attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for etcd-io/etcd

Objective: Compromise Application via Etcd Exploitation (Focus on High-Risk Paths)

Attack Tree Visualization

Root: Compromise Application via Etcd Exploitation
├── 1. Exploit Etcd Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│   └── 1.1. Exploit Known Etcd CVEs [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       └── 1.1.1. Identify and Exploit Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├── 2. Exploit Etcd Configuration and Access Control Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├── 2.1. Exploit Weak or Default Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── 2.1.1. Brute-force or Guess Default/Weak Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └── 2.1.2. Exploit Missing or Weak Authentication Mechanisms [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └── 2.2. Exploit Unsecured Etcd API Access [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   ├── 2.2.1. Access Etcd API without TLS Encryption [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └── 2.2.2. Access Etcd API from Unauthorized Networks [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └── 2.3. Exploit Leaked or Exposed Etcd Credentials [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       ├── 2.3.1. Find Credentials in Application Code or Configuration Files [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       ├── 2.3.2. Find Credentials in Logs or Monitoring Systems [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       └── 2.3.3. Find Credentials in Compromised Development/Staging Environments [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├── 3. Exploit Data Manipulation and Integrity Issues in Etcd [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └── 3.1. Data Injection/Modification via Etcd [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       ├── 3.1.1. Inject Malicious Data into Etcd Keys Used by the Application [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       └── 3.1.2. Modify Critical Application Configuration in Etcd to Disrupt Functionality [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├── 4. Exploit Denial of Service (DoS) against Etcd [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └── 4.1. Resource Exhaustion Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       ├── 4.1.1. Overload Etcd with Excessive Client Requests [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│       └── 4.1.3. Exhaust Etcd Network Bandwidth [HIGH-RISK PATH]
└── 5. Exploit Application Logic Vulnerabilities via Etcd Interaction [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    └── 5.3. Lack of Input Validation on Data Retrieved from Etcd [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        └── 5.3.1. Application Blindly Trusts Data from Etcd [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Etcd Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting security flaws within the etcd software itself. This is a critical node because vulnerabilities in etcd can have widespread and severe consequences for applications relying on it.
• 1.1. Exploit Known Etcd CVEs [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
  • Attack Vector: Targeting publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs) in etcd versions that are not patched. This is a high-risk path because known vulnerabilities are well-documented and exploit code may be readily available.
    • 1.1.1. Identify and Exploit Publicly Disclosed Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • Attack Vector: Actively scanning for and exploiting known vulnerabilities in the deployed etcd version. Attackers use CVE databases and security advisories to find exploitable weaknesses.
      • Impact: Can range from information disclosure, data manipulation, denial of service, to complete compromise of the etcd cluster and potentially the application.
      • Mitigation: Implement a robust patch management process to promptly apply security updates for etcd. Regularly monitor CVE databases and etcd release notes.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Etcd Configuration and Access Control Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]

• Attack Vector: Leveraging misconfigurations or weak access controls in the etcd deployment. This is a critical node because proper configuration and access control are fundamental security pillars for etcd.
• 2.1. Exploit Weak or Default Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
  • Attack Vector: Exploiting weak or missing authentication mechanisms to gain unauthorized access to the etcd API. This is a high-risk path due to the commonality of default credentials and misconfigurations.
    • 2.1.1. Brute-force or Guess Default/Weak Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • Attack Vector: Attempting to guess or brute-force default or weak usernames and passwords if they haven't been changed from default settings.
      • Impact: Unauthorized access to etcd, allowing data manipulation, configuration changes, or denial of service.
      • Mitigation: Never use default credentials. Enforce strong password policies. Implement account lockout mechanisms.
    • 2.1.2. Exploit Missing or Weak Authentication Mechanisms [HIGH-RISK PATH]
      • Attack Vector: Exploiting deployments where authentication is disabled or uses weak methods (e.g., basic authentication without TLS).
      • Impact: Unauthenticated access to etcd, leading to full compromise.
      • Mitigation: Always enable authentication for etcd client and peer communication. Use strong authentication methods like mutual TLS.
  • 2.2. Exploit Unsecured Etcd API Access [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • Attack Vector: Accessing the etcd API over unencrypted channels or from unauthorized networks. This is a high-risk path because it directly exposes the API to potential attackers.
      • 2.2.1. Access Etcd API without TLS Encryption [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Attack Vector: Intercepting or eavesdropping on unencrypted communication with the etcd API to steal credentials or data.
        • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data, credential theft, and potential for man-in-the-middle attacks.
        • Mitigation: Always enforce TLS encryption for all etcd client and peer communication. Disable non-TLS ports if possible.
      • 2.2.2. Access Etcd API from Unauthorized Networks [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Attack Vector: Accessing the etcd API from networks that should not have access, bypassing network segmentation controls.
        • Impact: Unauthorized access to etcd from potentially compromised networks.
        • Mitigation: Implement network segmentation and firewall rules to restrict access to the etcd API to only authorized networks and clients.
  • 2.3. Exploit Leaked or Exposed Etcd Credentials [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • Attack Vector: Obtaining valid etcd credentials through various means, such as finding them in code, logs, or compromised environments. This is a high-risk path because valid credentials grant immediate and significant access.
      • 2.3.1. Find Credentials in Application Code or Configuration Files [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Attack Vector: Discovering hardcoded credentials within application source code or configuration files.
        • Impact: Direct access to etcd using the exposed credentials.
        • Mitigation: Never hardcode credentials. Use secure secret management solutions.
      • 2.3.2. Find Credentials in Logs or Monitoring Systems [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Attack Vector: Finding credentials accidentally logged in application logs or monitoring system logs.
        • Impact: Exposure of credentials through logging systems.
        • Mitigation: Avoid logging credentials. Sanitize logs to prevent accidental exposure. Secure access to logging and monitoring systems.
      • 2.3.3. Find Credentials in Compromised Development/Staging Environments [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Attack Vector: Stealing credentials from less secure development or staging environments that might have weaker security controls.
        • Impact: Compromise of production etcd using credentials leaked from less secure environments.
        • Mitigation: Maintain strong security practices across all environments. Isolate environments and use different credentials for each.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Data Manipulation and Integrity Issues in Etcd [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Manipulating data stored in etcd to compromise the application's functionality or security. This is a high-risk path because etcd data directly influences application behavior.
  • 3.1. Data Injection/Modification via Etcd [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious data or modifying existing data in etcd keys that are used by the application.
      • 3.1.1. Inject Malicious Data into Etcd Keys Used by the Application [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Attack Vector: Inserting crafted data into etcd keys to exploit vulnerabilities in the application's data processing logic.
        • Impact: Application malfunction, data corruption, injection attacks within the application.
        • Mitigation: Implement input validation and sanitization on data retrieved from etcd before using it in the application. Treat data from etcd as potentially untrusted.
      • 3.1.2. Modify Critical Application Configuration in Etcd to Disrupt Functionality [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Attack Vector: Changing critical application configuration parameters stored in etcd to disrupt the application's intended behavior.
        • Impact: Application downtime, misconfiguration, and potential security breaches due to altered settings.
        • Mitigation: Implement integrity checks on critical configuration data retrieved from etcd. Monitor for unexpected changes in configuration.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Exploit Denial of Service (DoS) against Etcd [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Overwhelming etcd with requests or exhausting its resources to cause a denial of service, impacting the application's availability. This is a high-risk path because DoS attacks can directly disrupt application services.
  • 4.1. Resource Exhaustion Attacks [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • Attack Vector: Consuming excessive etcd resources (CPU, memory, network, storage) to degrade performance or cause a crash.
      • 4.1.1. Overload Etcd with Excessive Client Requests [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Attack Vector: Flooding etcd with a large volume of client requests to overwhelm its processing capacity.
        • Impact: Etcd performance degradation, application slowdown, or complete application downtime.
        • Mitigation: Implement rate limiting and request throttling on etcd clients. Monitor etcd resource usage.
      • 4.1.3. Exhaust Etcd Network Bandwidth [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Attack Vector: Saturating the network bandwidth available to etcd, preventing legitimate communication and causing DoS.
        • Impact: Etcd cluster instability, communication failures, and application downtime.
        • Mitigation: Implement network traffic monitoring and anomaly detection. Ensure sufficient network bandwidth for etcd cluster communication.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploit Application Logic Vulnerabilities via Etcd Interaction [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the application's code that arise from how it interacts with etcd data. This is a critical node because application logic flaws are often application-specific and can be subtle.
  • 5.3. Lack of Input Validation on Data Retrieved from Etcd [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
    • Attack Vector: The application blindly trusts data retrieved from etcd without proper validation, leading to exploitable vulnerabilities. This is a high-risk path due to the common occurrence of input validation issues in applications.
      • 5.3.1. Application Blindly Trusts Data from Etcd [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Attack Vector: The application directly uses data from etcd in operations without validating or sanitizing it, leading to vulnerabilities like injection flaws, logic errors, or other unexpected behavior.
        • Impact: Wide range of application vulnerabilities, including injection attacks (SQL, command, etc.), logic flaws, and data corruption.
        • Mitigation: Always validate and sanitize data retrieved from etcd before using it in the application. Treat data from etcd as external input and apply appropriate security measures.