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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for ethereum/go-ethereum

Attack Surface: 1. Unauthorized RPC/IPC Access

  • Description: Attackers gain control of the Geth node through exposed and unprotected RPC or IPC interfaces.
  • How go-ethereum Contributes: Geth provides RPC/IPC interfaces for node management and interaction. Improper configuration exposes these interfaces.
  • Example: An attacker finds a Geth node with the HTTP-RPC interface exposed on port 8545 without authentication. They use the personal_unlockAccount method (if enabled) to unlock a wallet and then use eth_sendTransaction to transfer all funds to their own address.
  • Impact: Complete compromise of the node, including potential theft of all funds, manipulation of the blockchain state, and disruption of node operation.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never expose RPC to the public internet without strong authentication.
    • Use a firewall to restrict access to trusted IP addresses only.
    • Prefer IPC over network-based RPC when possible (more secure by design).
    • Enable only the absolutely necessary RPC methods using command-line flags (--http.api, --ws.api, --authrpc.jwtsecret).
    • Implement strong authentication mechanisms (JWT, API keys, TLS client certificates).
    • Use a reverse proxy with WAF capabilities to filter malicious requests.
    • Regularly audit the RPC configuration and access logs.

Attack Surface: 2. Malicious Peers (P2P Network Attacks)

  • Description: Attackers operate malicious nodes on the P2P network to disrupt, deceive, or isolate legitimate nodes.
  • How go-ethereum Contributes: Geth relies on a P2P network for communication and consensus. This inherently exposes the node to interactions with potentially malicious peers.
  • Example: An attacker launches an Eclipse attack, surrounding a target Geth node with malicious peers. The target node becomes isolated from the legitimate network and receives only false information, potentially leading it to accept invalid blocks or transactions.
  • Impact: Node isolation, acceptance of invalid data, denial-of-service, potential double-spending (if the node is tricked into accepting a minority chain).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use a curated list of trusted bootnodes (and hardcode their enode URLs if possible).
    • Implement peer scoring and blacklisting mechanisms (Geth has some built-in, but custom logic may be needed).
    • Limit the maximum number of connected peers.
    • Monitor peer behavior for anomalies (e.g., excessive requests, invalid data).
    • Validate data received from peers rigorously.
    • Use static peers for critical connections (peers that are always connected).
    • Regularly update Geth to benefit from the latest P2P security improvements.

Attack Surface: 3. Chain Reorganization (Reorg) Attacks

  • Description: Attackers with significant hash power (or stake) attempt to rewrite portions of the blockchain, potentially causing double-spending.
  • How go-ethereum Contributes: Geth implements the blockchain consensus mechanism, making it susceptible to reorgs if the underlying network is attacked.
  • Example: An attacker with substantial hash power secretly mines a longer chain and then publishes it, invalidating previously confirmed transactions on the shorter, public chain. This allows them to double-spend coins.
  • Impact: Double-spending, loss of funds, invalidation of transactions, loss of trust in the application.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Wait for a sufficient number of confirmations before considering a transaction final. The required number of confirmations depends on the value of the transaction and the risk tolerance.
    • Monitor for deep reorgs using Geth's events and APIs.
    • Consider using multiple, independent Geth nodes for critical confirmations.
    • Be aware of the risks associated with low-liquidity or low-hashrate chains.

Attack Surface: 4. Geth Code Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Bugs or vulnerabilities within the go-ethereum codebase itself could be exploited.
  • How go-ethereum Contributes: This is a direct risk stemming from the Geth software.
  • Example: A newly discovered remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Geth's networking layer allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable nodes.
  • Impact: Remote code execution, denial-of-service, data corruption, complete node compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical (for RCE), High (for other serious bugs)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Stay up-to-date with the latest stable Geth releases. This is the most important mitigation.
    • Monitor security advisories from the Ethereum Foundation and the Geth team.
    • Use a specific, well-tested version of Geth and avoid using development or unstable builds in production.
    • Consider contributing to Geth's security audits and bug bounty programs.
    • Implement robust monitoring and intrusion detection systems to detect and respond to potential exploits.

Attack Surface: 5. Weak Key Management (If Geth Manages Keys)

  • Description: If Geth is used to manage private keys, weak security practices can lead to key compromise.
    • How go-ethereum Contributes: Geth provides key management functionality (keystore files).
    • Example: An attacker gains access to a server running Geth and finds unencrypted keystore files or discovers a weak password protecting the keystore.
    • Impact: Complete loss of funds associated with the compromised keys.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Always use strong, unique passwords to encrypt keystore files.
      • Consider using hardware wallets or secure enclaves for key storage.
      • Never store unencrypted private keys.
      • Limit access to the server where Geth and its keystore files are stored.
      • Regularly audit key management practices.
      • Use multi-signature wallets for increased security.
      • Avoid unlocking accounts for extended periods.