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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for etcd-io/etcd

Attack Surface: Unauthenticated Client API Access (Critical)

  • Description: Exposure of etcd's client API (gRPC or HTTP) without requiring authentication, allowing anyone with network access to interact with etcd.
  • etcd Contribution: etcd can be configured to listen on network interfaces and serve client requests without mandatory authentication.
  • Example: etcd is deployed with the client API exposed on a public IP without TLS client certificates or username/password authentication. Attackers can read, modify, or delete data.
  • Impact: Full compromise of application data, configuration, and potential denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable Authentication: Configure etcd to require authentication using TLS client certificates or username/password.
    • Network Segmentation: Restrict network access to the etcd client API using firewalls or network policies.

Attack Surface: Insecure Client-to-etcd Communication (No TLS) (High)

  • Description: Communication between applications and the etcd client API is not encrypted using TLS, exposing data in transit.
  • etcd Contribution: etcd supports both TLS and non-TLS client API communication. If TLS is not configured, communication is in plain text.
  • Example: Applications connect to etcd over HTTP instead of HTTPS. MitM attackers can intercept communication and steal sensitive data like secrets.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach, potential credential theft, data tampering.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable TLS for Client API: Configure etcd to use TLS for the client API and ensure applications connect using HTTPS or gRPC with TLS.
    • Certificate Management: Implement proper certificate management for TLS certificates.

Attack Surface: Unauthenticated Peer Communication (Critical)

  • Description: Communication between etcd cluster members (peers) is not authenticated, allowing rogue nodes to potentially join the cluster.
  • etcd Contribution: etcd cluster members communicate for consensus. Lack of peer authentication allows unauthorized nodes to participate.
  • Example: etcd cluster deployed without peer TLS authentication. Attackers can launch a rogue etcd instance and join the cluster, gaining control.
  • Impact: Cluster compromise, data corruption, denial of service, potential data exfiltration.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable Peer TLS Authentication: Configure etcd to use peer TLS certificates for authentication and encryption of peer communication.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate the etcd cluster network from untrusted networks.

Attack Surface: Insecure Peer-to-Peer Communication (No TLS) (High)

  • Description: Communication between etcd cluster members (peers) is not encrypted using TLS, exposing cluster-internal data in transit.
  • etcd Contribution: etcd supports both TLS and non-TLS for peer communication. Without TLS, peer communication is in plain text.
  • Example: Peer communication in an etcd cluster happens over plain TCP. MitM attackers can eavesdrop on sensitive data exchanged between members.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach of cluster internal data, potential for cluster disruption.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable TLS for Peer Communication: Configure etcd to use TLS for peer communication.
    • Certificate Management: Implement proper certificate management for peer TLS certificates.

Attack Surface: Weak or Misconfigured Authentication Mechanisms (High)

  • Description: Using weak passwords, default credentials, or insecure credential storage for etcd authentication.
  • etcd Contribution: etcd provides authentication mechanisms, but their security depends on user configuration and credential management.
  • Example: Using default username/password for etcd or storing credentials in plain text configuration files. Attackers gaining access can bypass authentication.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to etcd, data compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Passwords: Enforce strong password policies for etcd users.
    • Secure Credential Storage: Use secrets management systems or environment variables for storing credentials, avoid plain text storage.
    • Regular Credential Rotation: Implement a process for regularly rotating etcd credentials.

Attack Surface: Insufficient or Misconfigured Authorization (RBAC) (High)

  • Description: RBAC in etcd is not properly configured, leading to overly permissive access and potential unauthorized actions.
  • etcd Contribution: etcd offers RBAC for access control. Misconfiguration can lead to security vulnerabilities.
  • Example: Granting overly broad permissions to application roles in etcd RBAC, allowing unintended data access or modification.
  • Impact: Unauthorized data access, data modification, potential privilege escalation.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Implement RBAC based on least privilege, granting only necessary permissions.
    • Regular RBAC Review: Periodically review and audit RBAC configurations.
    • Stay Updated: Keep etcd updated to patch potential RBAC vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Lack of Data at Rest Encryption (High)

  • Description: etcd's data directory on disk is not encrypted, leaving data vulnerable to physical access.
  • etcd Contribution: etcd stores data persistently. Lack of data at rest encryption exposes data to physical access threats.
  • Example: Attackers gain physical access to an etcd server or backups and can directly read sensitive data from the unencrypted data directory.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach of all data stored in etcd.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable Data at Rest Encryption: Configure etcd to encrypt its data directory at rest.
    • Secure Backup Storage: Encrypt etcd backups and store them securely.

Attack Surface: Denial of Service (DoS) via API Abuse (High)

  • Description: Attackers overload the etcd client API with excessive requests, causing resource exhaustion and service disruption.
  • etcd Contribution: etcd's client API can be targeted for DoS if not protected.
  • Example: Attackers send a large volume of requests to the etcd API, overwhelming resources and making it unresponsive.
  • Impact: Application downtime, service disruption.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on the etcd client API.
    • Authentication and Authorization: Use authentication and authorization to limit API access.
    • Resource Monitoring and Alerting: Monitor etcd resource usage and set up alerts for potential DoS attacks.
    • Network Segmentation: Restrict access to the etcd API to trusted networks.