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Threat Model Analysis for docker/compose

Description: An attacker who gains access to the docker-compose.yml file (e.g., through version control exposure, file system access) can read hardcoded secrets like passwords, API keys, or TLS certificates. They can then use these secrets to access protected resources, services, or accounts. Impact: Confidentiality breach, unauthorized access to sensitive data, potential compromise of backend systems or external services. Affected Compose Component: docker-compose.yml file, specifically the service definitions and environment variable sections. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Utilize environment variables instead of hardcoding secrets in docker-compose.yml. * Use Docker Secrets for managing sensitive data within Docker Swarm or Kubernetes environments. * Integrate with external secret management solutions (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager) to retrieve secrets at runtime. * Ensure proper access control to the docker-compose.yml file and related files.

Description: An attacker exploiting a vulnerability in a container running with privileged: true can leverage the elevated privileges to perform actions on the host system. This could include container escape, accessing host resources, or even compromising the host operating system. Impact: Host compromise, complete system takeover, data breach, denial of service. Affected Compose Component: docker-compose.yml file, specifically the privileged: true directive in service definitions. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies: * Avoid using privileged: true unless absolutely necessary. * If privileged mode is required, carefully assess the security implications and minimize the scope of privileges needed. * Implement strong container security measures even when using privileged mode, as it reduces, but does not eliminate, risks.

Description: An attacker can exploit unintentionally exposed ports defined in the ports: mapping. This could allow them to access services that should not be publicly accessible, bypass firewalls, or exploit vulnerabilities in the exposed services. Impact: Unauthorized access to services, data breaches, exploitation of service vulnerabilities, potential denial of service. Affected Compose Component: docker-compose.yml file, specifically the ports: directive in service definitions. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Carefully review and configure port mappings to only expose necessary ports. * Use specific host IP addresses in port mappings to restrict access to specific interfaces. * Implement firewalls or network policies to further restrict access to exposed ports. * Regularly audit port configurations to ensure they are still necessary and secure.

Description: An attacker who compromises a container with volume mounts from the host can potentially access or modify sensitive files on the host system. If write access is granted, they could even overwrite critical system files or inject malicious code into host directories. Impact: Data leakage, data modification, host compromise, privilege escalation. Affected Compose Component: docker-compose.yml file, specifically the volumes: directive in service definitions. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Minimize volume mounts from the host. * Use named volumes instead of bind mounts when possible to improve isolation. * Carefully control permissions on mounted volumes to restrict container access to only necessary files and directories. * Avoid mounting sensitive host directories into containers unless absolutely required.

Description: An attacker who can exploit a vulnerability during the execution of docker-compose up or other Compose commands run with root privileges can potentially escalate privileges to the host system. This is because Compose operations can interact with the Docker daemon, which typically runs with root privileges. Impact: Host compromise, privilege escalation, complete system takeover. Affected Compose Component: Compose execution environment, specifically the user context running Compose commands. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Run Compose commands with minimal necessary privileges. * Consider using rootless Docker and Compose to reduce the attack surface. * Implement proper access control to the environment where Compose commands are executed.

Description: An attacker who gains unauthorized read or write access to the docker-compose.yml file can manipulate the application deployment. They could inject malicious containers, alter service configurations to create backdoors, or steal secrets stored in the file or related .env files. Impact: Application compromise, data breaches, injection of malicious code, denial of service. Affected Compose Component: File system access to docker-compose.yml and related files. Risk Severity: High Mitigation Strategies: * Implement strict access control mechanisms to protect the docker-compose.yml file and related files. * Use file system permissions to restrict read and write access to authorized users and processes only. * Store docker-compose.yml and related files in secure locations.

Description: An attacker can exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities in the Docker Compose binary itself. Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution on the host system running Compose, potentially allowing them to gain control of the system. Impact: Host compromise, arbitrary code execution, complete system takeover. Affected Compose Component: Docker Compose binary and its execution environment. Risk Severity: Critical Mitigation Strategies: * Keep Docker Compose updated to the latest version to patch known vulnerabilities. * Regularly monitor security advisories for Docker Compose and apply security updates promptly. * Implement security monitoring and intrusion detection systems to detect and respond to potential exploits.