 Send complex or resource-intensive queries [HIGH-RISK]
        • Details: Queriers handle data retrieval. An attacker can send queries that require significant processing power or memory, slowing down the system and potentially making it unresponsive.
        • Likelihood: Medium to High
        • Impact: Medium to High
        • Effort: Low to Medium
        • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium

  • 2.5 Network-Level DoS [HIGH-RISK]

    • Attack Vectors:
      • 2.5.1 Flood network connections to Cortex components [HIGH-RISK]
        • Details: A classic network flood attack, targeting the network interfaces of Cortex components to prevent legitimate communication.
        • Likelihood: High
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low to Medium
        • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 4. Privilege Escalation/Lateral Movement

  • 4.1 Compromise a Cortex Component (Distributor, Ingester, Querier) [CRITICAL]
    • Description: Gaining control of any Cortex component provides a significant foothold for further attacks. This is a critical step because it allows the attacker to move beyond simply disrupting or observing the system.
    • No specific high-risk sub-vectors listed in the reduced tree, but vulnerabilities or compromised credentials could lead here.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Configuration Manipulation [HIGH-RISK]

  • 5.1 Gain Access to Configuration Files/Store [CRITICAL]

    • Description: Accessing the configuration allows an attacker to modify security settings, redirect data, and generally control the behavior of Cortex.
    • Attack Vectors:
      • 5.1.3 Exploit misconfigured access controls on configuration storage [HIGH-RISK]
        • Details: If the configuration storage (e.g., Kubernetes ConfigMaps, etcd) has weak access controls, an attacker can directly modify the configuration files.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low to Medium
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • 5.2 Modify Configuration [HIGH-RISK]

    • Attack Vectors:
      • 5.2.1 Disable authentication/authorization [HIGH-RISK]
        • Details: Turning off authentication or authorization makes Cortex completely vulnerable to a wide range of attacks.
        • Likelihood: Medium (Requires prior access to configuration)
        • Impact: Very High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium
      • 5.2.2 Weaken rate limits or other security controls [HIGH-RISK]
        • Details: Reducing rate limits or disabling other security features makes Cortex more susceptible to DoS and other attacks.
        • Likelihood: Medium (Requires prior access to configuration)
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Intermediate
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium